A STUDY ON LIBYANS LIVING ABROAD

PROFILING OF LIBYANS LIVING ABROAD TO DEVELOP A ROADMAP FOR STRATEGIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The following executive summary provides a synopsis of the key chapters, findings, and recommendations of the Study on Libyans Living Abroad research project commissioned by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). A series of annex materials accompanying this research paper are outlined in the Table of Contents.

INTRODUCTION

The Study on Libyans Living Abroad is designed to be a flagship study to enhance the institutional and strategic management of the engagement of Libyans living abroad. The study is based upon a recognition of the emerging and innovative academic treatment of Libyans living abroad. The aim is to supplement this knowledge through a preliminary scoping of Libyans living abroad and the institutional apparatus for effective engagement of these communities. In doing so, the research concludes by advancing a series of recommendations and roadmap for the strategic engagement of Libyans living abroad. The study is designed to function as a bridge between academia and policy.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology of the study is inter-disciplinary and delivered through a mixed-method approach. It entails the engagement of primary and secondary source material through an extensive desk review of perti-

nent source material. This includes relevant government data and institutional mandates along with external documentation such as academic and policy-orientated research. This desk-review will be supplemented by direct in-market consultations with Libyan stakeholders and Libyans living abroad.

It is a phased methodological approach in line with normative standards of policy orientated research. An Inception Report was developed and approved with ICMPD colleagues. The methodology was then verified through participation at a regional conference on migration and development which resulted in the operationalization of the methodology. This culminated in the production of consultations and the V1 draft of the research. The final phase of the methodology focused on the final drafting of the research along with the delivery of a capacity development workshop agenda in line with findings of the research.

LOCAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXTS

This research paper is reflective of a growing local, regional and global interest in engagement of communities abroad. The engagement of communities living abroad is advancing as a policy of choice to deliver the developmental vision for many countries. Regionally, there has been a progressive growth in the number of engagement strategies and

policies in the sector. This research aims to enhance Libya's compatibility and competitiveness in these contexts.

The prominence of such engagement to global policy dialogues and developmental agenda has strengthened significantly over the past few years. The potential impact of communities abroad to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is beginning to feature within global development agenda, particularly in the context of Goal 10 of the SDGs. Target 10.7 of the SDGs aims to "facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies."

PROFILES OF LIBYANS LIVING ABROAD

This section of the research provides an analytical scoping of Libyans living abroad. This is rooted in a deep historiography which draws on analyses from the academic discourses on Libyans living abroad. This is layered through findings from the direct in-market consultations such as the Libyans Living Abroad Consultation Survey and a set of focus groups held for the research. Due to the ongoing methodological difficulty in accessing realistic datasets on communities living abroad, this profiling is designed as indicative rather than exhaustive with a lens to exploring the sentiments of the community abroad on the road ahead for engaging them.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Through this historiography, the research uncovers the realities of the current situation of Libyans living abroad – addressing the challenges, histories, memories and opportunities for engagement – spanning across the diverse identities at play within Libyans living abroad. This diversity is to be embraced and individual strategies can be designed to negotiate and support the varied expectations of the Libyans living abroad on their relationship with home.

The historiography follows the standardized academic categorizations and chronology of Libyan migration – the period of Gaddafi rule, role of Libyans living abroad during the events of 2011, and their role within transition in Libya. In line with the feedback from surveys, the research adds an early period to this chronology to include migration directly prior to the Gaddafi era. The survey indicates that there is still a presence of such individuals within the community abroad.

CONSTITUENCIES AND CHARACTERISTICS

The historiography untangled the complex yet rich academic assessment of Libyan migration flows and correlating creation of communities abroad by determining a set of constituencies and characteristics that help shape the profiling of the community abroad. These serve as an illustration of the evolving

1 **The Early Phase**

Constituencies:
• Elitist.

Characteristics:
• Exclusivity.

2 **The Emigrant & Exclusionary Phase**

Constituencies:
• Emigrant/Exclusionary & Exile.

Characteristics:
• Emigrant (Community of Loyalists, Next-Generation, Business).
• Exclusionary & Exile (Political, Isolation, Silence, Memory, Familial).

3 **The Engagement Phase**

Constituences:
• Distant, Mobilized, and Active.

Characteristics:
• Distant (Status Quo, Loyalists).
• Mobilized (Advocacy, Communications, Technology, Relationships, Symobolism).
• Active (Participatory, Political, Return).

4 **The Existing Phase – Transition and Unrest**

Constituencies
• Distant, Active, Mobilized.

Characteristics:
• Same as previous phase but with added uncertainty on how to collectively influence.

Figure i. Constituencies and Characteristics of Libyans Living Abroad

Authors' illustration based on historiography conducted by authors (see Chapter "Profile of Libyans Living Abroad")

dynamism of the community and its close linkages to the cultural, economic, social and political contexts of Libyan history. For example, its move from a phase of elitist driven emigration to one driven by political ideologies during the Gaddafi era. The communities abroad then experience a period of re-awakening with the events of 2011 culminating in the current status of a strong willingness to support Libya but a lack of clarity and trust on how to proceed.

The layers of constituencies and characteristics identified here are the rooted realities of the community today. It also conveys that the community is matured with complex layers that will require targeted engagement mechanisms. The strategic engagement of Libyans living abroad will need to reflect these historical realities and put in place a system to de-politicize engagement. The focus should be on community rather than politics.

DENSITY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Beyond understanding the constituencies and characteristics of Libyans living abroad through the historiography, it is essentially to provide preliminary scoping of the geographical density and demographics of the community.

Table i. Distribution (%) of Libyans Living Abroad by Level of Development and Income of Countries of Destination for Various Years, 1990–2017

Year	Most Developed (%)	Less Developed (%)	High Income Countries (%)	Middle Income Countries (%)	Low Income Countries (%)
1990	33.11	66.89	57.82	40.60	1.57
1995	36.49	63.51	61.40	36.90	1.70
2000	41.39	58.61	65.14	33.04	1.82
2005	56.21	43.79	73.62	25.32	1.05
2010	63.35	36.65	75.95	22.96	1.09
2015	54.75	45.25	65.42	33.50	1.08
2017	55.55	44.45	65.64	33.34	1.02

Source: UN DESA (2017)

The necessity of this research is based in the fact that migration of Libyan nationals is a growing industry. Given that, from a definitional perspective, the scope for our definition of Libyans living abroad can extend beyond Libyan born migrants to those with ancestral or affinity-based links to Libya, then the potential of this sector for Libya is noteworthy. For example, in 1990, it was estimated that the population of Libyans abroad was 76,071. This remained relatively stagnant through the 1990s to an estimate in 2000 of 78,811. However, an expansion occurred with growth to 98,964 (2005), 127,168 (2010), 154,534 (2015) and 158,798 (2017).

The maturing of the community abroad has simultaneously resulted in a stronger presence of Libyans living abroad in most developed countries and high-income countries. This indicates that there are strong capacities within Libyans living abroad to be engaged for the betterment of Libya. The challenge is now to channel their propensity to engage. Libyans living abroad will also be valuable repositories of social remittances, political and social cultures along with potential partner countries for Libya on the road to security and stability. This centres engagement of Libyans living abroad as a potential key contributor in the short, mid and long-term future of Libya.

PROFILE CONSULTATIONS

This section of the research focuses on the survey and focus group findings. The Libyans Living Abroad Consultation Survey was distributed digitally and facilitated through community gatekeepers within Libyans living abroad. It was available in both Arabic and English with all survey input provided anonymously. The survey was limited in reach due to ongoing issues of trust from Libyans living abroad, but it does provide an interesting snapshot on the sentiment and profile of the community abroad. Also, the survey provides instrumental analysis on the structuring of engagement from the perspective of Libyans living abroad.

Overview of Survey Findings

- 96.77% of respondents identify as Libyan (including respondents born abroad);

- 82.75% of respondents left Libya since 2000;

- 46.15% hold a Bachelor Degree, 30.777% hold a Master's Degree, 15.38% hold a PhD;

- 74.19% of respondents had not lived in another country of destination;

- 74.20% of respondents were married & 80% were married to other Libyans;

- 42.28% are in a household of 1-5 people; 37.93% in a household of 6-10 people, and 13.79% in a household of 10+ people;

- Majority of respondents do not define themselves as frequent visitors to Libya (impacted by security situation);

- 41.96% of respondents left for educational development;

- 56.62% do not sense a strong community network amongst Libyan living abroad;

- 86.36% are not part of any formal community network or organization of Libyans living abroad;

- 52.63% are willing to participate in professional activities to advance Libya;

- 95% do not regularly remit to Libya;

- 89.47% have not invested in Libya;

- Social (45%), Professional (25%) and Economic (25%) pillars are the preferred type of future relationship with Libya.

Source: Survey conducted by authors (2019)

Whilst the research paper divulges greater analysis on other profiling and sentiments of the community abroad including the identification of regional variations in the findings, the survey provides a compelling overview of who the community abroad sees as key to the systematic design and management of engagement. This is an early marker in the step from the academic to applied research focus of the project. The table below illustrates the feedback from the survey.

Table ii. Ranking by Libyans Living Abroad of the Importance of Libyan Actors for Engagement

Agency/Grouping	Ranking of Importance
Libyans Living Abroad	1
Civil Society Organizations	2
International Agencies/ Donors	3a
Ministry of Education	3b
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	3c
Ministry of Cultural Affairs	4

Source: Survey conducted by authors (2019).
1= Highest importance

The above table is an indicative composition of actors deemed instrumental to bring engagement forward. It illustrates a desire from communities abroad to be positioned as partners in the design and creation of their engagement roadmap. There is a need to build a partnership-based governance framework that reflects the sentiments of the community.

Libyans living abroad see themselves as a seminal constituency in the engagement journey. The heightened focus on civil society emphasizes the need for honest brokers in the engagement process. Essentially, these indications tell us that if the engagement process is solely governmentally led then it will not succeed.

Focus Group Synopsis
There were 3 focus groups held as part of the research process in London, Tunis and Sfax. These were identified as they provided access to a representative sample of the community abroad focusing on both the successful and vulnerable members of the community abroad. Whilst the research paper provides more in-depth analysis, the executive summary outlines common themes identified in each focus group. The aims of the focus group were to derive insight in 3 core areas: current situation, aims/needs, and priorities of Libyans living abroad. This was designed with a view to the aim of the research to enhance the institutional and strategic management of engagement of Libyans living abroad.

Within the current situation, key themes emerged such as a lack of community infrastructure, sporadic engagement, isolation from support structures, and the presence of a deep connection to Libya. In many ways, these are the building blocks from which to begin engagement. In terms of aims/needs of the community, consensus emerged on topics such as community building (for example, spaces to meet for cultural events), de-politicizing engagement, enhanced consular/embassy services, and support in creating networks for Libyans living abroad. In terms of priorities, there were slight variations depending on the composition of the audience (successful and vulnerable communities) with strong consensus on focusing engagement on: Business; Cultural Heritage; Education; Health; Networking (inter-community collaboration between different countries of destinations with Libyans living abroad); and Training (on how to build effective community infrastructure).

Libyan Institutional and Policy Framework
This section of the research paper assesses the existing policy and institutional apparatus within Libya for pursing engagement of Libyans living abroad. The ongoing fragility

of Libya's institutional apparatus limits the depth and scope of research possible, but this chapter serves as an illustrative guide on the necessary inter-institutional collaboration for engaging communities living abroad.

SETTING AN INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK – FROM MANDATE TO MECHANISM

This section of the research outlines the primary and secondary institutional apparatus that can enhance the strategic engagement of Libyans living abroad. This was based upon an assessment of the institutional mandates provided by ICMPD to the research team.

The institutional apparatus – centred through the work of the Department of Expatriate Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – were categorized as follows:

Primary Institutional Apparatus: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (particularly Department of Expatriate Affairs and Department of Consular Affairs) and Ministry of State for Migrants and the Displaced.

Secondary Institutional Apparatus: The Department of Civil Society Organizations, The Department of International Organizations, The Department of European Affairs, and The Department of International Cooperation.

At an institutional level, these apparatus and entities reflect the nuanced sectors required for engagement of Libyans living abroad and echo the governance findings from the survey. The next barrier is to embed a governance structure that can support a policy or strategy framework for engagement of Libyans living abroad given the research findings to date.

GOVERNANCE AND MECHANISM TO FACILITATE ENGAGEMENT

The governance roadmap is designed as an incremental process to simultaneously increase the capacity of Libyan stakeholders whilst nurturing community abroad confidence to work towards market readiness for engagement. The governance process is one of creation, consolidation and curation.

The creation phase is reflective that a new governance system needs to be established for the engagement of Libyans living abroad. This should be operationalized within ongoing plans around a national level coordination body on migration management as to not dilute or duplicate efforts and ensuring policy coherence across the migration portfolio in Libya. The consolidation phase is the period of market testing of the system of governance and the curation phase is the exit strategy towards a new frame of governance if the initial system proves impacts.The research document provides detailed analysis on how to work through these transitions. These phases are based upon a two-tier governance structure: Tier 1 (T1) – Executive Leadership, Tier 2 (T2) – Operational Leadership. These are institutionalized via the organogram below:
The executive tier is the internal inter-insti-

Figure ii. Institutional Tiers of Proposed Model of Engagement Governance

Authors' illustration

tutional apparatus to be built in Libya. It will focus on identifying the core organizational culture and collaboration to design engagement. Given the early stage of the engagement process, this will also be centred upon identifying the required capacity development of relevant institutions in Libya to shape impact through engagement of Libyans abroad.

The operational leadership tier is an assessment of the required technical capacity and partners to enact engagement given the attitudinal and structural barriers outlined in the historiography and profiling of the community abroad. Given the institutional landscape in Libya and the current situation of the communities abroad, Libyan stakeholders will need to adopt a multi-stakeholder partnership to effectively scale engagement of Libyans living abroad.

LAYERS OF THE ORGANOGRAM: A SHORT SYNOPSIS

This section of the research outlines a short overview of each layer of the organizational structure.

Tier 1 would be embedded via the Migration Governance Coordination Body which would be responsible for coordinating the intervention of all Libyan public institutions in charge of the migration issue. This will necessarily involve the establishment of inter-institutional agreements that would regulate and systematize all the interactions between the different institutions.

In bridging from the executive to technical layers of the governance framework, it is essential to allocate a core Libyan institution to provide that brokerage. It is recommended that the Department of Expatriate Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs execute this role. Their mandate is mostly centralized on the aims and expectations of future engagements from the perspectives of both Libya and its communities abroad.

The composition of the various entities within the organogram at Tier 2 level will need to be determined by the key stakeholders through consultation. However, the creation of a technical committee and representative body of Libyans living abroad will deepen the culture of connectivity and communication needed for effective engagement. The role of ICMPD and the Donor Relationship Management entity is in direct response to the findings of the research and they will have an instrumental role in the accountability and transparency of the engagement process. The role of Libyan stakeholders in this model is one of facilitator, not implementer.

However, at a top-tier minimum, Tier 2 it should develop an auditory body that will:

• Be led by a management council of 7-10 representatives with an elected chairperson and vice-chairperson;

• Consist of executive level leadership within their respective entities/organizations;

• Include high-level members of the Libyans living abroad; Reflect the stated cultures outlined later in this research particularly on areas of diversity, equality and inclusivity

• Act as a formal and informal "ambassador" for the engagement with Libyans living abroad;

• Advocate for financial support through partnership with donors to support the aims/activities of engagement.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CULTURE

In designing a governance roadmap and an organogram to operationalize such a vision, it is imperative to outline a core code of good practice to guide these operations.

Given the specificities of the Libyan context and histories, the engagement of Libyans living abroad is now entering a key "values-driven" phase. These values are stated in the following sections.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The organizational culture of engagement of Libyans living abroad is based on the standardized principles of engagement of communities abroad informed by ICMPD's approach and global best practice. It should be the stated aim to undertake engagement of Libyans living abroad in an accountable manner.

OPERATIONAL CULTURE

The institutional roadmap identified above has instilled a system of accountability to protect donor and community confidence in the transparency of the operational culture. Contextualizing both those components is a stated commitment by Libyan stakeholders to ensure sustainability both in terms of sourcing support and its operational output for engagement of the community abroad. Furthermore, there is a commitment to ensure that the operational output works to the sustainability of the communities it serves, respective partners and Libyans living abroad.

ENGAGEMENT BEHAVIOUR/ IMPLEMENTATION

By embedding these organizational and operational cultures, we can now outline a robust baseline of behaviour commitments from Libyan stakeholders. These are:

• To adhere to an accessible and agile model of engagement that is based on diversity, equality and inclusivity;

• To work towards ensuring that the aspirations of Libyans living abroad are heard and considered;

• To focus on ensuring community integration for Libyans living abroad and to promote their co-operation with counterparts in Libya (government and non-governmental);

• To promote digitalization and innovation in the engagement process when possible;

• To adhere to world-class standards on accountability and transparency to ensure trustworthiness of the engagement process.

The potential of such commitments is that they are a set of values and commitments. They are free; and would signify an important recognition from Libyan stakeholders on how Libyans living abroad want to be engaged by Libya.

ROADMAP: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY ENGAGING LIBYANS LIVING ABROAD

This chapter collates the findings outlined above along with the core guiding principles to answer a simple yet challenging research question:

What are the policy recommendations to enhance the institutional and strategic management of engagement of Libyans living abroad?

The harsh reality is that issues of discord and distrust mean that the job at hand is now to develop market readiness for engagement of Libyans living abroad. Whilst there are clear attitudinal, behavioural and structural barriers to engagement, immediate recommendations must focus on building blocks of engagement. This envisages a dual process of internal and external development in the first phase of the roadmap. Without these building blocks in place, it would be illogical to advance any systematic engagement activities as the infrastructure will not be strong enough to sustain such engagements.

Internal Development

- Institutional Development
- Leadership Development/Upskilling of Staff
- Policy Infrastructure
- Accessing Global Best Practice

External Development

- Network Infrastructure
- Cross–Community Collaboration
- Listening
- Governance
- DRM

Market Readiness

- Setting the Agenda
- Focus Group Findings
- Pragmatism
- Building the System

Figure iii. Road Map for Market Readiness for Engagement of Libyans Living Abroad

Authors' illustration

ROADMAP: EARLY ACTIVITIES

The internal and external development nee–ded for the first phase of the roadmap is out–lined below in more detail:

Internally, there will need to be significant–ly invest in capacity development processes and trainings along with upgrading research and development on issues of engaging communities abroad for Libyan stakehol–ders. Externally, with a lens to the commu–nity abroad and the findings of the research, Libyan stakeholders can initially begin to answer some of the aims, needs and priorities outlined in earlier sections. The governance system of the previous chapter becomes a focal point in this period. These internal and external steps are essentially designed to get the market ready for engagement of Libyans living abroad.

MARKET READINESS TO ENGAGEMENT: RISK-MANAGEMENT

In building the above system to ensure mar–ket readiness, a phased implementation programme should then be built through a robust legislative and policy standing for engagement of communities abroad. When shifting towards the operationalization of

engagement, stakeholders in Libya and its partners should ensure to curate a culture of engagement that scales through systematic process. There are a series of risk mana–gement techniques that can be built within the engagement cycle to achieve this scale in process.

The risk management of the roadmap can also be guided by international best practice on engagement of communities abroad and through an ongoing central role for ICMPD. Three key elements of risk management can be categorized as communications, trust and scale. The communication need is the huma–nistic endeavour to build connectivity and relationships between Libyan stakeholders and Libyans living abroad. A subset of this is the issue of trust. Trust is not an event; it must be earned, so Libyan stakeholders now need to enact engagements to build trust. Finally, scale is the testing moment of the market readiness process. It is simply a pro–cess to verify the earlier roadmap activities by testing engagement in softer areas of en–gagement to see whether it will work or not. It is the application of the theory.

Some of the key facets within these elements

that will work as risk management (to verify if the engagement process is working towards scale) and that can guide Libyan stakeholders are:

• **Communication:** Governance Partnership, Role of Civil Society/International Agencies & Transparency; Ongoing Consultations – Local Ownership to Libyans living abroad.

• **Trust:** Promotion of Dialogue/Forums; Advancing an Ethics of Care; Promoting Skills Transfer.

• **Scale:** Involve Libyans living abroad in advocacy programmes; promote social development partnerships between Libyan stakeholders and Libyans living abroad; develop a culture of philanthropy within Libyans living abroad.

VISUALIZING THE ROADMAP

The overall assessment of this research paper is that there needs to be a systematic

Figure iv. Policy Road Map for Engagement of Libyans Living Abroad

Authors' illustration

design of a multi-year roadmap for engagement of Libyans living abroad. This roadmap is cyclic and cumulative in nature. This is visualized below:

This roadmap caters for the findings drawn across the various chapters of the research. It allows for respecting the histories of the Libyans living abroad in line with their testimonies that shaped earlier chapters of the research. It sets in motion a process-driven approach to ensure that the aims, concerns, and needs of both Libyan stakeholders and Libyans living abroad can be met in a meaningful way.

Strand 1 works on the creation of the necessary institutional apparatus within Libya and the community abroad. It then enacts the governance framework; this requires budget and expertise. This will see significant upskilling of the stakeholders in Libya necessary to enact engagement – governmental and non-governmental.

Strand 2 focuses on supporting the Libyans living abroad. It caters for the communication and community-based needs identified through the research project. It will act as a proof of commitment by Libyan stakeholders to the engagement process. It gives to Libyans living abroad before asking them to give.

Strand 3 focuses on the facilitation of human capital exchange from Libyans living abroad back to Libya. These interventions are low risk and can nurture the critical trust to scale later engagements in line with the analysis of the previous section.

Strand 4 envisions transition projects from human capital to economic development programmes. The role of Libyans living abroad in the economic development of Libya will not happen instantaneously. Given the expectations on expenditure of donor and public funds, the roadmap should have a stand-alone strand on monitoring and evaluation. This should execute world-class compliance with issues of accountability, re-

porting and transparency as noted earlier.

CONCLUSION

This research paper has, at its core, an aim to contribute to the growing academic and practitioner assessments of Libyans living abroad. The communities of Libyans li–ving abroad are a complex tapestry that are shaped by the many histories, memories and stories that have sparked their creation.

The research has worked to reflect the voices and realities of Libyans living abroad. It has strived to put in place recommendations that are achievable and realistic for all involved. Through building relationships of meaning rather than transactions, then this research recommends that Libya can set in motion a spirit of partnership and trust that can bring a new emphasis for engagement of Libyans living abroad. This will require honesty and patience from all involved. It is achievable together.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

"The Libyan diaspora, a repository of enormous talent, remains largely untapped. While a few have returned, little can be done until the warring sides decide they want to share the country."[1]

The observation in the Financial Times editorial that the Libyan diaspora represents a repository of enormous talent pinpoints the necessity of this study along with future knowledge creation relating to Libyans living abroad. However, the challenge remains in designing and shaping a research field that can shift beyond the complex analytic base of academic treatise to a more operationally bound research endgame.

The purpose of such an endgame should be to provide the necessary capacity and opportunity for Libyan stakeholders and their communities abroad to build meaningful mechanisms for collaboration. This research is designed to initiate that process and provide a guide on the road ahead for engagement of Libyans living abroad.

The validity and value of the academic treatment of Libyans living abroad is still in its infancy but is displaying signs of increased significance. Therefore, the endeavour to link academic to applied research in the context of Libyans living abroad is a rich source of new analytical enquiry. To merge the theoretical methodologies underpinning such academic work with an operational research agenda can be a powerful aggregator and contributor to channelling new resources to stakeholders in Libya and its communities abroad to create a new paradigm of engagement.

The work ahead – including this research – should remain focused on tackling the *"marginalization of the Libyan diaspora."*[2] The question therefore now is a simple one – where do we begin to narrow this marginalization? This study begins with understanding the unique historical and political evolutions within Libya that have come to define how Libyans living abroad came into being.

Through our methodology, the study then provides some proprietary scoping on the current situation of Libyans living abroad. Given ongoing sensitivities among Libyans living abroad, stemming from these historical and political precursors of its community formations, this scoping is indicative rather than exhaustive. The aim of this research is to look internally in Libya and externally from the perspective of its communities abroad and identify an achievable body of work to incubate engagement.

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1 'Libya needs help to step back from the brink.' Financial Times, January 19, 2015.
2 Peter Seeberg. "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes. The role of the Libyan diaspora from Qadhafi's Jamahiriyya to post-revolutionary civil war and state collapse." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, e-publication (print forthcoming).

The research remains acutely aware of the sensitivities of the subject matter of this study. In response to these sensitivities, the research will work towards making robust assertions on the core constituencies and characteristics of the community abroad. This works to include the voices of the community abroad.

The study then shifts towards assessing an ever fluid institutional landscape in Libya for engagement of communities abroad. The research concludes with an assessment of some of the core organizational and operational steps that can be taken to bring engagement forward. This process will be contingent on a process of listening to Libyans living abroad and understanding their aims, concerns, and hopes for their relationship with home. Finally, the study provides a strategic roadmap to bring engagement to market in a cyclic, incremental process.

METHODOLOGY

As noted in the Terms of Reference (ToRs) for this research project, the research "will mainly be of qualitative nature" due "to the scarcity of data" available.[3] This study is in direct response to such data, knowledge and operational gaps. The methodology of the study is inter-disciplinary and delivered through a mixed-method approach. The methodology had 3 core phases outlined below. (Figure 1)

The methodology entailed the engagement of primary and secondary source material through an extensive desk review of pertinent source material. This includes relevant government data and institutional frameworks along with external documentation such as academic and policy-orientated research. Established and verified sources of data relating to migration were also engaged.

This desk-review was supplemented by direct in-market consultations with Libyan stakeholders and Libyans living abroad. Through collating the findings of the desk review and consultation sessions, the study developed a robust baseline assessment that enabled the production of achievable recommendations for enhancing the strategic and institutional management of engagement of Libyans living abroad.

PRIMARY TOOLS: SURVEY, INTERVIEW GUIDE AND WORKSHOPS

The core analytical tools utilized for the study reflect the tools best matched to the methodology outlined earlier. They included closed and structured questionnaires, personal interviews and workshops.

The survey was structured to garner indicative insight into the expected knowledge outcomes of the study including the establishment of profile indicators on Libyans living abroad, assessment of the current institutional and policy instruments to better engage Libyans living abroad, and garnering recommendations on potential mechanisms to engage Libyans abroad. It was made available in Arabic and English. The survey was delivered digitally through key distribution channels via partners such as ICMPD and key community gatekeepers within Libyans living abroad.

The validity of the analysis and insights garnered here was safeguarded through a commitment of anonymity for the respondent. The added value of this study for ICMPD and stakeholders is rooted in its ability to be independent. The methodology ensured this independence.

The focus group tool was designed to ensure interactive approaches and provide a hybrid of analytical tools to build robustness into the drafting mechanism for the study. It again ensured anonymity of all input. The focus groups were based upon a triangu-

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3 ICMPD. "Study on Libyans Living Abroad: Terms of Reference." Tunis, 2019.

lated model of presentations, groupwork and roundtable discussions.

A methodological note of significance is that such consultation should continue beyond the life cycle of this research project. It was clear from the outreach process that there remains significant credibility and trust issues among Libyans living abroad in sharing their data and insights with official stakeholders in Libya. Addressing such issues will take time and must be rooted in processes of continued dialogue.

LOCAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXT

This research paper is reflective of a growing local, regional and global interest in engagement of communities abroad. The engagement of communities living abroad is advancing as a policy of choice to deliver the developmental vision for many countries. Regionally, there has been a progressive growth in the number of engagement strategies and policies in the sector. This research project is designed to ensure that Libya and its communities abroad are embedded into this growth. At the global level, the engagement of communities abroad has never been in a stronger position. The prominence of such engagement to global policy dialogues and the developmental agenda has strengthened significantly over the past few years. Key signature gatherings such as Global Forum on Migration and Development, Global Diaspora Forum, and High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development have all identified this form of engagement as a key contributor to effective development. Similarly, the potential impact of communities abroad to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is beginning to feature within global development agenda, particularly in the context of Goal 10 of the SDGs. Target 10.7 of the SDGs aims to:

"*Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.*"[4]

Figure 1. Key Deliverables of Methodology

Authors' illustration

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4 United Nations. 2030 Agenda for sustainable Development. New York. The Global Indicator Framework for the SDGs was adopted in 2017.

PROFILE
OF LIBYANS
LIVING ABROAD

PROFILE OF LIBYANS LIVING ABROAD

This chapter is focused upon extrapolating key insights and trends on the profile of Libyans living abroad. Due to the ongoing methodological difficulty in accessing realistic datasets on communities living abroad, this profiling is designed as indicative rather than exhaustive. As noted earlier, the engagement of Libyans living abroad will require substantive continuation of consultations and listening exercises with the community abroad. It will also require a deepening of the community infrastructure of organizations within countries of destination to acquire a more robust understanding of the community.

In this section of the research, the study contributes to existing understanding on the subject matter by providing a deep historical analysis which can unearth characteristics and constituencies within Libyans living abroad. This layering of knowledge will enable Libyan stakeholders and communities abroad to design segmented interventions for engagement.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

This historiography of Libyans living abroad is designed to explore elementary insight on the constituencies and characteristics of Libyans living abroad. These insights will inform an improved system of institutionalization at home and abroad led both for and by Libyans living abroad.

Through this historiography, the study works to uncover the realities of the current situation of Libyans living abroad – addressing the challenges, histories, memories and opportunities for engagement – spanning across the diverse identities at play within Libyans living abroad. This diversity is to be embraced and individual strategies can be designed to negotiate and support the varied expectations of the Libyans living abroad on their relationship with home.

Concessions and negotiations will need to be nurtured but the indications are that there is an emergent and vibrant sense of Libya-ness at work within the Libyans living abroad. As Baser and Halperin note:

"*Without doubt, diasporas are heterogeneous entities. Various groups within a diaspora community might have different needs, experience and agendas about future actions. Therefore, within a diaspora community one can observe diverse organizational patterns, interests and identity formations. Their mobilization patterns and diasporic agenda is also very much dependent on the political, social and economic opportunity structures that they encounter in their country of residence.*"[1]

Libya's recent history means that this cultural, identity and societal bond is strengthening. It means that the for engagement of the Libyans living abroad is now."

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1 Bahar Baser & Amira Halperin. "Diasporas from the Middle East: Displacement, Transnational Identities and Homeland Politics." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 46, Issue 2, 2019.

This density of the communal binds has been described as "*crystallized in a sense of groupness based on a powerfully imagined and strongly felt commonality and relational connectedness.*"[2] In the Libyan frame, however, research must move slowly through the complexity of how these communities were formed. This historiography is rooted in the infancy of interest in the subject matter. As one recent analysis noted, the historical understanding of Libyans living abroad is a "*a subject so far remained unexplored.*"[3]

Therefore, this research is adding new knowledge to the emerging discourses on Libyans living abroad. It is offered as an operationally focused addition to the landscape as our vision beyond this work is to enact engagement rather than adopt a discursive or descriptive approach to the topic. The contextual and data grounding that these combined sources offer will enable us to narrow the dominant pitfall of diaspora studies and diaspora engagement as described by Toloyan in his pre-eminent framing of the past, present and promise of diaspora studies. He argues:

"*homeland governments and international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF have quite clumsily sought to develop means to attract more investment and remittances, sell bonds to the diaspora, and generally direct the political and economic capital of diasporas.*"[4]

Put simply, this study needs to set the basis to avoid accusations of clumsiness. His in-

sightful appreciation of the various binaries that drive diaspora studies also brings us to a harsh reality for this study.[5]

Binaries will not suffice in untangling the complex constituencies and characteristics that comprise the communities of Libyans living abroad. It has been noted that there is "*a highly complex historical evolution of long-distance nationalism among Libyans abroad.*"[6] This brings us to important considerations on framing and terminology that inform this research.

A NOTE OF FRAMING AND TERMINOLOGY

Within the emerging discourses on the histories of Libyans living abroad, there is a logical consensus on the historical framing to analyse the subject matter. The pre-eminent framing has been to determine the chronology within 3 phases – the period of Gaddafi rule, role of Libyans living abroad during the events of 2011, and their role within transition in Libya.

This provides a logical base for this historiography also as it will enable us to enrich our research through the relative sourcing within the academic field. This study adds a short analysis on the immediate pre-Gaddafi era as the seeds of the Libyan communities abroad – however limited in numbers – were sown here and Libyans born in that era remain represented in our survey dataset.

A more complicated issue remains with terminology. This study adopts a more divergent approach from the consensus due to a variety of factors. Within the existing li-

2 Alice Alunni. "Long-distance nationalism and belonging in the Libyan diaspora (1969–2011)." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 46, Issue 2, 2019.
3 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."
4 Khachig Tololyan. Diaspora Studies: Past, Present and Promise. IMI, Oxford, 2012.

5 Tololyan outlines a series of binaries that lack the nuances to fully achieve the promise of diaspora engagement. For more information, see Tololyan, Diaspora Studies.
6 Baser and Halperin. "Diasporas from the Middle East."

terature, the use of diaspora as the central concept makes sense as it positions the research within a specific set of inter-disciplinary fields including humanities, human geography, international relations and political science. However, with our lens on functional research, we adopt the terminology of "Libyans living abroad" as a mechanism to de-sensitive the terminology and strive towards a diverse, equal and inclusive framing. This also recognizes the historical complexities and connotations that diaspora has within certain geo-political contexts.

For example, in any engagement activities, no one person's sense of Libya-ness should overcome another's. The power of these forms of engagements quite often comes through de-politicising the engagement process. As seen in later sections of this research, this process of de-politicising is a core recommendation from Libyans living abroad. In later sections of this historiography, the use of diaspora will be limited to the direct usage of the term within the relevant and referenced literature.

Another note of de-sensitizing the discourse comes around the predominant descriptive framing of the events in 2011. This research, with its focus on operationally bound outcomes, strategically refers to the events of 2011 instead of embedding these events as a revolution or uprising. The use of the latter terminology will only be utilised when directly adopted from referenced material. The operational aims in designing profiles and roadmaps is to remain independent.

Similarly, the analytical and conceptual bases driving much of the academic literature will have less significance in an operational research scope. For example, much of the existing literature pivots through concepts such as constructivism, globalization, transnationalism and a vast array of complex acade-

mic considerations.[7] These considerations contain an important currency within the academic realm and greatly enrich our understanding of the subject matter. However, within the scope of this research, the study will need to simplify the framing to make it actionable.

The historiographical literature pinpoints a nuanced diversity within the Libyan communities abroad due to the varied contexts of its creation. The study, therefore, aligns with Mandaville and Lyon's approach of disaggregating communities abroad to explore these nuances.[8] In establishing constituencies of Libyans living abroad, the study then looks at the characteristics of each constituency through the prism of assessing how these characteristics (how they functioned, evolved and now stand) may be able to guide on enhancing the strategic and institutional management of engaging Libyans living abroad.

CONSTITUENCIES AND CHARACTERISTICS

The deep history of Libya is too expansive for this study to consider given its focus on potential engagement mechanisms. As noted above, the study identifies 4 key phases of Libyan history relative to the current standing of Libyans living abroad. In assessing the constituencies and characteristics of the community abroad during these phases, the study accesses instructive profile indicators via a situational analysis of Libyans living abroad.

PHASE ONE: THE EARLY PHASE

The constituencies and characteristics of this

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7 The aim of this study is to not engage in the academic complexities of diaspora studies. It is more applied in focus but a fuller bibliography on diaspora studies can be provided if requested.

8 Terence Lyons and Peter Mandaville. Diasporas in Global Politics. George Mason University, Centre for Global Studies, Policy Brief, 2010.

era are a minor influencer given the unique composition of Libyan migration in the era. It was noted by a partner on this research that the desire to emigrate in Libya is not too common.[9] This is confirmed from various historical analyses of emigration from Libya as being determined by drivers of migration such as elitism or "persecution."[10] The data – outlined in the concluding sections of this report – indicates this. Therefore, the era preceding the Gaddafi era is marked by an "*early Libyan diaspora consisting of the remnants of the monarchy and the elite around it.*"[11]

Constituencies

The early phase is determined through a pattern of moving abroad that was exclusive and elitist tied into the monarchical leadership at the time. The constituency of this era was formed of "*the growing Libyan diaspora (...) of officers from the army, who during the revolution might have been close to Qadhafi and participated in the revolt against the monarchy, but later were out-manoeuvred by Qadhafi.*"[12] This shaped the constituency as a hybrid mix of elites and officers which lay the basis of the community abroad. This witnessed a myriad of influxes in the next phases due to the aggressive policies of the Gaddafi era.

Characteristics

The early phase characteristics echoed its constituencies. Emigration was primarily

the domain of elites and exiles where "*in the 1960s (...) the [Arab] diasporic and migrant mobilizations were organized by party elites.*"[13] This composition brought some early indication of the characteristics that would come to define later phases of the Libyans living abroad. The politicization of the process, the exclusionary position of the community and the associated complexities of this existence all lay the foundation for the creation and function of Libyans living abroad in the next phase.

PHASE TWO: THE EMIGRANT & EXCLUSIONARY/EXILE PHASE

The analysis of phase one is contextual and introductory. Communities of Libyans living abroad came to experience a fundamentally realigned existence during the Gaddafi era. Within the literature, this era is positioned as the precursor to explaining how the Libyans living abroad negotiated various affinities, agency, and authenticities.

There is an emerging analytical base that explores key issues of contest within the Libyans living abroad such as isolation, memory and silence. Within this historiography, it is important to probe at these characteristics to give understanding of the longevity of these issues and how they will influence the road ahead for engagement.

Furthermore, the literature has entered the discourse into fresh conceptual frames to define this era. Moss' work on transnational repression is a prime example of this and will be discussed in more detail later.[14] Therefore, the study can identify a certain series

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9 Input from Stakeholder Consultation.
10 The theme of exile and persecution runs across many of the academic analyses of early Libyan migration trends including the work of Alunni, Seeberg and others.
11 Dirk Vandewalle. A history of modern Libya. Cambridge/New York, 2006. Quoted in Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."
12 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."

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13 Claire Beaugrand and Vincent Geisser. "Social Mobilization and Political Participation in the Diaspora During the "Arab Spring". Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2016.
14 Dana M. Moss. "Transnational Repression, Diaspora Mobilization and the Case of the Arab Spring." Social Problems, Volume 63, Issue 4, 2016.

of constituencies within this phase that lead to a foundational set of characteristics that retain influence on the profile of the community today.

Constituencies

The Gaddafi era can be broadly defined as a period where Libyans living abroad consisted of three constituencies. Firstly, the mainstream emigrant population constituted loyalists of the Gaddafi regime – usually positioned in official posts abroad, next-generation Libyans living abroad (particularly students and children of Libyans living abroad), and businessmen.

These constituencies were supplemented by those Libyans living abroad who were in exile and living – in part – an exclusionary existence in terms of their relationships with Libya. The constituencies combined develop a suite of characteristics that still exert influence on the composition and operations of Libyans living abroad today.

Before engaging in a deeper analysis of these characteristics, it is important to provide a short historical narrative of key events during this period that come to verify these categorizations of constituencies. The narrative offered here is not exhaustive and the academic literature (illustrated in accompanying bibliography) provides a more detailed assessment.

The rise to power of Gaddafi and subsequent actions came to define this phase of Libyans living abroad. As one commentator notes, "*The Libyan diaspora in its pre-2011 configuration emerged from the political, economic and cultural revolution imposed on the Libyan people by the regime of Muammar Gaddafi.*"[15] The imposition framework utilized in this assessment quickly conveys the

emergence of the exclusionary and exile framing above.

The presence of a community of loyalists abroad is also signposted in the work of Alunni who astutely conveys the constituencies at work within Libyans living abroad in determining that her "*article does not address the community of loyalists in the diaspora before or after 2011 or that of economic migrants per se but rather focuses on the active diaspora participants who engaged at some level with politics or civil society before and during 2011.*"[16] In this description, the layering of the community abroad emerges into focus.

During the 1970s, Gaddafi's imposition of a "political, economic and cultural revolution" resulted in a significant reworking of the communities of Libyans living abroad. The Libyans living abroad consisted of "*political dissidents across the entire political spectrum and citizens from different socio-economic backgrounds such as students in higher education, businessmen and professionals.*"[17] At the end of the 1970s, "*around 100,000 Libyans well educated and with degrees from western universities had left the country out of a population of about three million.*"[18]

These estimates may be below the actual figures with local stakeholders indicating that during this period; much larger numbers of government scholarships were also offered.[19]

The emergence of oil revenues in the early

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15 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."

16 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."
17 Vandewalle. A history of modern Libya. Cambridge/New York, 2006. Quoted in Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."
18 Vandewalle. A history of modern Libya, quoted along with World Bank Population data in Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."
19 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

1970s had also resulted in the ability to "eliminate" the private sector meaning that "*several businessmen and doctors relocated to Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Europe and the USA.*"[20] The economic sanctions of the 1980s along with an aggressive potential and reality of reprisal for dissent brought new contestations within the Libyans living abroad. The sanctions "*led to reluctance from the side of international investors to work in Libya and added to the marginalization of the Libyan diaspora by making it more difficult for the exiles to maintain their economic interests in their home country.*"[21]

Given that the communities abroad were borne out of exclusion and exile with a component of emigrant constituencies, the community began to turn inward. Moss' perspective on transnational repression is a useful descriptor of the 1980s and 1990s within the Libyans living abroad.

Moss describes transnational repression as referring to "*political processes under Qadhafi where a diaspora population cannot escape the authoritarian character of their home country.*"[22] Key features include "*fear of return, but also for instance fear of reprisals against relatives left behind in Libya.*"[23] She also advances the notion of proxy punishment where regimes punish or threaten

family members at home.[24] As she notes, "*at least 25 assassinations of exiled Libyans were ordered between 1980 and 1987, 10 of which were carried out in the UK in 1984–85.*"[25]

The experiential nature of such transnational repression opens important considerations on the real and lasting communal impacts that emanates from such a process. With a lens towards engagement, these lived realities will need to be discussed, embraced and negotiated. Of importance here is the issue of memory – particularly the collective memory – of Libyans living abroad. It can be projected that a softer public diplomacy will need to occur to nurture trust with Libyans living abroad.

Moving into the early 2000s and with movements from Gaddafi to open a more embracing relationship with the West, emanating from a reduction in sanctions due to co-operation with key legacy issues such as the Lockerbie bombing, Libyans living abroad begin to unearth organic and constructed developments. The organic developments began to emerge through the second and third generation of the communities abroad. It is noted that isolated, "*small networks of second-generation exiled youths worked to reinvigorate anti-regime opposition in the mid- to late-2000s.*"[26]

The more constructed avenues of engagement came from an attempt to formalize outreach to Libyans living abroad through a son of Gaddafi. Given the complex contestations of ideology and nationalism at play within the communities abroad, along with the

20 Azza Maghur. Highly-skilled Migration (Libya)—Legal aspects. CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes 2010/31, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, quoted in Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."
21 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."
22 Moss, "Transnational Repression, Diaspora Mobilization."
23 Moss, "Transnational Repression, Diaspora Mobilization."

24 Moss, "Transnational Repression, Diaspora Mobilization."
25 Moss, "Transnational Repression, Diaspora Mobilization."
26 Moss, "Transnational Repression, Diaspora Mobilization."

lack of strategic focus for the outreach from Libyan stakeholders, this engagement lacked the capacity to succeed.

The ongoing vacuum of trust in Libyan communities abroad derived from the processes that created the communities arguably remained a powerful deterrent to engagement efforts. The implementation of such engagement and attempts of reconciliation is best evaluated through the delivery of a government scholarship programme. It was assessed that "*the young Libyans who did take advantage of a newly instituted government scholarship programme for overseas study in the mid-2000s were often children of regime loyalists.*"[27] Put simply, the heterogeneity of Libyan communities abroad was now a reality.

By the end of the 2000s, deep-rooted constituencies were formed within the Libyans living abroad. It was a period marked with dissent, discord and disputation. The next phase of the story – the events of 2011 – earmarked a transformative moment for Libyans living abroad where they came to redefine their role at home and abroad. Before assessing this period, we can build upon the preliminary characteristics outlined in the preceding analysis to develop insight on the characteristics that would simultaneously deter and empower the role of Libyans living abroad in Libya from 2011 onwards.

Characteristics
In the previous analysis on constituencies, the study has laid the roadmap to some of the core characteristics within Libyans living abroad during this phase of Libya's history. It has identified features such as community

composition (exclusion/exile) along with additional layers such as academic, business and next-generation segments within the community. The analysis has initiated discussion on the communal impact framings such as dissent had on the community where a game of zero-sum tribalism came to define the landscape with competing ideologies at work.

The research can now deepen the analysis to explore the impacts of these issues into how the communities abroad functioned and what Libyan stakeholders may have to keep in mind for future engagement activities. By doing so, the research can begin to scope out some of the formal and informal dynamics within the profile of community abroad and its impact on their relationship with Libya. It would be too difficult to ascribe a chronological order to these features to match the historical developments of Libya as many of these features are fluid. They are situated within the complex theories on how emigrant communities' function in a global context whether rooted in trans-nationalist or other conceptual frames.

This phase brought to the fore a characteristic that remains a determinant in any future likelihood of success in engaging Libyans living abroad. Gaddafi's authoritarian leadership hindered the development of a reliable and robust institutional apparatus in Libya. Recent work has begun to create such a framework and this research concludes with a roadmap to further institutionalize engagement through a strategic process.

Moving from such systems with the influence of exile and exclusion, Libyans living abroad repeatedly struggled to create a viable institutional apparatus abroad to empower potential involvement back home. As Seeberg asserts, "*these realities also contributed to limited success in establishing a network and/or organisations within the diaspora – in combination with the earlier mentioned*

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27 Mieczysław P. Boduszynski. "The external dimension of Libya's troubled transition: the international community and 'democratic knowledge' transfer." The Journal of North African Studies, Volume 20, Issue 5, 2015.

attempts at keeping a low profile while in exile."[28]

This "low-profile" or isolation posited certain long-lasting characteristics upon the community such as isolation and silence. The isolationist tendencies of the communities abroad resulted in a specific set of community formations. It is here that the literature reverts to binaries – determined as a problematic framework for assessment earlier – such as "political and apolitical" along with "the other between first generation migrants and 1.5/second generation migrants," to explore the community abroad.[29] Examples are provided of how communities of *"political exiles tended to be small in size, geographically concentrated around few main cities—for example, London, Manchester and Lexington (Kentucky, USA)—and mostly isolated from the a-political communities(…) Unable to return but always longing to return, members of the political opposition in exile and their families tended to congregate among themselves and to build closed communities with minimal interaction beyond the trusted political networks."*[30]

It is argued that, apolitical communities – *"composed of individuals who left Libya in search of better education and work opportunities"* – leveraged different forms of associational approaches relying on *"networks around family and friendships previously established in Libya with minimal interactions*

with the political opposition."[31] Whilst useful precursors, this research will need to work beyond such binaries to compose a mosaic of community activities to develop realistic engagement platforms. This will be centred on active segmentation of the community abroad to match the right people with the right purpose.[32]

It has been argued that *"the lack of a political culture attached to functioning state institutions also had consequences for the possibilities of the diaspora attempting to influence how the Libyan state and society should develop after the fall of Qadhafi."*[33] This was another characteristic stemming from the exclusionary nature of exile. When coupled with the ideological basis of many attempts at communal organization abroad during this period, the lack of a community infrastructure at an institutional level remains a barrier to progress in engagement. In later sections of the study, the testimonies of Libyans living abroad echo this point.

However, in the latter stages of this phase, there seems to be a promising development within the landscapes of civil society and next-generation involvement in the potential to develop a community institutional infrastructure. One commentator contends that the decade of 2000s, *"left a legacy of political and civil society networks within the diaspora, between the diaspora and the civil rights movement in Libya, as well as online,*

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28 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."

29 Asher and Emerson Case. "A generation in transition: A study of the usage and attitudes toward public libraries by generation 1.5 composition students." Reference & User Services Quarterly, Volume 47, No. 3, 2008, quoted in Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."

30 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."

31 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."

32 Kingsley Aikins and Martin Russell. The Networking Institute's Diaspora Engagement Training Programme. Dublin, 2019. For a more detailed overview see, Kingsley Aikins and Nicola, White. Global Diaspora Strategies Toolkit. The Networking Institute, Dublin, 2011.

33 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."

that were mobilized in 2011."[34] Others note that this phase ended with the creation of an "incipient civil society."[35]

This promising growth is a unique opportunity for engagement through this research and beyond. The negotiations of various forms of Libya-ness and its associated nuances of authenticities, legacies and memories will need to rely on key interlocutors such as civil society to bring Libyan stakeholders and Libyans living abroad together. It is also important to invest in this as a long-term process where key enablers of engagement such as listening, and networking, can be curated to create a sense of collaboration, ownership and trust between the main agents involved.

An additional stream of support may be emerging through the cycle of next-generation ties emerging towards the end of this phase of the historiography. Utilizing Alunni's concept of a "diasporic public space" these early changemakers within Libyans living abroad point towards the potential of embedding a more inclusive approach to the concept. She notes that this phase was marked by "mistrust and suspiciousness among Libyans abroad" resulting in:

"(...) relatively isolated and small networks of people tied by political ideology and/or kinship. This prevented the establishment of a diasporic public space where all Libyans could come together in the host countries to openly and freely 'imagine' their nation and discuss its characters collectively, something that should be facilitated by the experience of migration and the ability to communicate more easily and freely(...)"[36]

The cultural negotiation of identity particularly through children and off-spring of Libyans living abroad may indicate a useful template for such spaces. In an emotive analysis, Barley and Merchant provide a compelling assessment of how identity amongst children in Libyan communities abroad operated in public spaces. They contend that "more attention needs to be paid to the diverse social and cultural issues that pattern childhood and the communication economy in which they are embedded," and in, "new and emerging patterns of migration, coupled with the increased diversity and availability of new media, challenge existing definitions of community."[37]

The issue during this phase was that Libyans living abroad worked in "closed" communities relying on family mostly for such networks.[38] The onset of new media in this phase of the historiography led to a partial re-awakening of Libyans living abroad where next generation members of Libyans living abroad embraced a new appetite for risk. This would become a defining feature of the next phase of the historiography and opens new scope for potential engagement. The lack of such tools contributed to the limited community building earlier in this phase. Old media tools such as "a radio programme and bi-monthly newspaper remained limited in their ability to reach Libyans across the world and inside the country," during this phase.[39]

In the mid-2000s, the National Conference

34 Claudia Gazzini. "Talking back: Exiled Libyans use the Web to push for change." Arab Media & Society, March 2, 2007, quoted in Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."
35 Boduszynski, "The external dimension of Libya's troubled transition."

36 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."
37 Ruth Barley and Guy Merchant. "'The naughty person': Exploring dynamic aspects of identity and children's discourses before and during the Libyan Uprising." Childhood, Volume 23, Issue 4, 2016.
38 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."
39 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."

for the Libyan Opposition in London brought to the fore how new media technologies could either enrich engagement or entrench divides developed within the communities abroad. The conference was described as "*a good combination of smart use of old diasporic non-Islamist political networks, new technologies, the media and the regime's inability to entirely control those,*" to develop new narratives on the future of Libya at the time.[40] A quiet battle remains within Libyans living abroad on who should lead the narrative on Libya's future.

The centrality of smart power to such endeavours provides a useful reference framework for future engagement capacities for Libyan stakeholders. Smart power is defined as "people to people" power and is an evolution from the leading work of Nye in areas of soft power and diplomatic capital. Another central innovator of smart power is Anne-Marie Slaughter who argues that we are now living in the networked age where "*the measure of your power is your connectedness.*"[41]

This is important in creating the agency to enact future engagement and safeguard its relevance within Libya. With the mandating of the Department of Expatriate Affairs, there is now an opportunity to position engagement of Libyans living abroad as a key pillar of Libyan foreign policy. This will endear such foreign policy to evolving connotations of smart power.[42]

This form of policy is low-cost foreign policy and on the rise. As Adamson notes:

"*It is not surprising that increasingly many states are seeking to secure a political advantage by engaging with or managing 'their' diaspora. In a globalized world, this gives states an additional source of power and a sphere of influence that extends beyond the physical borders of the nation. Once shunned or ignored by policy makers, many diasporas are now viewed by state actors as potential sources of revenue and investment, as lobby groups for promoting state interests abroad, or as ambassadors that can facilitate bilateral trading relationships.*"[43]

This phase ended with an entrenched limitation within the communities abroad along with a few sparks of renewed creativity and energy as showcased above. Overall, it can be positioned that despite the rich commercial, cultural and educational tapestry within the community abroad, Gaddafi's era had diminished the potential to develop a community network to let it flourish.

Despite the diminished potential, several efforts in key destination countries such as the UK and US were seen to develop community entities. Whilst communal division and lack of organizational capacity resulted in limited impact, there is scope for this research to re-invigorate such efforts. This will be an elementary first step in ensuring market readiness for strategic engagement of Libyans living abroad. Effectively engaging communities living abroad is dependent on the presence of a strong community network of those living abroad. Otherwise, engagement becomes ad hoc and sporadic.

The community was described as "*weak and incoherent*" where "*mistrust and the persecution of the diaspora by agents from the*

40 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."

41 Joseph S. Nye Jnr. "Smart Power. " The Huffington Post, November 29, 2007.

42 Anne-Marie Slaughter. "America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century." Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, Vol 88, Issue 1, 2009.

43 Fiona B. Adamson. "The Growing Importance of Diaspora Politics." Current History, November, 2016.

Libyan regime can at least partly explain the missing transnational network between the different diasporic communities, resulting in a lack of frequent communication, a limited number of diasporic organizations, media, etc."[44] However, the historiography was to be influenced by a phase that brought a true revitalization of Libyans living abroad – with various consequences.

With the fall of Gaddafi, the "*revolution de facto brought to the forefront of Libyan politics the Libyan diaspora raising questions about its role, nature and the processes through which it came into being before 2011."*[45] Or as Brand articulately posits:

"*The fall or overthrow of authoritarian leaders has opened up institutional and identity horizons that have previously been blocked or circumscribed. In this context, a range of civil society actors, both in-country and abroad, at times encouraged or supported by external actors, has taken the initiative to further expand the practices of citizenship and the institutionalized boundaries of national identity."*[46]

PHASE THREE: THE ENGAGEMENT PHASE – EVENTS OF 2011

Around the world, the Libyan diaspora took to the streets to call for Gaddafi's downfall. For many, this was the first form of political protest that they had taken part in.[47]

The events of 2011 in Libya marked a watershed moment for Libyans living abroad. It culminated in a series of emotive, philosophical and psychological decisions for many of those living abroad. Whilst the previous era was defined by isolation and silence, this period brought a new paradigm for potential engagement. This paradigm was embraced on various levels by Libyans living abroad.

Some struggled to operate beyond the normalized frame of isolation and remained distant. Others embraced the moment to encourage a period of mobilization. Whilst, finally, a certain cohort became actual and active determinants in the immediate future of Libya. As one analyst notes, "*The year 2011 became a year in which the diaspora gained influence on the political development in Libya. With the Libyan revolution, the political conditions changed and made it possible for the Libyan diaspora to influence and directly take part in the changes in the Libyan polity."*[48] These three constituencies inform a great deal on the current prevailing profile and realities for engagement of Libyans living abroad.

The historical narrative of the role of Libyans living abroad in this era validate the constituencies being categorized in these pillars. The period brought an incremental, if somewhat quickened, process of potential mobilization of Libyans living abroad. However, the conditioning impact of the Gaddafi era ensured that issues of mistrust and silence remained as significant attitudinal and structural barriers for many Libyans living abroad.

In the early days of the events of 2011, the historical analyses strongly relay how the fear of the previous decades led many Li-

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44 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."
45 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."
46 Laurie A. Brand. "Arab Uprisings and the changing frontiers of transnational citizenship: Voting from Abroad in political transitions." Political Geography, Volume 41, 2014.
47 Barley and Merchant. "'The naughty person': Exploring dynamic aspects of identity."

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48 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."

byans living abroad, particularly those with in-person experience of Libya, to adopt a risk-averse strategy. There are several fascinating narrations of how familial hierarchies within Libyans living abroad were coming into conflict with parents keen to retain a distance whilst their offspring embracing a more open and risk aggressive condemnation of the Gaddafi regime.[49]

Another subsidiary of this distant frame was the fact that the period also brought a new layer to Libyans living abroad with the influx of individuals who were loyal or had close connections to the Gaddafi regime. It is estimated that, "*during 2011 and particularly after the fall of the regime, a significant number of Libyans having had different types of work relations and/or political affiliations with the former regime fled to neighbouring countries. Many of them, fearing reprisals from new leaders and the militias, settled in Egypt or Tunisia.*"[50] In this instance, there is a diversification of the destination countries of Libyans living abroad as will be explored later in data section of this research. Their propensity to retain isolation and silence for survivalist tendencies entrench it as an ongoing reality of Libyans living abroad.

However, the distant framing emerged as a minority within this phase given the velocity of violence that came to define the spread of discord in Libya. This period was marked by one analysis as Libya's "*moment of enthusiasm.*"[51] This translated to the constituencies being predominantly focused on mobilization and active participation. The lack of a diaspora public space outlined earlier was transformed with the 2011 events. Libyans living abroad, through the move for change, become visible influencers within the public domain. The closed clusters of familial and social networks that had defined the previous era became conduits of mobilization and action. It has been argued that "*a sense of commonality and connectedness allowed for an emotional sense of belonging to Libya to emerge which can help contextualize the involvement of the diaspora in the 2011 revolution.*"[52] This awakening marks an informative opportunity for future engagements.

It signposted the shift from a dormant existence to a potentiality of engagement for the betterment of Libya and its communities abroad. The subsequent years brought challenges to this landscape, but it cannot be undervalued as a moment of growth for Libyans living abroad. Of course, there remains nuances to be negotiated but there is an emergent new spectrum for engagement. This is further denoted by the emergence of new community organizations and the development of civil society outlined earlier.

A testimony to convey these new realities came from the founders of the Libyan American Organization in 2012. The founders remain convinced that the "*initiative would not have been possible before the revolution,*" as the "*diasporas' coming out signifies a transition from subjecthood to citizenship, the process by which groups transcend the shackles of authoritarianism and embrace civic participation as a means of social change remains a promising topic of inquiry.*"[53] There are several examples of such mobilization with protests at embassies in the US and UK during the time along with an emerging digital based advocacy through next-generation Libyans living abroad.

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49 This is a consistent theme across much of the literature. For in-depth analyses, see bibliography.
50 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."
51 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."

52 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."
53 Moss, "Transnational Repression,

However, direct involvement of Libyans living abroad in the events of 2011 also came to define this phase. It is noted that "*approaching a post-Qadhafi scenario, the exiled and well-known parties or movements returned home in order to gain influence on the new Libya.*"[54] Many formed new political parties to become "*active parts of the transformation processes,*" in Libya.[55]

This period of return also signposts the need to ensure synergy between the domestic community and returnees. Across the literature, there is substantive analysis of how disconnects between these communities resulted in credibility issues.

Later sections of this research will assess the audience costs of domestic politics on such communal binds. It will be essential to ensure that the image, perception and reality of the aims/visions of Libyans living abroad for their involvement in the development of Libya is articulated to the domestic audience. Co-operation, dialogue and trust will need to be built between those who stayed and those who left.

Therefore, through these constituencies, the study can extract a series of profile characteristics that enhance our understanding on Libyans living abroad. Given the closer historical proximity to the current situation, these characteristics can be intrinsic in helping us to scope out potential engagement activities today.

Characteristics
As noted earlier, the distant constituency remained a minority in this phase but the influx of new Libyans living abroad, and the

longevity of isolation means that creating engagements that develop softer community development activities will be critical in years ahead. There will be historical tensions within the community where engagement will need to de-politicise relationships and promote an inclusive sense of Libya-ness or inclusive diasporic public spaces. The power of convening and culture will be upholding tools in this regard.

Within the mobilized framework, the study unearths key criteria that inform our understanding of Libyans living abroad. The clearest characteristic within this constituency is that the engagement landscape has been transformed – particularly due to communication and technological advancements. During this phase, the historiography is littered with examples of how these advancements ruptured traditional communal structures and brought new portals of engagement.

Communities living abroad now "*use online platforms to make their voice heard, for political mobilization and empowerment. They use websites, blogs, social media and smart phone applications to disseminate their personal stories to global audiences.*"[56] During the events of 2011, Libyans living abroad had new audiences and ways to tell their stories. Compelling and evocative testimonies from activities within Libyans living abroad are strong exemplars in this progression.

As one activist noted, their openness to sharing their identity came from witnessing the willingness of people in Libya to shed anonymity to fight for change.[57] If the stu-

54 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."
55 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."

56 Baser and Halperin. "Diasporas from the Middle East."
57 Dana M. Moss. "Diaspora Mobilization for Western Military Intervention During the Arab Spring". Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2016.

dy prescribes to the founding assertion of Gabriel Sheffer of diaspora politics being about "being at home abroad", then the onset of communication and technology advancements enable this assertion like never before.[58] These advancements are not always positive however which we will see in the analysis of the next phase where the digital landscape provided a platform for scepticism and criticism of the role of Libyans living abroad in Libya's transition.

Evaluating the positive impact of communications and technology must also assess the instrumental impact it had on traditional structures of community within Libyans living abroad. The enhanced digital proximity to the events of 2011 in Libya did have disruptive impact on familial hierarchies as noted earlier. Next-generation Libyans living abroad adopted an emboldened strategy of risk to support their counterparts back home. This led to tensions within the familial system on whether to build advocacy or not. These tensions were reduced given the violence of the events in 2011 and indeed, the ties of family were often a spark for advocacy. As one article contends, "*the transnational ties of first- and second-generation immigrants to family members who were at risk of regime violence weighed heavily in their decisions over whether or not to mobilize publicly against home-country regimes from abroad.*"[59] Within the mobilized framing of this phase, the power of advocacy is the lasting legacy.

The distinguishing between advocacy for involvement and advocacy for intervention should be noted within this historiography. The role of US and UK involvement in Iraq

for example had brought an "initial scepticism" for Western involvement within Libyans living abroad.[60] However, with the escalation of violence, a push for advocacy on involvement rather than intervention was the focus for Libyans living abroad.

Several mechanisms emerged to push this advocacy. Members of the communities abroad "*launched protests and formed organizations dedicated to lobbying the U.S. and British governments on behalf of the revolutions, including the Washington, DC-based Libyan Emergency Task Force, the Libyan-British Relations Council.*"[61] This mobilization reflected a harsh reality of engaging communities abroad – often the glue of engagement is crisis.

In time, Libyan stakeholders need to shift the mindset from a reactive to a proactive setting. Again, the power of media and communications are important features of how community mobilization crystallizes in moments of crisis. In the Libyan context, it was noted that due to "satellite images," it became clear that "*if they [diaspora] didn't act, a million people may die in Benghazi.*"[62]

The prominence of imagery showcases the final characteristic of note within the mobilization constituency. This phase became a battlefield of symbolism also within Libyans living abroad. Such symbolism retains a powerful currency in shaping identity and affiliations abroad. Again, Barley and Merchant's real-time analysis of how Libyan children living abroad shaped their identities during this period provides a compelling sy-

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58 Gabriel Sheffer. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. Cambridge, 2006.
59 Moss, "Diaspora Mobilization for Western Military Intervention."

60 Moss, "Diaspora Mobilization for Western Military Intervention."
61 Moss, "Diaspora Mobilization for Western Military Intervention."
62 Moss, "Diaspora Mobilization for Western Military Intervention."

nopsis of this currency. They explain that: "(...) *children's identities were performative, situated and dialectical, as they used linguistic and semiotic resources drawn from their home, school and media lives, reflecting a complex interweaving of translocal discourses. The work suggests that identity can be viewed as in a continual state of becoming (Hall, 2000). Consequently, social situations such as the Libyan Uprising are dynamic agents in the fluid performance of identity.*"[63]

In designing a roadmap for engagement, it will be important to explore and understand these currencies of advocacy and symbolism with a view to determining the feasibility of such engagements and to provide a holistic engagement portfolio. This, in time, will be a key influencer of the public and cultural diplomacy that will inform engagement of Libyans living abroad as it earmarks such communities as important conduits of diplomatic capital for Libya and positions Libyans living abroad as a non-state actor of influence for the future of Libya.

Moss' triangulation of assessing diaspora mobilization in the Libyan context may be a helpful starting point in this regard. She assesses that such mobilization should be understood by:

> (a) the character of the crises motivating their interventionist mobilizations,
> (b) their networked relations with those in the home-country, and
> (c) the rise of the "responsibility to protect" that promotes multilateral intervention in cases of mass atrocities.[64]

The sincerity of the mobilization phase comes to be complicated by the active and direct influence sought by many Libyans living abroad during the events of 2011. This re-inserts an inherently political agenda to the engagement scope. Through direct return and participation in political process, it offered Libyans living abroad with a new form of capital. It pushed advocacy towards participation and brought forward issues that came to define the next phase of the historiography.

The legacies of the previous era played an important contextual influence in this regard. Returnees were returning to a different Libya where their memories may not have matched the reality of the situation on the ground. It has been argued that the political involvement of returnees was weakened since they "*were less familiar with present realities in Libya and they lack strong ties to the country's new power brokers.*"[65]

There is a quiet subtext to this when shaped against global best practice on engagement of communities abroad. Quite often there is a fascination in getting your communities abroad to return. Impact, however, for the betterment and development of the home country often comes when your constituencies stay abroad. Libyans living abroad can arguably do more for Libya in Washington D.C. or London than in Tripoli. Another legacy impact was the variation of ideologies at work within the political agenda. As astute assessment outlines that "*reconciling the different thick ideologies present inside the country and abroad, as well as the demands of the ethnic groups (...) is not a political project of easy realization.*"[66]

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63 Barley and Merchant, "'The naughty person': Exploring Dynamic Aspects of Identity."
64 Moss, "Diaspora Mobilization for Western Military Intervention."

65 Christopher S. Chivvis and Jeremy Martin. Libya after Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future. RAND Corporation, 2014, quoted in Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."
66 Alunni, "Long Distance Nationalism."

This participatory moment stemmed not only from the direct involvement of returnees in politics. Efforts were made to include voting for Libyan citizens overseas in the 2012 election. In her comparative analysis of overseas voting in the region, Brand asserts that this was "unsuccessful" as "*limited institutional capacity and a short time frame constituted an important reason for the low participation of the exiles.*"[67] The limited institutional capacity illustrates the legacy issues of the Gaddafi era where engagement will need to be built slowly to close institutional, informational and implementation gaps for effective engagement of Libyans living abroad.

This phase of this historiography, rooted in the events of 2011, indicated that Libyans living abroad were finding their voice. It marked a moment of connectivity and community which shows that engagement of the communities abroad can be achieved. This moment of enthusiasm remains unfulfilled – partially due to the onset of civil unrest that came to determine the final phase of the historiography.

PHASE FOUR: THE EXISTING PHASE TRANSITION AND UNREST

Beyond 2011 and entering a post-Gaddafi era, the constituencies of distant, mobilized and active still retain pertinence as a framework for the constituencies within Libyans living abroad. There were a series of key events that began to build polarizations between the domestic community in Libya, the returnees aiming to shape transition, and Libyans living abroad. These complicated the realities of Libya's moment of enthusiasm and illustrate characteristics that pinpoint the significance of the role organizations such as ICMPD can play in bringing new energies to engagement of Libyan's living abroad.

Constituencies

A signature decision in determining the type of communities and relationships that defined Libyans living abroad during this phase was the Political Isolation Law.

The law banned Gaddafi-era officials from holding office for a period of time.[68] This led to a "*a tendency to leave the country,*" gaining "*strength among Libyan politicians, businesspeople, academics.*"[69] The law had significant impact for Libyans living abroad in weakening "*their possibilities of exerting influence on the political development in Libya. The ability of contributing to a constructive transition became reduced as lack of functioning institutions and unrest spread in Libya.*"[70]

The influx of more arrivals into the communities of Libyans living abroad from the Law brought further tensions to bear in the community. This period of retreat and exit stifled many of the potentials pushed forward by the mobilized community abroad.

With the rise of civil unrest, there was also an emerging scepticism on the role of Libyans living abroad by the domestic audience in Libya. Echoing some of the analysis of Baum's audience cost of domestic politics on foreign policy creation, these scepticisms will need to be discussed in ongoing engagement.[71] The aggregator tools of new media played

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67 Brand, "Arab Uprisings and the changing frontiers of transnational citizenship."

68 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."
69 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."
70 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exceptional transition processes."
71 M.A. Baum. "Going Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 48, Issue 5, 2004.

an important role in nurturing these tensions. As one commentator notes, "*social media is full of conspiracy theories about Western motives. Postings have blamed Libyans from the diaspora for derailing the transition.*"[72]

Libyans living abroad were also operating in a domestic setting that may not have been conducive to engagement. It is argued that, "*in spite of the large reservoir of goodwill resulting from Western support for the revolution, Libyans were wary and even hostile to outside interference in their transition.*"[73] The continued lack of institutionalisation to build meaningful transition again returned to the fore.

Characteristics
The constituencies displayed similar characteristics to the previous phase with one key addition. The role of Libyans living abroad in the events of 2011 and transition showcased that engagement was now a possibility.

Deeper philosophical questions now need to be asked to shape our engagement moving forward. These are the true characteristics of this phase.

So, let's explore these questions. We must begin with politics. Should the endeavour of Libyans living abroad be political? The power of advocacy has greatly outweighed the impact of the active constituency. There are key lessons here. Political influence often best arrives through de-politicised engagements. The immediate future of engagement is community-orientated not political.

It is in this light that the study returns to our issues of terminology as outlined earlier. This tendency to position the role of Libyans living abroad in systematic framings of international relations and political science is detrimental to engagement. It is overtly political and limits the potentiality of engagement areas.

The characteristics of this phase tell us that we need to build connectivity and togetherness for Libyans living abroad. This will mean tough discussions on the past and the memories or legacies inherent in this past. It will be slow work, and patience will be the victor. It is in these insights that the role of agencies such as ICMPD play an integrative role. They can bridge the complexities of the historiography and its treatment of Libyans living abroad to the realities of engagement. The engagement process needs both skillsets.

The literature does showcase this. For example, in showcasing the marginal role of Libyans living abroad in the development of a National Dialogue by the UN in 2015, Seeberg argues that "*members of the diaspora become part of a social space in which multidimensional and autonomous fields struggle to obtain dominant positions, and only rarely do they possess the necessary resources, solidarities and organizations for strong mobilization and collective action.*"[74]

These "resources, solidarities and organizations" are the opportunities for ICMPD, Libyan stakeholders and like-minded partners for the years ahead in Libya. The opportunity is to negate a "lack of coherence" within Libyans living abroad.[75] Initial progress by the inclusion of input from Libyans living abroad in the Libyan National Conference Report in 2018 by the Centre for Humanitarian Dia-

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72 Boduszynski, "The external dimension of Libya's troubled transition."
73 Boduszynski, "The external dimension of Libya's troubled transition."

74 Seeberg, "Transnationalism and exception transition processes."
75 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

logue with support of the UN is a positive step–change.[76]

This brief historiography creates a newer un–derstanding of the constituencies and cha–racteristics of Libyans living abroad along with why these features have been created. It informs us to some of the foundational fea–tures of the profile of Libyans living abroad at a communal level. To leverage this towar–ds engagement of Libyans living abroad, the study provides with a short synopsis on what the initial dataset on Libyans living abroad can tell us. This data is from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) In–ternational Migrant Stock data.[77]

DENSITY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

This section outlines some relevant profile indicator from existing datasets. These will be supplemented by analysis of the consul–tation processes with Libyans living abroad enacted through our methodology. Blending

both sets of analysis, the research will then shift from the historical and contextual to the operationally bound focus of its research purpose.

The initial datasets indicate a relatively small cohort of Libyan born migrants living abroad within the UN data estimates. It is important to note here the definitional parameters uti–lized within the UN dataset. It focuses on Li–byan citizens whilst our definition and histo–riographical analysis has included additional datasets such as next–generation Libyans li–ving abroad. The conditioning impacts of the historiography can also be estimated to have had an impact on the willingness of Libyans living abroad to be visible.

Similarly, the historiography showcased an openness to work with the West par–ticularly sparking into life in the 2000s af–ter the removal of sanctions. This seems to bear through in the dataset. For example, in


Figure 2. Estimated Number of Libyans Abroad (in thousands) for Various Years, 1990 to 2017.

Source: UNDESA (2019)

76 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. The Libyan National Conference Process. Tunis, 2018.
77 United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs. International Migrant Stock Data. Geneva.

1990, it was estimated that the population of Libyans abroad was 76,071. This remained relatively stagnant through the 1990s to an estimate in 2000 of 78,811. However, an expansion occurred with growth to 98,964 (2005), 127,168 (2010), 154,534 (2015) and 158,798 (2017).

This growth indicates a maturing of the community abroad and conveys the potential for engagement if the agenda and agency is set correctly as discussed in the historiography. Exploring this potential can also be deepened through an assessment of the locales of destination of Libyans living abroad. Again, the reference framework is per UN defini-

the community of Libyans living abroad was projected to be 4,608 with incremental growth to 14,989 in 2017[78]. Again, the definitional parameters associated with our framing of Libyans living abroad will include cultural and generational ties implying that the density of the community in North America that can be engaged is deeper than these figures. The density of communities in other geographies is assessed in the coming sections of this research.

The challenge is now to channel their propensity to engage. Furthermore, these trends provide useful insight into the type of engagements that can occur. For example, the

Table 1. Distribution (%) of Libyans Living Abroad by Level of Development and Income of Countries of Destination for Various Years, 1990–2017

Year	Most Developed (%)	Less Developed (%)	High Income Countries (%)	Middle Income Countries (%)	Low Income Countries (%)
1990	33.11	66.89	57.82	40.60	1.57
1995	36.49	63.51	61.40	36.90	1.70
2000	41.39	58.61	65.14	33.04	1.82
2005	56.21	43.79	73.62	25.32	1.05
2010	63.35	36.65	75.95	22.96	1.09
2015	54.75	45.25	65.42	33.50	1.08
2017	55.55	44.45	65.64	33.34	1.02

Source: UNDESA (2019)

tions. This can be broken down as follows: The maturing of the community abroad has simultaneously resulted in a stronger presence of Libyans living abroad in most developed countries and high-income countries. This indicates that there are strong capacities within Libyans living abroad to be engaged. For example, according to UNDESA data, the community in North America witnessed strong growth during this period. In 1990,

most developed categorizations would indicate that these countries of destination would

78 United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs. International Migrant Stock Data. Geneva. The incremental growth across the timeframe was as follows: 6,271 (1995), 7,981 (2000), 10,211 (2005), 11,918 (2010), 14,476 (2015).

have a relatively stable domestic climate upon which to build networks of Libyans living abroad. They will also be valuable repositories of social remittances, political and social cultures along with potential partner countries for Libya on the road to security and stability. This centres engagement of Libyans living abroad as a potential key contributor in the short, mid and long-term future of Libya. A snapshot of the key regions of-destination also enables the study to pinpoint where Libyan stakeholders may build an incremental focus to engagement of Libyans living abroad. This is a relatively new policy field for Libyan stakeholders so a phased implementation approach will enable a structured risk management to the engagement

the opening to the West partially accounts for the exponential growth in Europe from 2000 (23,211) to 2017 (69,984).

Other key influencers here are the migration flows to Italy due to civil unrest. Italy emerges from 2010 as a key destination country. Given the nature of such migration, it is also likely to ensure that issues of vulnerability are embedded into any engagement of Libyans living abroad. The migratory process is often one of struggle from success to significance – many often do not make it out of the struggle phase. Libya will have a duty of care to its people abroad who may be vulnerable, and this should be a key feature of any engagement strategy, policy or roadmap.

Figure 3. Estimated Libyan Population by Destination Region for Libyans for Various Years, 1990–2017

Source: UNDESA (2019)

process. This geographical focus within the data can be broken into 4 key regions:
The strong stability of Africa as a destination region confirms the ongoing regional emigration of recent years as countries such as Egypt and Tunisia reside within this categorization. The later growth in Asia also illustrates the diversification of emigration trends suggested within the historiography. Again,

Other emerging countries of destination include the United Kingdom and United States which may reflect the community confidence borne from mobilization phase outlined earlier. From the beginning of the dataset in 1990, both countries more than doubled in the size of the community base of Libyans living there. The community in the UK grew from 6,468 (1990) to 14,499 (2017) with

the US growing from 4,037 (1990) to 9,520 (2017). Again, given the wider definitional approach to engagement of Libyans living abroad, it can safely be estimated that those who identify as Libyan will outstrip these estimates. The indicative data findings and trends will enable any engagement to take a tailored and incremental approach. This will help donors, policymakers and practitioners to truly gauge the variations existing within the communities of Libyans living abroad. It is these nuances that the wider research project aims to explore. By being a first-mover in this regard in terms of engagement, the study adds an influential knowledge set for the future engagement of Libyans living abroad.

PROFILE CONSULTATIONS

The direct in-market consultations empower the research to move from data to application. They provide a real-time snapshot and synopsis of the communities abroad. The scope of outreach was limited due to the reach and timeframe of the project but the sample borne out of this research can be respected as a guide given the diversity of communities engaged. It adheres to the emerging engagement model of choice for engaging communities abroad in accessing successful and vulnerable members of the community abroad.

Survey Synopsis

The Libyans Living Abroad Consultation Survey was distributed digitally and facilitated through community gatekeepers within Libyans living abroad. It was available in both Arabic and English with all survey input provided anonymously. Whilst limited due to the timing of the research project, it is recommended that such a consultation survey be enacted annually as it will provide a base metric on the growth of engagement from Libyans living abroad.

The uptake of the survey was conditioned by the historiography outlined earlier along with the ongoing credibility and trust issues in

the relationship between Libya and Libyans living abroad. The emphasis on community gatekeepers and the independent nature of the research through ICMPD conveys a compelling lesson for future iterations of such consultations. The willingness of a community abroad to share their data will be dependent on such actors or honest brokers.

The survey findings, whilst limited in scale, with 17 respondents to the English Version and 14 to the Arabic version, are offered here as a scoping of the sentiment of the community abroad. Later sections of this research will position this sentiment into a more systematic roadmap where the robustness and validity of the findings can be further tested before market entry of any engagement initiatives.

These sentiments are real and must be recorded. Furthermore, the reticence from the community abroad to engage with the survey in scale is also a telling contribution. Their silence is indicative of the challenges ahead for engagement. It must be based on authenticity, credibility and trust. Indeed, micro trends of responses within the survey also point to further silences. Some respondents refrained from answering certain questions due to their sensitivities. Therefore, the analysis that follows are representative of the applicable answers to those issues – certain questions have outliers of silence.

The researchers would like to place on record thanks to all survey respondents and key community gatekeepers who helped to share the survey. It is clear from the process of the survey that an early deliverable of any strategic and institutional management of engagement of Libyans living abroad will need to focus on establishing research partnerships to deepen understanding of the community. Within this, strict guidelines on issues of data production, protection and management will need to be outlined to build confidence from the community abroad to engagement more

systematically in such research.

The following sections provide an overview of the sentiments of the community abroad. It is designed as indicative rather than exhaustive and follows the 4 sections of the survey. These were: Demographic Information, Educational and Professional Profile, Community Networks and Organizations of Libyans Living Abroad, and Future Relationship with Libya.

Demographic Information

The indicators drawn from the survey provide preliminary scoping for the strategic roadmap to follow in the conclusion of the study. In terms of demographic information, the findings closely align with the characteristics identified through the historiography. In terms of age, the respondents reflect the layered and maturing composition of the community abroad outlined in the historiography as illustrated in the table below:

Table 2. Distribution (%) of Survey Respondents by Year of Birth

Year of Birth	% of respondents
1990s	25.81
1980s	32.26
1970s	16.13
1960s	9.68
1950s	6.45
1940s	9.68

Source: Survey conducted by authors (2019)

Table 3. Distribution (%) of Survey Respondents by Year Left Libya*

Year Left Libya	% of Respondents
2010s	51.72
2000s	31.03
1990s	10.34
1980s	6.90

Source: Survey conducted by authors (2019)

*Two respondents did not answer the question on the year they left Libya

This data echoes the historiography not only in terms of the composition of the community abroad but also in terms of the newer generations of migrants working beyond traditionalist framings to be more visible in their outreach. The fact that over 80% of respondents left Libya since 2000 identifies that there is a new potential to engage a community more willing to be visible.

When contextualized within other indicators from the demographic information section of the survey, it unearths some potential early stage engagement areas with Libyans living abroad. For example, the predominant reason for leaving Libya was educational development (41.96%), with other influencing factors being economic advancement, family and safety. Most of the respondents (74.20%) were married.

Within measurable respondents, 80% were married to other Libyans and the demographic breakdown of children within the community spread across all ages and both genders. The breakdown of household size indicates ongoing deepening of familial bonds abroad with 48.28% in a household of 1–5 people, 37.93% in a household of 6–10 people, and 13.79% in a household of 10+ people. The majority of respondents noted that their children have visited Libya, but the ongoing instability has hindered more recent visits. This is signposted by the fact that most of the respondents do not define themselves as frequent visitors to Libya.

Whilst this data is a holistic overview, there were some slight variations on data between the Arabic and English version of the survey. The Arabic version, which we can project was submitted by respondents representing regional migrants from Libya, may then help Libyan stakeholders to gauge variations of engagement needed across different geographies of destination of Libyans living abroad. For example, within the Arabic survey, the issue of gendered migration and

stronger gendered profiles of the community abroad due to a heightened presence of familial re-unification is an interesting finding.

This will ensure that gender mainstreaming is a must across the roadmap but more investment may be needed regionally, especially if regional migrants also consist of vulnerable members of the Libyans living abroad.

The sense of belonging to Libya remains robust. 96.77% identify as Libyan and a majority expressed a desire to return to Libya in the future. Coupling this with the deepening of familial bonds, this would indicate that designed engagements of care and culture will be integral to safeguarding connections between Libya and Libyans living abroad. There will be layers of Libya-ness at work across generations and geographies where cultural and public diplomacy engagements can strengthen these bonds. These engagements can be instrumentalized to create dialogue and trust with a lens towards direct developmental engagements in areas such as economic and human capital transfer.

The fact that the majority of respondents identify as Libyan is a powerful connection to Libya that should not go unrecognized. The community is clearly passionate about their heritage with responses also focusing on the need to envision "Libya as home" rather than a contested ideological or political space. A large majority of respondents noted the lack of ideological and political consensus as a barrier to engagement. This strength of connection is a feature that will be explored more in the assessment of focus groups and reaffirms the commitment to de-politicized engagement. This has important implications at a governance level.

Strengthening this finding, away from familial trends, there is an indication that Libyans living abroad invest in putting down roots in their adopted homelands. 74.19% of respondents had not lived in another country

of destination prior to the one they are in now. The breakdown of length of stay in their adopted homelands also support this indication. The breakdown is as follows:

Table 4. Length of Stay (Years) of Survey Respondents in Country of Destination

Length of Stay in Country of Destination	% of applicable respondents
0 – 5 years	25.81
6 – 10 years	38.71
11 – 15 years	12.90
+15 years	22.58

Source: Survey conducted by authors (2019)

This shows the layering of the community as indicated in the historiography. With the reduced frequency of visits to Libya (admittedly tied to the security situation) and the trend to establish roots in their country of destinations, this is a telling insight for the road ahead.

This indicates a need to invest in the infrastructure of communities abroad as they are likely to remain situated in their country of destinations. This should not be defined as a deterrent to engagement; quite the opposite. Engagement of communities abroad has long been undermined by the "return" myth; where governments and international agencies thought that the physical return of the community abroad was a necessary ingredient for success.

Through our engagement roadmap, it will be imperative to design interventions of digital and remote connectivity given the reduced frequency of visits to Libya. This, coupled with the infrastructural investment noted, will onset a process of mutual relationships between Libyan stakeholders and Libyans living abroad that can act as pathway projects to more transformative developmental asks (such as economic development). The centrality of familial bonds and children, as noted, can provide powerful engagement

points through cultural diplomacy for Libyan stakeholders. This can have substantive impact on the nation branding of Libya through such diplomatic portfolios.

Interestingly, within the demographic information, all respondents identified as Libyan and the respondent pool included respondents born outside Libya. This has important implications on the definitional parameters set on our understanding of Libyans living abroad. It will be imperative, in time, to develop an ancestral and affinity–based definition to fully realize the potential of engagement.

These demographics can help Libyan stakeholders understand that it will need to design engagements across the spectrum of the community abroad. For example, the pertinence of digital engagement, next generation engagement and gendered engagement are all signposted in the above indicators. Furthermore, a body of work remains on the historical legacies of migration with a view to tackling the silences of the survey and empowering the community abroad to trust the process of engagement.

Educational and Professional Profile
Beyond demographics, the educational and professional profiles of the respondents were impressive. All respondents were professional and highly educated with the profile visualized below:

Given this indicative base from respondents' inputs, it can be deduced that the community of Libyans living abroad remains the repository of talent outlined in the Financial Times article that opened this research. With 46.15 % of respondents holding a bachelor's degree, 30.77% holding a master's degree respectively, and 15.38% holding a PhD, the community has the potential to be a highly influential advocate for Libya across many sectors and portfolios. The respondents to the survey drew expertise in areas such as academic, aeronautical industries, architecture, commerce, dentistry, ICT, law, medicine, professional services, and veterinarian science.

Again, slight variations in the dataset from respective versions of the survey may indicated variations in the engagement portfolio across countries of destinations. With the Arabic survey, the slight increase within the bachelor's degree categorization in this survey indicates that targeted engagements around access to employment services, educational advancement, or wider career development services may be suitable within regional geographies of recent arrivals of Libyans living abroad.

Reflecting on the historiography, there is a slight disconnect between the type of professional development being undertaken.


Figure 4. Educational Profile of Survey Respondents
Source: Survey conducted by authors (2019)

Whilst historical migration trends indicated the centrality of government scholarships to educational development abroad, 89.47% of applicable respondents indicated that they did not receive a government scholarship in this survey. This may signpost the development of an independent community abroad and a move away from an eagerness to engage in official government programmes. Further exploration will be needed in time on this issue to shape engagement, yet there remains a simple question from this section of the survey:

The community of Libyans living abroad remains a source of connections, expertise and talent – are they engaging back home?

The challenge remains cultivating and networking this talent as only three respondents indicated that they have participated in any form of knowledge transfer back to Libya. It will be imperative to engagement of Libyans living abroad to create networks of interest where peer to peer networks bring impact for the development of the community and Libya alike. There is a strong record of sector specific networks bringing impact through networks of professional and personal development for communities abroad. A prime example of this is ASCINA, which is a network of Austrian scientists globally. The Annex material accompanying this research provides more examples.

Despite the highly educated and professional profile of the community, the respondents displayed an acute awareness to the migratory difficulties that Libyan communities face when moving into their adopted homelands. Whilst difficult to ascertain a specific focus on support services from the dataset, some recurring themes did emerge in the survey on potential areas of support to Libyans living abroad, namely:

• Access to employment;
• Access to resources (financial,

housing, and other supports);
• Integration Support (including rise of anti-immigrant sentiment);
• Transferability of Qualifications;
• Community and Cultural Support.

The need for a holistic support offering from Libyan stakeholders is imperative to the strategic engagement of the community abroad. Sustaining the engagement of Libyans living abroad is based on reciprocity and respondents indicated that newer arrivals may not have the same level of educational or professional background. This heightens the need for such supports and positions the strategic roadmap in line with global best practice on engagement of communities abroad; it should focus on engaging the successful and vulnerable members of Libyans living abroad.

Community Networks/Organizations of Libyan Living Abroad & Relationship with Libya
The concluding sections of the survey are most compelling in the shift towards application of engagement that will determine the final sections of this research. Whilst earlier indicators scope out potentialities of engagement, the survey sections on existing networks within Libyans living abroad and the respondent's ongoing/future relationship with Libya can inform us on the reality of the situation as it stands today.

56.62% of respondents do not sense a strong community network amongst Libyans living abroad in their country of destination. 86.36% of applicable respondents indicated that they are not part of any community network or organization of Libyans living abroad in their country of destination. Of those who are, the focus is social purposes; and, no organization was indicated to be more than 20 people in size. This is a significant opportunity for Libyan stakeholders.

This enhances the recommendation on a focus on building the community infrastructure of Libyans living abroad. Such a step will become an integral part of the architecture for engagement and help ease process of communication and outreach. A key early stage of the roadmap must be the formalization of engagement structures, both within and outside Libya.

The story of this survey echoes these findings; distribution of the survey was difficult due to the sporadic nature of the community. Building the community network infrastructure of Libyans living abroad will position Libyan stakeholders in the role of facilitator to support the communities abroad in building this infrastructure.

The necessity of this step for such engagement is outlined by the basic research questions that drive this type of engagement – who are the Libyans Living Abroad, where are they, and what are they doing. It is illogical to conceive that Libyan stakeholders can access this information alone. By investing in community infrastructure, it can create a cluster of connections that can advance the research question.

The survey respondents' ideas on how to improve community networks indicate as such. Their asks are quite simple – enhanced communication, hosting events, and promotion of Libyan culture/heritage. In fact, the ranking of key barriers to engagement is as follows: lack of Communication; lack of efficiency (administrative and organizational); and lack of resources.

By embedding engagements to narrow such barriers into the roadmap, we can support Libyans living abroad to organize to be ready for engagement when stability in Libya is achieved. Indeed, the respondents also articulate the need to enhance data on the community abroad as it is a barrier to their own integration and community development.

In terms of ongoing and future relationship with Libya, the issues of trust come back to the fore. For example, 95% of respondents do not remit funds regularly to Libya and 89.47% of applicable respondents indicated that they have not invested in Libya. The investor sentiment does remain positive however if stability is achieved. Several respondents linked stability and a conducive investor climate as key precursors for investment. Others indicated innovative approaches to bridge Libyans living abroad investors with the official investment agencies of country of destinations investing in Libya. The survey also scoped out the framework of interest in the type of future relationship that respondents would like to have with Libya. In the graph below, there are fascinating shifts


Figure 5. Type of Future Relationship with Libya of Interest to Libyans Living Abroad

Source: Survey conducted by authors (2019)

occurring within the community to guide the framework of engagement.

The dilution of political aspirations for a future relationship with Libya is a timely opportunity to embed the communities of Libyans living abroad with a mission to help achieve peace in the country. There is a specific fatigue and concern on how Libya is being depicted globally. This purpose can be a glue for the communities abroad. It also may denote an evolution within the community from the historiography where politics was a core constituency and characteristic of the community. There is now a need to depoliticize engagement of the community abroad.

The sentiment indicates that the investment aspect of engaging Libyans living abroad is towards the latter stages of any roadmap cycle, but it remains achievable in time. As displayed above, this is a clear sentiment guide on where to focus engagements across the lifecycle of the strategic roadmap. This is enhanced by the response to a direct question on what types of activities did the respondents want to engage with for the betterment of Libya. 52.63% indicated a willingness to participate in professional activities.

The preeminent position of social engagements followed by professional and economic engagement gives us a baseline of a cyclic roadmap developed in later sections of the report. At its core, the importance of social engagement and relationship with Libya marks the presence of a founding feature of engagement of communities living abroad; communities living abroad like to engage back home and with their counterparts abroad because they care about both constituencies.

Whilst sentiment is indicative, the survey also scopes out the institutional apparatus and system needed to execute such engagement. The responses drew fascinating considerations for this system from an organizational

and operational perspective. This will have intrinsic value in the designing of a suitable governance framework in later sections of

Table 5. Ranking by Libyans Living Abroad of the Importance of Libyan Actors for Engagement

Agency/Grouping	Ranking of Importance
Libyans Living Abroad	1
Civil Society Organizations	2
International Agencies/ Donors	3a
Ministry of Education	3b
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	3c
Ministry of Cultural Affairs	4

Source: Survey conducted by authors (2019).
Ranking; 1= Highest importance

the research. The ranking of key agencies offered for assessment in the survey was as follows:

The above table is an indicative composition of actors deemed instrumental to bring engagement forward. It illustrates a desire from communities abroad to be positioned as partners in the design and creation of their engagement roadmap. It pinpoints the need for a layered and partnership-based governance roadmap. This has integral impact on the roadmap that follows as it means that these systems of partnership and governance require construction prior to engagement outreach.

In terms of initializing engagement, the survey also scoped out priorities of engagement. These were identified and ranked as follows: support initiatives/projects of Libyans living abroad; engage community leaders amongst Libyans living abroad on designing policies; and support cultural and schooling activities within communities of Libyans living abroad.

It can be asserted that Libyans living abroad see themselves as a seminal constituency in the engagement journey. The heightened

focus on civil society again emphasizes the role of honest brokers in the engagement process. Essentially, these indications inform that if the engagement process is solely go–vernmentally led then it will not succeed.

The governance prerequisite will be to de–sign a framework that operates upon a partnership–based model that embeds all the relevant actors. These actors will need to have a seat at the leadership table for engagement to ensure that it is fit for purpose. This again positions Libyan stakeholders in a facilitative framework. By designing and adopting such a governance framework, Libyan stakehol–ders can make a statement of commitment to their community abroad by ensuring that they are working in partnership rather than parallel. If effectively implemented, this will open opportunities to revisit the governance framework as engagement matures and trust develops.

The following section outlines the focus group input. This, coupled with the deep his–toriography of previous chapters and survey overview, provides a solid analytical base upon which to build the organizational and operational frameworks to enhance the insti–tutional and strategic engagement of Libyans living abroad. This concludes with the visua–

lization of a new roadmap for engagement based on such analytical insight, applied re–search and, most importantly, the voices of Libyans living abroad.

Focus Group Synopsis

The study held 3 focus groups with one held in London in the summer of 2019 and two in Tunisia (Tunis and Sfax) in the autumn of 2019. These focus groups were an ins–trumental feature of the mixed–method ap–proach. They reflected the ongoing commit–ment of the research to embed Libyans living abroad as an active voice in the research process. All the following input is in line with commitments on anonymity and represent a reflection on the applied engagements that will need to be catered for in the strategic and institutional engagement of Libyans li–ving abroad.

London Focus Group

"*There needs to be a commitment to respect of law, respect of human rights and respect of democratization. Do not politicize enga–gement of Libyans living abroad and we can move forward. It will not happen quick but will take time.*"[79]

The focus group held in London convened a

Current Situation	Aims/Needs	Priorities
• Segmented Community. • Confusion of Communication. • Mistrust & Corruption	• Vehicle for Vision & Coherence. • Community Infrastructure. • Role of Media/New Media. • Convening Points (Physical). • Depoliticizing engagement. • Reform as social/ethical necessity.	• Nation Branding. • Training. • Business. • Inter-community collaboration. • Education/Schooling.

Figure 6. Synopsis of Findings from London Focus Group

Source: Focus group conducted by authors in London (2019)

79 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

cohort of Libyan professionals working and living in the United Kingdom. Their insights and testimonies provide compelling analysis on the complexities they face in negotiating their complex sense of identity in their country of destination. They open compelling indicators for the future of engagement for Libyans living abroad, along with the institutional apparatus needed to make this a pragmatic, realistic engagement.

The forwardness and openness of delegates at the focus group deserves recognition. These insights provide the landscape on which Libyan stakeholders are trying to establish a roadmap of activity. There will be a need for a systematic commitment to an organizational and operational culture to pre-empt such a roadmap. The representa-

tives of this focus group clearly displayed a fatigue with an ongoing culture of insincerity in efforts to engage with them. Future work will need to tackle this culture. The current situation could be defined as three-fold, with the community in the UK displaying significant correlation with the historiography. The community, whilst passionate about Libya, is segmented. Delegates noted that:

• the community pre-2011 was a political orientated with a movement towards working on community unison post-2011.[80] Efforts to establish a Libyan scientific network and school infrastructure were signature steps in this regard. However, both were ultimately undermined by a lack of funding and awareness on how best to integrate with fun-

Vehicle for Vision & Coherence
Focus Group Participants Noted: Potential to develop a vehicle to channel their vision for Libya. Entities such as EU and ICMPD have a critical role to play in this.
Community Infrastucture
Focus Group Participants Noted: Need for help in building their community infrastructure. This will help to develop small scale but successful projects within the community.
Role of Media/New Media
Focus Group Participants Noted: Opportunity to tackle negative connotations of Libya in digital and mainstream media. These depictions are being "accepted as truth" and communities abroad can help change this narrative.
Convening Points (Physical)
Focus Group Participants Noted: Strong need to provide conveing spaces for the community. There is a "need to meet in person and unite the vision."
Depoliticizing Engagement
Focus Group Participants Noted: Opportunity to ensure engagement is done through systems rather than social contracts with folks back in Libya. Systems and processes needed to depoliticize and tackle corruption.
Reform as social/ethical necessity
Focus Group Participants Noted: Need to ensure a governance system to advance reform as an ethical/social necessity for the development of Libya.

Figure 7. Overview of Aims/Needs Expressed by London Focus Group

Source: Focus group conducted by authors in London (2019)

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80 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

ding sources in the UK. This is a service that can be provided to the community through a roadmap for engagement.

• There is confusion on who to communicate with in terms of accessing diplomatic services. One delegate noted that "*we do not know who to deal with*"[81] Similarly, with the historic events of 2011, they also noted that this brought a communication culture shock on who should lead the communication process.

• The current situation is embedded by mistrust and corruption. There is a tangible sense of mistrust built within the community and normalizing community networks will be important in this regard. Also, the issue of corruption back in Libya acts as a barrier to entry for many to be willing to engage in the development of Libya.

The aims/needs of the community are inextricably linked to the current situation as detailed in Figure 7.

Within these aims/needs, despite their fatigue, the community remains ready to help Libya if the right systems are built. Their focus on embedding external partners is an important note. It builds a tiered process of work in terms of the institutional and policy apparatus to engage Libyans living abroad. It also denotes an important feature for the next sections of this research. The necessary support systems to enact engagement are not only needed in Libya; the community abroad also needs direct intervention to ensure they are capacitated to deliver on their potentials. This is emphasised in terms of the prioritization of focus advanced by the London focus group.

The key priorities were:

1. Training: Provision of training and capacity building for the Libyan community in the UK to develop their community infrastructure, fundraising and networking. Also, to provide guidance on how the work effectively with UK counterparts.

2. Business: Development of a mechanism to build reform on business process in Libya to make the market conducive to engagement of Libyans living abroad. The disconnect in standards of business culture in UK and Libya could be a form of social remittance to embed back to Libya.

3. Education/Schooling: Support can be provided to help establish a schooling system in the UK to preserve cultural heritage of Libyan children and strengthen a sense of community.

4. Inter-community collaboration: Eagerness and keenness to ensure that there are potential contacts between Libyans living abroad in different countries. For example, UK focus group participants were particularly interested in connecting with other focus groups planned in other locales.

5. Nation-Branding: A key priority should be changing public and political perceptions of Libya as it can act as a deterrent of all the other priority areas identified.

The important message from the above analysis remains the ongoing willingness to engage from the community abroad. Along with this, their asks are not substantive and can be key predictors for the planned road map at a strategic and institutional level to follow later in this research. Their eagerness for systems and due process opens considerations for the institutional apparatus to be designed later.

The inputs from this focus group can now be situated within the other focus groups

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81 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

with a vision to extract consistent messaging on the roadmap. If the research can prescribe consistency in the current situations, aims/needs, and priorities of the community abroad in different countries of destinations and socio-economic backgrounds, then this is a sound profile base upon which to build the roadmap. To achieve this, the study assesses two additional focus groups held as part of this research project. `

Tunis Focus Group

"*The Libyan diaspora in Tunis represents an effective tool at the disposal of the Libyan government to ensure networking, innovation, fundraising and also the promotion of industries.*"[82]

Current Situation
• Sporadic, Informal Engagement. • Next Generation Engagement. • Lack of Institutional/Infrastructural Support. • Continuing Integration.

Aims/Needs for Engagement
• Sectored networks (for example, business). • Advocacy. • Institutional Recognition. • Role of Civil Society. • Convening Opportunity.

Priorities
• Business – Feasible engagement/Data. • Networking. • Cultural Heritage. • Education.

Figure 8. Synopsis of Findings from Tunis Focus Group

Source: Focus group conducted by authors in Tunis (2019)

This focus group, held in Tunis, consisted of a gathering of Libyans living abroad that fall within the professional categorization of the community abroad. In this sense, it deepened our understanding of this cohort from the focus group in London.

The focus group provides invaluable mapping of the core outline of the current situation, aims/needs for engagement by Libyan stakeholders and the priority areas for the roadmap outlined later. In terms of the current situation, participants provided four key considerations:

• **Sporadic and Informal Engagement:** The current situation, derived further from the historiography, is one of sporadic and informal engagement. Focus group participants displayed varying levels of ongoing engagement with members of the community abroad displaying "*an unconditional commitment to the development of Libya, and to the Libyan diaspora in Tunisia.*"[83]

Interestingly, this strength of linkage was also articulated by younger members of the focus group. This indicates that there is potentially a vibrant sense of community among younger members of the community abroad that can be engaged strategically through mechanisms aligned with their community behaviour – for example, digital diplomacy.

Other stakeholders noted the pertinence of personal networks to their engagement with Libya.[84] Tackling this informality is a key deliverable for the roadmap ahead. There is an organic ethics of care building across the engagement of communities living abroad that remains unfurnished in Libya due to a lack of institutional frameworks for engagement.

• **Next Generation Engagement:** Echoing the analysis of the historiography, the readiness of the next generation to engage is a com-

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82 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

83 Mustapha Kaaniche. "Report: Tunis Focus Group, 15/11/2019." ICMPD Tunis, 2019.
84 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

pelling insight. One participant, for example, within this bracket has advanced numerous engagement points – including with leading institutions such as the BBC and UN. This points toward the potential ambassadorial role for next generation engagement and the need to mainstream such engagement in the roadmap.

• **Lack of Institutional/Infrastructural Support:** Across the cohort at the focus group, there was a consistent thread on the need to embed further institutional/infrastructural support for such engagement. This will work across the migration management portfolio rather than specifically for engagement of Libyans living abroad with key services from Embassies and Consulates needing upgrading. For example, delegates noted that

previous attempts to formalize community networks in key sectors have been weakened due to this shortcoming.[85]

• **Continuing Integration:** The ability to engage effectively with the community abroad will be determined by building affinity and belonging for development of Libya. It was noted that "*most Tunisians are welcoming and kind, and integration into Tunisian society has been easy.*"[86] Evolving legislative restrictions, such as the three-month residence permit, along with increasing waves of new arrivals in Tunisia, are deepening the community. It is, however, bringing tensions in the integration journey in areas such as rent. There is a diplomatic challenge in the offing for Libyan stakeholders in safeguarding the welfare of their people abroad. This

Sectored Networks
Focus Group Participants Noted: Potential for Libyan stakholders to design targeted business, educational and socio-cultural action programmes aligned to real needs.
Advocacy
Focus Group Participants Noted: Need for Libyan stakeholders to advocate/consult with Tunisia (e.g. bilateral conventions) to safeguard rights of Libyans in Tunisia.
Institutional Recognition
Focus Group Participants Noted: Potential for Libyan elites and successes to be given special attention by Libyans institutions.
Role of Civil Society
Focus Group Participants Noted: Potential to anchor the principles and values of civil society and the encouragement of participatory, citizen, associative initiatives of Libyans abroad.
Convening Opportunity
Focus Group Participants Noted: Potential for Libyan Embassy in Tunis to organize each year a Libyan Businessmen's Forum in Tunisia, an event that provides a workshop space for networking, information on promising niches, exchange and conclusion of partnership agreements with their counterparts in Libya

Figure 9. Overview of Aims/Needs Expressed by Tunis Focus Group

Source: Focus group conducted by authors in Tunis (2019)

85 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.
86 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

should be a key focus for the roadmap on engaging Libyans living abroad.

The aims/needs of the engagement road re-emphasize some of the above points along with providing key additional insight for the roadmap. The aims/needs for engagement along with stakeholder input can be categorized as detailed in Figure 9.

These aims, combined with survey material and other focus group insights, pinpoint the early implementation activities to be developed from the roadmap. To formalize priority, stakeholders outlined a list of priority engagement areas where the roadmap can focus.

The key priorities were:

1. Business environment: Encourage, guide and inform Libyans to invest and launch projects in Libya; Present Libyans abroad with ideas for feasible projects and grant them the main tax and financial advantages; List Libyan businessmen in Tunisia in order to invite them to actively participate in events aimed at them.[87]

2. Networking process: List Libyan expertise and support their influence by organizing scientific or technological events; the Libyan authorities must implement its programmes of activities both within the country and in the host countries, relying in particular on a decentralized administrative and technical network; to motivate the associative initiatives of Libyans abroad and in particular those aimed at young people and families in the sense of citizenship and social and cultural integration.[88]

3. Cultural heritage: the implementation of targeted educational and socio-cultural action programmes based on the real needs of the younger generation while taking into account living conditions in Tunisia; Organize community rich programs as regards cultural, leisure and training events.[89]

4. Education: Provide Libyan students with almost free training in French; Support the creation of Libyan schools in Tunisia.[90]

It was recommended that the mains gaps can be summarized as a dual need of institutional and non-governmental needs. The institutional needs focused on "*creation of structures to implement the Libyan government's migration policy.*"[91] The non-governmental needs focused on the values of civil society and the encouragement of participatory, citizen, associative initiatives of Libyans abroad.

Focus Group Sfax

"*I think every day of Libya from north to south from east to west, I try to call my family every day, my friends and all those I know in Libya to hear from them and also about the situation in Libya on all levels (security, social, economic,...), in addition to phone calls, we also organize live calls on Skype with friends and we spend a whole evening together as if we were in Libya.*"[92]

The focus group in Sfax was arguably the most compelling focus group held as it directly engaged more vulnerable members of the community abroad. As such, and to ensure transparency of input, a more discursive approach was taken to the focus group. In engaging more vulnerable members of a community abroad, it is integral to remain respectful to their realities and make them feel comfortable to share their sensitivities.

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87 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.
88 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

89 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.
90 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.
91 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.
92 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

Given the composition of the focus group participants, the research will reflect their words and realities rather than assert an interpretative tone for this section of the study. As a research team, this step is taken as recognition of their voices and realities. Their input and ideas will then be embedded into the roadmap of activities identified later. In terms of the current situation, there is a deep and emotive connection to Libya. Stakeholders noted that the link to Libya "*is essential and indispensable,*" and they "*try with all available means to keep this strong connection.*"[93] It was noted that they "*monitor the situation in Libya on a daily basis through the media, social networks and also through their personal relationships.*"[94]

Current Situation
• Deep and Emotive Connection. Isolated from Support Structures. • Mistrust. • Data Violations.

Aims/Needs for
• Next Generation Support. • Creation of Associative Body. • Need for Political/Security Stability. • Enhanced Embassy/Consulate Services.

Priorities
• Health. • Networking. • Cultural Heritage. • Education.

Figure 10. Synopsis of Findings from Sfax Focus Group

Source: Focus group conducted by authors in Sfax (2019)

They remain, however, distant from institutional support structures as all participants noted that their connection to home "*as or-*ganised by personal means*" and that they "*received no support from the consulate and embassy as well as Libyan asspciations.*"[95] Enhancing such support can be a low-cost, early success for Libyans stakeholders in engaging their communities abroad.

This distance also fed from their "*mistrust especially towards the associations that have already contacted them, and did nothing for them, except for the organization of a few conferences, which they still believe do not provide anything concrete and do not change their vulnerable situations. In addition, these organizations have used their personal data for purposes other than social assistance, and this without their consent.*"[96] This mistrust is real and tangible for such layers of the community abroad and breaking down such attitudinal barriers in an early challenge for the forthcoming roadmap.

In relation to the aims/needs of engagement for this community, they can be categorized as as detailed in Figure 11 :

These insights help to design any formal engagement plan for engagement of Libyans living abroad. The first purpose for Libyan stakeholders is a duty of care for its people abroad. Throughout this focus group, the importance of diplomatic support was central. Consideration was given to issues such as:

• The renewal of circulation permits for cars in Tunisia and procedures for renewal;

• Obstacles in financial transactions with Tunisian banks;

• Difficulties over residence permits; Lack of communication from Embassy/

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93 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.
94 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

95 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.
96 Mustapha Kaaniche. "Report: Sfax Focus Group, 08/11/2019." ICMPD Tunis, 2019.

Next Generation Support
Focus Group Participants Noted: Their children share the same feelings of belonging to their country, and wish to visit Libya regularly. Also, they expressed dissatisfaction and claimed a lack of support and assistance for their children's schooling.
Creation of Associative Body
Focus Group Participants Noted: A need to set up an official or associative body so that they could better communicate with the Libyan authorities, and benefit from the necessary social and economic support, and at the same time contribute to the development of their country.
Need for Political/Social Security in Libya
Focus Group Participants Noted: Libya cannot develop without political and security stability; and their situation abroad is directly tied to such security.
Enhanced Embassy/Consulate Services
Focuse Group Participants Noted: Solutions for Libyans residing abroad can only be found through structural policies that focus on good governance of migration, but they do not hide their immediate needs, which can be met through short-term measures, such as improving services in consulates and embassies, especially in the social field and essentially covering care costs.

Figure 11. Overview of Aims/Needs Expressed by Sfax Focus Group

Source: Focus group conducted by authors in Sfax (2019)

• Consulate and resources within those institutions;

• Lack of adequate support in areas such as education, healthcare, and housing;

• Lack of community infrastructure especially in terms of networking between them, through the organization of activities, conferences, etc.

These concerns are, in fact, an opportunity for Libyan stakeholders to enact a meaningful step-change in its diplomatic care to Libyans living abroad. It will signpost that they are being taken seriously and that their issues matter.

The prioritization tool was again used to focus a phased implementation model for the roadmap. Although participants prescribed varying level of importance to key issues, the 4 most common priorities areas

were: Health, Networking, Cultural Heritage and Education. The reduced prominence of business was expected given the composition of the community.

As the focus group report notes, "*Networking, health and education present the priority areas for most participants, this is justified given the vulnerable situation of most participants*".[97] According to the participants, "*networking, between peers for example, will allow them to build relationships, and subsequently a network of connections that could be homogeneous in terms of concerns, which will further facilitate communication with the various Libyan or Tunisian stakeholders.*"[98]

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97 Mustapha Kaaniche. "Report: Sfax Focus Group, 08/11/2019." ICMPD Tunis, 2019.
98 Insight from Stakeholder Consultations.

Given the analysis offered within this section, the study must now address how to bring such engagement models that cater for the needs of Libyan stakeholders and Libyans living abroad from potential to policy to practice. The next sections of this research outline optimal institutional and engagement roadmaps to ensure that the next phases of this journey are impactful. They are designed to be simple, informative and based in the realities of the current profile and situation of Libyans living abroad.

LIBYAN INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

LIBYAN INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

This section of the study assesses the existing policy and institutional apparatus within Libya for pursing engagement of Libyans living abroad. The ongoing fragility of Libya's institutional apparatus limits the depth and scope of research possible, but this chapter serves as an illustrative guide on the necessary inter-institutional collaboration for such engagement.

Engaging the Libyan communities abroad will cut across several ministerial or institutional portfolios and a core set of recommended policy practices can attribute early impact for such engagement. At a minimum, Libyan stakeholders can commit to:

• Ensuring, when possible, high-level political support to the issue of engagement of Libyans living abroad

• Ensuring collaborative inter-institutional engagement

• Ensuring acknowledgement of engagement of Libyans living abroad in all relevant institutional framework/policy documents

• Ensuring development of an optimal organizational and operational culture for engagement of Libyans living abroad

• Ensuring a representative role for Libyans living abroad in the operationalizing of engagement activities.

SETTING AN INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK – FROM MANDATE TO MECHANISM

This section provides a synopsis of the key institutional apparatus with a mandate that positions such institutions as a core contributor to engagement of Libyans living abroad. The ongoing fluidity of institutionalization that informs Libyan policy landscapes given the ongoing migratory sensitivities in the region means that such mandates may be open to change. This equates to the need to ensure an agile governance framework for our roadmap.

It is not the aim of this research to assert on the validity of such mandates but to assess the institutional apparatus working on the topic with a view to developing recommendations on how best to develop a mechanism for engagement of Libyans living abroad at an institutional level. This mechanism should be designed to also include external partners such as ICMPD, international partners and Libyans living abroad themselves. It is through this collaborative lens, that the research identifies the relevant institutions below.

From a scoping of the relevant institutional apparatus currently operating within Libya, we can identify the following leading and supplementary apparatus for engagement of Libyans living abroad[1]:

Leading Apparatus

- **Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in particular):**
  - **Department of Expatriate Affairs**
  - **Department of Consular Affairs**
- **Ministry of State for Migrants and the Displaced**

Supplementary Apparatus

- **Department of Civil Society Organizations**
- **Department of International Organizations**
- **Department of International Cooperation**
- **Department of European Affairs**

Figure 12. Primary and Supplementary Apparatus in Proposed Institutional Road Map
Source: Authors' illustration

PRIMARY APPARATUS

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

The relevant aspects of the mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pertinent to the

engagement of Libyans living abroad include: Developing plans and programs that are designed to strengthen the political and economic relations between Libya and other countries; Holding oversight over the diplomatic functions of the Libyan State; and Housing of Social Attaches within certain embassies in order to provide data and information about displaced Libyans in those countries (mainly Egypt and Tunisia).

Given that the Department of Expatriate Affairs is part of this Ministry, the wider portfolio of the Ministry situates it as a key agency in the roadmap. It is uniquely positioned to address issues such as the education of children, medical insurance, residence and/or visas that have emerged as common problems for Libyans abroad.

The Social Attaches report back to the MFA and sometimes directly the Ministry of State for Migrants and the Displaced (MoSMD). However, recently the MoSMD set up an online service where displaced Libyans/forced Libyan migrants can apply online for assistance and do not need to visit an embassy. The aim of the roadmap, in part, should be to regularize these support engagements whilst also providing engagement opportunities for overachievers within Libyan communities living abroad. This duality of engaging the successful and supporting the vulnerable will address the findings of the research to date.

Department of Expatriate Affairs

The Department of Expatriate Affairs has a role in emigration, particularly in terms of looking after Libyan expatriates, as demonstrated in the mandate that is presented below. This mandate positions this department as the core apparatus of implementation for the roadmap as outlined in Figure 13.

The supplementary apparatus will bring context-specific expertise to enact engagement pertinent to their areas of work. It will be essential in the roadmap to ensure

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1 ICMPD. Information on Institutional Aspects of Policies on Libyans Living Abroad (Internal Document). Tunis, 2019. The institutions identified in this section of the analysis were based on this institutional scoping.

The mandate of the Department of Expatriate Affairs is set out in article (18) of Cabinet Decree No. (214) of 2012:
1. Preparation of a list of data and information on Libyans residing abroad.
2. Definition of expatriate contributions at home and abroad.
3. To connect the expatriates to their mother country Libya and to benefit from their experiences and experiences, care and lose their conditions and solve their problems.
4. To assist those who wish to return to the homeland and enable them to work, education and engage in three state institutions
5. Facilitate the procedures needed by the expatriate inside and outside the country.
6. Work to provide moral guidance and assistance to those who have been negatively affected by the cultures of others.
7. To connect and communicate between the Western society and the Libyan society to transfer the culture and practices that are consistent with our Islamic culture.
8. Transfer of knowledge and technology and the formation of strong relations in the field of education and scientific research. Encourage people with experience and skills, and identify and push them to take leadership positions and contribute to the service of the homeland, as well as encouraging the owners of capital to invest in the homeland

Figure 13. Mandate of Department of Expatriate Affairs

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Article (10) of Cabinet Decree No. (214) of 2012

that these supplementary entities formalize the importance of engaging Libyans living abroad within their own internal portfolios and strategic plans. This will safeguard the importance of the topic at an institutional level and enable the roadmap to build a tiered governance structure that can deliver executive and technical expertise to the engagement process. This is outlined in more detail in the next section of the research.

Department of Consular Affairs

The Department of Consular Affairs plays a broad role in emigration and mainly in terms of serving Libyans abroad for their consular needs (passports, documents, assistance, civil status, certifying documents, amongst other issues). Reflecting on the findings of previous sections, a central motif was on the need to improve capacity and services within consulates and embassies. The role of this department will be integral to further listening on these improvements along with providing scope to instrumentalize the enhancements.

Ministry of State for Migrants and the Displaced (MoSMD)

The mandate of the Ministry of State for Migrants and Displaced is not established by law. Rather, it has been established by an internal decision. The MoSMD only works with displaced Libyans (internal or external) and forced Libyan migrants. Its main function is to facilitate their return home or to other safe places of safe refuge within Libya. This ministry has an important role to play in engaging more vulnerable layers of the community abroad.

SUPPLEMENTARY APPARATUS

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

Department of Civil Society Organisations

While the Department of Civil Society Organisations does not have any direct mandate for migration management, it does have a mandate to work with civil society. Given the insights derived from the profile of Libyans living abroad and consultation processes, ci-

vil society entities are key actors in the road ahead.

They will be enablers of engagement by providing bridging services between Libyan stakeholders and its people abroad. They can be the honest brokers to build meaningful relationships across the spectrum of engagement.

Department of International Organisations

The Department of International Organisations does not have any direct mandate for migration management, but it does have a mandate to work with international organisations. For the same reasons that apply to the Department of Civil Society Organizations, this department will be an important contextual influencer for the roadmap and institutionalization of engagement. Such international organizations are repositories of capacity to develop the engagement model. They are key partners in this journey.

The Department of European Affairs

The Department of European Affairs under the MFA is responsible for all dealings with European countries. Given the fact that migration from Libya is generally destined for Europe, this department plays a significant role in migration management. The importance of this department relays to the diplomatic capital it can channel for our roadmap.

The Department of International Cooperation

The Department of International Cooperation plays a similar role to the Department for European Affairs, however for a broader region than just Europe. This department will be important as we advance the research and development on Libyans living abroad. As the data trends outlined earlier, globality is now emerging as the norm in terms of countries of destinations for Libyans living abroad.
The globality of the community will result in the need to develop international co-operation within many international jurisdictions.

Therefore, this department will play a key role in accessing the globality of the community. Whilst this may take time to achieve, it will be imperative to embed this department from the early stages of engagement in order to ensure they are informed of the roadmap and planned activities.

The study can now begin to focus on how to most effectively blend the mandate driven institutional apparatus with the community driven feedback of earlier sections. The first challenge is to enter a design concept phase where the study designs an optimal governance framework to bring engagement forward. This framework must be designed to be reflective of the evolving marketplace of engagement of communities living abroad along with being driven by a set of values driven purpose.

GOVERNANCE AND MECHANISM TO FACILITATE ENGAGEMENT


Figure 14. Phases of Governance of Proposed Institutional Road Map
Authors' illustration

Given the findings of the profile research and community consultations of this research, it is clear that a phased governance procedure needs to be enacted to safeguard engagement of Libyans living abroad. The attitudinal, behavioural, institutional and structural barriers to such engagement means that the governance framework should be one built incrementally with a clear focus on risk mitigation.

This research advocates for the application of the governance system based on creation, consolidation and curation. This will enable Libyan stakeholders to develop their internal capacities before enacting substantive engagement activities. This will provide opportunities to reduce the barriers outlined early by embedding the community abroad as a key constituent in designing the roadmap for activities also.

Furthermore, the projected implementation culture of partnership engagement posits certain governance needs to ensure donor and market confidence to deliver strategic engagement.

Governance Structure

Figure 15. Proposed Tiered Governance Structure for Engagement of Libyans Living Abroad

Authors' illustration

The juxtaposition of internal and external governance can be simplified to the process of developing an executive and operational tier to the governance framework. The executive tier is the internal inter-institutional apparatus to be built in Libya. It will focus on identifying the core organizational culture and collaboration to design engagement. Given the early stage of the engagement process, this will also be centred upon identifying the required capacity development of relevant institutions in Libya to shape impact through engagement of Libyans living abroad.

The operational leadership tier is an assessment of the required technical capacity and partners to enact engagement given the barriers outlined in the historiography and

profiling of the community abroad. Given the institutional landscape in Libya and the current situation of the communities abroad, Libyan stakeholders will need to adopt a multi-stakeholder partnership to effectively scale engagement of Libyans living abroad.

The research findings have indicated that there will be the need for a systematic process of community building and trust-building to be enacted. The historical complexities that informed the creation of communities of Libyans living abroad along with the ongoing potential of engagement cannot solely be a government-to-community-led process. If such a model was to be enacted, then there would be initial but unsustainable impact.

There is a prerequisite for engagement to ensure that all pertinent stakeholders – civil society, communities abroad, governmental institutional apparatus, international agencies, and the private sector – are built into a system of partnership to safeguard engagement. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the current situation in Libya heightens this need. The operational tier is focused on bringing those partners to the table to enhance the capacity of Libyan stakeholders. This is the creation phase.

Furthermore, the communities of Libyans living abroad should also be viewed as an integral partner in this tier. It is important to give Libyans living abroad a sense of ownership in this journey. The visualization below is an indicative top-tier organogram to execute such governance in action.

The below organogram displays the agency within the tiered structure. The executive leadership of the governance framework should be embedded into the ongoing work towards the creation of a national migratory system for Libya. Previous assessments undertaken by ICMPD showed that Libya does not yet have a clear institutional coordination platform for migration governance at a national

Figure 16. Institutional Tiers of Proposed Model of Engagement Governance
Authors' illustration

level. As long as no intra-Libyan inter-institutional coordination mechanism ("migration governance system") exists, Libya does not have a platform to define its strategy and priorities to inform its international cooperation and thus ensure its sustainability.

The establishment of such a system is imperative for the executive competencies to drive engagement of Libyans living abroad. This form of engagement will flux across institutional apparatus and the need for an intra-Libyan inter-institutional coordination mechanism is imperative. Many of the failures in engagement of communities abroad by different governments is rooted in their inability to build such a mechanism.

It is noted in ongoing dialogues that the intermediary of a «Migration Governance Coordination Body» (MG-CB) would ensure inter-institutional coordination among all stakeholders in the field of migration management regardless of their sector and area of intervention. This co-ordination and convening role positions such a body as the natural executive body of the governance framework of engagement of Libyans living abroad.

Tier 2 brings an array of operational models for its implementation. Given the projected partnership model of engagement, the number of active participants within the tier increases. The core challenge then reverts to an issue of co-ordination. Given the contexts and findings through the research thus far, the governance roadmap must assess as to where the core responsible agency for implementation should be. This is the consolidation phase.

For example, should it be a government-led process or a community-led process? Should it be a blended process that embeds a mutuality of involvement across the active participants? Should it be a civil society led process? Should it be local, regional or globally situated? These all have various implementation models, but the research findings lend towards two viable options. These are visualized below:

Given the ongoing work to increase the institutional capacity of Libyan stakeholders then there is a potential to situate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically through the Department of Expatriate Affairs as the

co-ordinating mechanism to embed the other key stakeholders. This will align with the recommendation to ensure ongoing institutional capacity development. However, when assessed in the context of the research

ration phase where Libyan stakeholders will have the necessary capacities to execute a firmer leadership role in engagement of Libyans living abroad.


Figure 17. Options for Structure of Tier 2 of Proposed Governance Structure

Authors' illustration

findings, this model may need to be the deliverable of the next stage of work. There are significant findings in terms of the barriers to engagement that indicate that such a model is not market ready. In line with the plans around a national intra-Libyan inter-institutional governance system, budget may also be a significant barrier to market entry for this model. It is imperative, therefore, to consider Model B as a pathway model towards Model A. This model is developed through a networked agency model to avoid hierarchical approaches to implementation structure. This adopts "a team of teams" approach that is shaping optimal implementation models in the public and private sector. The "team of teams" approach is a decentralized model that is based on mutual accountability for the successful implementation of the engagement process. By transitioning to Model A at the end of the roadmap, this will be the cu-

This ensures that all participants and stakeholders have equal buy-in and sense of ownership to the process. An added value of the model is also that it is based on an agile model of governance where small teams in disparate geographies can relate to their common purpose and vision. It is this agile connectivity that makes it an optimal model for engagement of Libyans living abroad given the current profile and situation of the community.

For example, in the operational leadership tier of the governance framework, the geographical spread of influencers would be a challenge in a different model. The role of the Department of Expatriate Affairs and the Technical Committee will be based in Libya, the role of ICMPD and their engagement of Donor Relationship Management will be across geographies, as will the role

of the Representative Body of Libyans Living Abroad. This "team of teams" approach will set out specific terms of reference for each entity and enable collaboration through digital and in-person connectivity. The "team of teams" approach ensures that all who should have a voice, can have a voice. It also works to ensure equality and inclusivity; thus, delivering the organizational culture outlined later in this research.

At a practical level, it offsets budgetary and logistical pressure from the MoFA but positioning it within a triangulated model of implementation partnership. It will open access to sources of budgetary and capacity knowhow along with providing ongoing engagement with key partners that can support its evolution towards sole lead implementation agency. The next section of the research identifies how each layer of the organogram is shaped and operationalized.

LAYERS OF THE ORGANOGRAM: A SHORT SYNOPSIS

This section outlines a short overview of each layer of the organizational structure. The Migration Governance Coordination Body, as outlined in documents on possible institutional reforms, would be responsible for coordinating the intervention of all Libyan public institutions in charge of the migration issue. This will necessarily involve the establishment of inter-institutional agreements that would regulate and systematize all the interactions between the different institutions. Moreover, it can play either only a coordinating role without decision-making leadership (an inter-ministerial commission under the aegis of the Presidential council), or a joint coordinating and leadership role (e.g. being a ministry or a state secretariat) or a third format to be agreed later.

In bridging from the executive to technical layers of the governance framework, it is essential to allocate a core Libyan institution to provide that brokerage. It is recommended

that the Department of Expatriate Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs execute this role. Their mandate is mostly centralized on the aims and expectations of future engagements from the perspectives of both Libya and its communities abroad.

This layer of governance – as per Model B outlined earlier – also embeds a simultaneous presence for external partners to work in collaboration with this department. This will bring the capacities provided by such external partners into direct support of the core implementation agency. This is a risk mitigation tool to ensure that the necessary capacity to deliver engagement is afforded to Libyan stakeholders.

As noted earlier, this model will bring a substantive repository of budgetary, capacity expertise and know-how to help engagement of Libyans living abroad. Furthermore, it is intrinsic for issues of accountability and transparency – echoed through input from Libyans living abroad through this research – that the governance mechanism embeds audit partners to nurture early stage engagement. The tier will, at a minimum:

• Be led by a management council of 7-10 representatives with an elected chairperson and vice-chairperson

• Consist of executive level leadership within their respective entities/organizations

• Include high-level members of the community of Libyans living abroad

• Reflect the stated cultures outlined in this research particularly on areas of diversity, equality and inclusivity

• Act as a formal and informal "ambassador" for the engagement with Libyans living abroad

• Advocate for financial support through partnership with donors to support the aims/activities of engagement. (A Prospect Index will be needed to source such participants).

It is imperative that the governance design is not solely governmental led so embedding key constituencies from the communities living abroad can be developed to support this work. Similar entities have brought impact in other countries on engagement of communities living abroad, for example Ireland, Mexico and Portugal.

For example, the "*Portuguese Diaspora Council is a non-profit private association, founded in 26th December 2012, with the high patronage of the President of the Portuguese Republic."*[2] The work of the council is driven through a World Portuguese Network. The governance of the council is based upon roles of Honorary Presidency, General Assembly and a Board of Directors. These roles are allocated as follows:

The Honorary Presidency: is composed by the President of the Portuguese Republic and the Minister of the Foreign Affairs

The General Assembly: is "*the supreme body that decides on the policies to follow, composed by all members of the association that represents the universality of the associates. The Bureau of the Diaspora Council is composed by one President, one Vice-President and one statutory auditor (non-member of the Council). The Diaspora Council meets once a year."*

The Board of Directors: is "*the decision-making body of our association who determines the strategic positioning and vision. It is composed by 11 Board Members, including the President of the Board, with a diverse range of experience and background. The Board meets at least four times a year."*[3]

It will be important to further create a technical committee of government staff who will be responsible for the core day to day management of engagement. Linking this technical committee with a representative body of Libyans Living Abroad will enable a deeper connection between Libya and its people abroad. The Portuguese model outlined above is one option and the annex material accompanying this research provides a representative sample of global best practices. This is smart power foreign policy in practice; people to people power.[4]

These steps also have a subsidiary impact for the community living abroad. There is a strong need to begin to develop a culture of connectivity and convening between Libyans living abroad. Such a representative body of Libyans living abroad will act as a pathway to such a culture. It will remain intrinsically difficult to engage Libyans living abroad if they remain disconnected to each other in their countries of destination. This inter-community networking is a necessity for engagement.

There will be a need to embed monitoring and evaluation in line with projected public and donor expenditure in this model. During these evaluative points, this implementation framework can be assessed for market compatibility. As engagement of Libyans living abroad matures, the implementation framework may take on a more complex footing. This will require a fresh re-imagining of the implementation framework at that stage.

2 For more information, see https://www.diasporaportuguesa.org/board-of-directors/?lang=en.

3 For more information, see https://www.diasporaportuguesa.org/board-of-directors/?lang=en.
4 See footnote 44 regarding the work of Joseph Nye on smart power.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CULTURE

Given the specificities of the Libyan context and histories, the engagement of Libyans living abroad is now entering a key "values-driven" phase. Whilst the energies and interests of the communities abroad to engage back home are clear, there is now a need to embed a systematic organizational and operational culture to such engagements. These cultures are a stated commitment to act as a code of good practice and baseline expectation to increase market trust for such engagements.

The relevance of asserting a stated commitment on how the engagement process will act is focused on the attitudinal, behavioural and structural barriers identified in the stakeholder consultations. Libyans living abroad are acutely aware of why Libyan stakeholders want to engage them, particularly the successful members of the community. Yet, there is a fatigue as several engagements have been deemed insincere by Libyans living abroad.

By establishing a short section in the study on organizational and operational cultures, they act as a promise to the community abroad and the partners for engagement on how the engagement process will proceed in terms of behaviour from Libyan stakeholders. This is critical for engagement and can also be instrumental in sourcing external support for the roadmap ahead. In terms of engaging international partners, ensuring compliance with their ethos and values is emerging as a key determinant in donor decision making.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The organizational culture of engagement of Libyans living abroad are based on the standardized principles of engagement of communities abroad informed by ICMPD's approach and global best practice. ICMPD's working philosophy is based upon the conviction that:

"*the complexities of migration challenges can only be met by working in partnership with governments, research institutes, international organisations, intergovernmental institutions and civil society. The work of ICMPD is based on a three-pillar approach: Policy & Research, Migration Dialogues and Capacity Building.*"[5]

This research advocates that engagement of Libyans living abroad – owing to the compositive constituencies of successful and vulnerable communities abroad – be based upon a spirit of ethos, ethics and empathy. The ethos should be based upon togetherness and reciprocity. It views Libyans living abroad as co-creators of Libya's development.[6]

The operational culture is first and foremost driven through an ethics of care prior to ethical engagement.[7] It should be the stated aim of Libyan stakeholders and their partners to contribute to its vulnerable people abroad whilst also ensuring ethical engagement of its successful members living abroad. This is based upon a culture of empathy. Empathy is an important belief system in engagement of communities living abroad. An empathetic organizational culture will ensure listening across the spectrum of engagement.

OPERATIONAL CULTURE

It should be the stated aim to undertake en-

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5 For more information see: https://www.icmpd.org/our-work/.

6 The concept of co-creation has been advanced in several emerging examples of good practice in diaspora engagement. See annex material for more information.

7 The ethics of care concept in diaspora strategies was initially advanced by the collaborative work of Prof. Mark Boyle, Dr. Elaine Lynn Ee Ho and colleagues. For a formative overview, see Elaine L.E Ho, Mark Boyle, and Brenda S.A Yeoh. "Recasting Diaspora Strategies through Feminist Care Ethics." Geoforum, Vol 59, 2015.

gagement of Libyans living abroad in an accountable manner. The institutional roadmap identified above has instilled a system of accountability to protect donor and community confidence in the transparency of the operational culture.

Contextualizing both those components is a stated commitment by Libyan stakeholders to ensure sustainability both in terms of sourcing support and its operational output for engagement of the community abroad. Furthermore, there is a commitment to ensure that the operational output works to the sustainability of the communities it serves – respective partners and Libyans living abroad.

ENGAGEMENT BEHAVIOUR/ IMPLEMENTATION

By embedding these organizational and operational cultures, the study outlines a robust baseline of behaviour commitments from Libyan stakeholders. These are:

- To adhere to an accessible and agile model of engagement that is based on diversity, equality and inclusivity

- To work towards ensuring the aspirations of Libyans living abroad are heard and considered

- To focus on ensuring community integration for Libyans living abroad and to promote their co-operation with counterparts in Libya (government and non-governmental)

- To promote digitalization and innovation in the engagement process when possible

- To adhere to world-class standards on accountability and transparency to ensure trustworthiness of the engagement process.

By working along these commitments, the research is recommending a vital step-change in the culture of engagement along the lines of input from our research findings. The potential of such commitments is that they are a set of values and commitment. They are free; and would signify an important development in how Libyans living abroad want to be engaged from Libya.

ROADMAP: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY ENGAGING LIBYANS LIVING ABROAD

ROADMAP: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY ENGAGING LIBYANS LIVING ABROAD

This chapter collates the analysis and findings outlined above along with the core guiding principles to answer a simple yet challenging research question: What are the policy recommendations that can enhance the strategic and institutional management of engaging Libyans living abroad? The answer to this needs to be rooted in realism and can be reimagined to a more basic consideration below:

How can we get the strategic and institutional market ready for engagement of Libyans living abroad? The harsh reality is that issues of discord and distrust means that the job at hand now is to develop market readiness for engagement of Libyans living abroad. Contextually within this body of work, the research must be driven by a desire to ensure sustainability to our engagement. Within this, the research must answer the fundamental question of why we are engaging Libyans living abroad? And then, assess whether the motivations of Libyan stakeholders reflect the motivations of Libyans living abroad. Consensus is the deliverable.

Whilst there are clear attitudinal and structural barriers to engagement, immediate recommendations must focus on building blocks of engagement. The study recom-

mends a simultaneous process of internal and external development in the first phase of the roadmap. Without these building blocks in place, it would be illogical to advance any systematic engagement activities as the infrastructure will not be strong enough to sustain such engagements.

ROADMAP: EARLY ACTIVITIES

The above roadmap provides an achievable process of activity that can enhance the market readiness for engagement of Libyans living abroad. It develops internal and external capacities whilst setting in place a procedure that can be road-tested via direct market interventions.

In terms of direct internal capacity building, there is a need to enact the governance framing outlined in the earlier chapter. This will enable key interlocutors to assess capacity needs of key Libyan institutions in more detail and design long-term projects to shape such capacity support. Some other key steps in this regard include investment in the upskilling of key staff and institutions. Engagement of communities abroad remains a diplomatic skillset so there is an opportunity to invest in the training of such staff and institutional representatives.

Internal Development

- **Institutional Development**
- **Leadership Development/Upskilling of Staff**
- **Policy Infrastructure**
- **Accessing Global Best Practice**

External Development

- **Network Infrastructure**
- **Cross–Community Collaboration**
- **Listening**
- **Governance**
- **DRM**

Market Readiness

- **Setting the Agenda**
- **Focus Group Findings**
- **Pragmatism**
- **Building the System**

Figure 18. Road Map for Market Readiness for Engagement of Libyans Living Abroad
Authors' illustration

This research has informed the development of a capacity development workshop to be held in early 2020. This acts as a base scenario of elementary trainings to upskill staff. The workshop will showcase research findings along with specific training on Research and Development [R&D]; Donor Engagement (Networking and Fundraising); the 3rd Sector; and Success Stories from other countries.

The training on R&D will focus on comparative assessment of the institutional coordination mechanisms for engagement of communities abroad for Libya and the skillset to execute these models. The networking and fundraising training will focus on the softer skills of engagement required and is linked to the training on the importance of working with the 3rd sector (sectors outside government and business such as civil society).

Yet, it is important to note here that the upskilling process should be a blend of the hard and soft skills of diplomacy in 21st century statecraft. This is echoed through the focus groups and providing a baseline, accredited training programme in engagement of communities abroad with such a blended focus is a natural first step in the training process.

Finally, the sharing of success stories is an influential aggregation of knowledge given that the engagement of communities living abroad is a non–competitive sector. For example, an individual who wants to help Libya does not want to help Lithuania so countries can share their models of engagement.

Another logical internal development process is the development of an updated strategy on engagement of Libyans living abroad. This strategy can safeguard engagement during the ongoing fragile context of Libya. Such a strategy can be a bridge towards formalization of the policy infrastructure in the development of an official policy on engagement of Libyans living abroad. A strategy template for Libya based on this research follows as the conclusion of the research. In the interim, there is strong capital in opening access for Libyan stakeholders to regional and global best practice on engagement of communities living abroad.

Externally, this research has unearthed a long process of community building that needs to happen for Libyans living abroad. Enacting an ethics of care means investment and sup–

port should be provided to the deepening of the network infrastructure of Libyans living abroad. This will help with accessing data and building consultations further. Libyans living abroad are disconnected and providing connective platforms can enable greater cohesion at a community level.

In the direct interventions outlined later, we explore how commitment to dialogue, governance, and listening can be supported. Finally, in terms of external capacities, there is a unique opportunity for Libya to convert on the growing regional and global interest on engagement of communities abroad. There is a need to embed a Donor Relationship Management structure – as outlined in the governance roadmap - to ensure sustainability to the plans for engagement of communities abroad.

Donor Relationship Management is based on upgrading existing international cooperation mechanisms for Libyan stakeholders. It focuses on positioning a professional and strategic approach to fundraising and other forms of cooperation. It is important in this professionalization to invest in research and development of the donor landscape – both public and private sector – that can help build priorities and prospects for external support. The landscape of international development finance is shifting significantly, and this type of management is designed to ensure that Libyans stakeholders engage the right partner for the right purpose for the right period.

Engagement of communities abroad and projects within this sector often fail due to a lack of long-term finance and planning to attract such finance. Donor Relationship Management is designed to professionalize the planning process to adopt a long-term, relationship driven engagement of donors. It is imperative that external support "moves from

transactions to habitual."[1]

By linking such internal and external capacity development, Libyan stakeholders will be able to arrive at a collaborative agenda for engagement encapsulating the input of pertinent influencers. These will be rooted in pragmatism and ensure that the early system for engagement is built. It will ensure simultaneity in the development of internal stakeholders in Libya along with external stakeholders – namely the communities of Libyans living abroad. The study now focuses on engagement recommendations to be enacted upon completion of capacity development to test the effectiveness of these steps.

MARKET READINESS TO ENGAGEMENT
Risk–Management & Engagement Activities

In building the above system of engagement to ensure market readiness, a phased implementation programme should then be built through a robust legislative and policy standing for engagement of communities abroad. When shifting towards the operationalization of engagement, stakeholders in Libya and its partners should ensure to curate a culture of engagement that scales through systematic process. In other words, the engagement portfolio should not overreach in the early phases.

There are a series of risk management techniques that can be built within the engagement cycle to achieve this scale in process. This research – through an indicative overview of organizational and operational culture – has begun this process. These core behavioural expectations are designed as the first steps in creating such a culture of engagement.

1 Kingsley Aikins and Martin Russell. "Why Diaspora Matters for Policy and Practice." Migra Migration, Policy, Practice, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 2013.

The risk management of the roadmap can also be guided by international best practice on engagement of communities abroad and through an ongoing central role for IC-MPD. At its core, engagement of communities abroad is still a sector in development. The truth is that a lot of such engagements fail due to rushing to market too quickly. It is important to study these failures to identify elements that contributed to their lack of impact. In the context of this research, the study can categorize three key areas of engagement recommendations to focus on to limit the likelihood of failure.

These key elements can be categorized as communications, trust and scale. The communication need of this study is the humanistic endeavour to build connectivity and relationships between Libyan stakeholders and Libyans living abroad. A subset of this is the issue of trust. Trust is not an event; it has to be earned, so Libyan stakeholders now need to enact engagements to build trust. Finally, scale is the testing moment of the market readiness process. It is simply a process to verify the earlier roadmap activities by testing engagement in softer areas of engagement with Libyans living abroad to see whether it will work or not. It is the application of the theory.

Upon completion of the organizational planning and capacity development, there will be a need to road-test engagement. The above are a series of low-risk intervention areas for engagement of Libyans living abroad that will be able to successfully chart the effectiveness of the procedures and planning advocated earlier in this research.

The communications pillar will establish a process of accountability that will act as a record of fact in the implementation of the procedural developments. Within the governance structure outlined previously, there should be a minimum of annual reports from both tiers of the structure. Within the strategy

template to follow, each activity within each strand should also embed realistic reporting procedures in lines with normative expectations of the implementing agency. This will ensure a macro and micro level of monitoring and evaluation materials that will enhance market confidence in the procedures developed for engagement.

This is based on the active inclusion of international agencies and partners to enact engagement. It is also based on the active implementation of Libyans living abroad as local owners of their respective engagement portfolios. It is through a robust communication strategy to relay these partnerships and steps that market confidence will be able to build on the mutuality of purpose in engaging Libyans living abroad.

Figure 19. Engagements as Verification of Market Readiness

Authors' illustration

Similarly, engagements should be able to test the creation of trust. Trust can and should lead to action by Libyans living abroad. If the processes and procedures are built at a communal level between Libyan stakeholders and Libyans living abroad then the next logical step is to mobilize through this trust. It would be illogical to expect expansive mobilization so segmented engagements of low risk need to be nurtured.

Promotion of dialogue/forums – both in country of origin and residence – can be powerful convenors to see if trust can translate to engagement. For example, the Global Irish Civic Forum is a convening of community leaders from the Irish diaspora who return to Ireland for a forum to discuss the aims, concerns and needs of Irish diaspora – in particular, vulnerable members of the diaspora. Organized by the Irish Abroad Unit of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the forum works across key themes and acts a pathway to real-time insight on how best support the Irish diaspora.

Several countries utilize such gatherings to continue to build relationships with their communities abroad. They are also design gatherings where the engagement journey can be mapped out. They focus on identifying the capacities and propensities of your communities abroad to engage.[2] Furthermore, such convenings should be authentic and embed the communities abroad as the active participants and influencers in the design and success of the convening. It is important to provide a balance between government input and input from the community abroad.

Libyan stakeholders can also advance trust through softer asks and mindsets. A key mindset in creating trust is in the process of giving to your community abroad before trying to get something back from them. This will lead to engagement in areas of care, community and culture that provide pathways to more robust developmental asks for Libya such as skills transfer or economic development.

Indeed, the survey findings posit that promotion of cultural heritage, supporting networks and building inter-community connections are all low-cost impact areas for Libyan stakeholders. Furthermore, the prominence of professional exchange to advance Libya in the survey findings indicate such exchange as a natural engagement point.

The lack of community organizations within the findings of the survey for example provide an obvious way of giving back to the communities abroad. Supporting them in their work to build such organizations can be a powerful commitment from Libyan stakeholders.

Underpinning a lot of the above is a simple proposition: If Libyan stakeholders invest in building the correct system of engaging Libyans living abroad and we get the market ready – will Libyans living abroad advocate for Libya? The historiography outlined earlier indicates that Libyans living abroad are ready to stand with Libya when they are needed to. The focus groups powerfully articulate the affinity and passion that Libyans living abroad have for Libya. This should not be underestimated or undervalued. The engagement of Libyans living abroad is not merely an engagement of choice for Libyan development; it is an engagement of necessity for Libyan development. Scaling engagement will come back to providing the communities abroad with "*asks and tasks.*"[3]

A soft yet powerful ask is to ask the communities of Libyans living abroad to advocate for Libya and help contribute to continuing to build a positive perception of Libya globally. The intersections of communities living abroad, and nation-branding is an emerging discourse of interest for many governments as it is an early prerequisite for scalable engagement.

2 Kingsley Aikins and Martin Russell. "Why Diaspora Matters for Policy and Practice." Migration, Policy, Practice, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 2013.

3 Aikins and Russell, "Why Diaspora Matters."

Evolving engagement from softer engagements to developmental engagements of scale will take time. Within this roadmap, it will mean the design of engagement projects aligned with the wider culture of care that many communities living abroad desire. Whilst governmental foci have centred on issues of economic development through engagement of communities abroad – to limited success – pathway projects to such engagements are often overlooked.

It is the recommendation of this roadmap that Libyan stakeholders culminate this roadmap through engagement activities that serve the interest of their communities abroad. The simple reality is that many Libyans living abroad want to engage with Libya because they care about its cultural and social development. Key interventions in areas of social development and philanthropy – particularly given the current situation in Libya – are the natural next frontiers of engagement of Libyans living abroad.

VISUALIZING THE ROADMAP

The assessment of this research paper is that there needs to be a systematic design of a multi-year strategic template for engagement of Libyans living abroad. This roadmap is cyclic and cumulative. This is visualized below:


Figure 20. Policy Road Map for Engagement of Libyans Living Abroad
Authors' illustration

This template will enhance the strategic and institutional management of engagement of Libyans living abroad. It will enact the necessary internal and external procedures to design effective engagement. Strand 1 should focus on the institutional and leadership development in line with the governance components of the research outlined earlier.

It works on the creation of the necessary institutional apparatus within Libya and the community abroad. It then enacts the governance framework; this requires budget and expertise. Without this strand and the coordination apparatus it provides, engagement will not be built on a solid footing. This strand should not be built quickly. The research has proven that patience is now needed to build the engagement framework. It is imperative to adopt a long-term vision, and this will be a courageous leadership decision by Libyan stakeholders. This will see significant upskilling of the necessary stakeholders in Libya to enact engagement – governmental and non-governmental.

Within this strand, there is also a need to deepen understanding on Libyan's living abroad. This includes a specific research and development component not just focused on deepening datasets on the community abroad but also promoting external research on the subject matter. For obvious reasons, there remains a reticence from the community abroad to share their data, so such external knowledge production is essential to inform data driven decision making in later strands of the roadmap.

Strand 2 should focus on supporting the Libyans living abroad. It caters for the communication and community-based needs identified through the research project. It will act as a proof of commitment by Libyan stakeholders to the engagement process and tackle the issue of fatigue within the community abroad. Activities within this strand should focus on cultivating the community's eagerness

to build in their adopted homelands. It gives to them before asking them to give.

Strand 3 should focus on the facilitation of human capital exchange from Libyans living abroad back to Libya. These interventions are low risk and can nurture the critical trust to scale later engagements in line with the analysis of the previous section. Activities within these strands can focus on sector networks, peer to peer networks, emerging talent networks or institutional partnerships such as academia.

Finally, strand 4 should see transition projects from human capital to economic development programmes. The role of Libyans living abroad in the economic development will not happen instantaneously. By following these strands of the roadmap, the research can get the institutional landscape in Libya and the community belief in Libyans living abroad market ready.

Given the normative expectations on expenditure of donor and public funds, the roadmap should have a stand-alone strand on monitoring and evaluation. This should execute world-class compliance with issues of accountability, reporting and transparency as noted earlier.

CONCLUSION

This study has, at its core, an aim to contribute to the growing academic and practitioner assessments of Libyans living abroad. The communities of Libyans living abroad are a complex tapestry that are shaped by the many histories, memories and stories that have shaped their creation. This research worked to remain cognizant and respectful of such historical complexity.

Therefore, as Libya now begins to design a more systematic approach to engagement of these communities with the vision of mutual benefit for Libya and its communities abroad, it must recognize that such engagement is at its infancy. Engagement to date has been ad hoc and sporadic, linked to the historical fortunes of Libya. Therefore, now is a moment of significant opportunity in the story of Libya and its communities abroad.

Despite ongoing uncertainty within Libya, its communities abroad and their ties to home have reawakened through the events of 2011. Libya can now put in place the building blocks of engagement. This is a powerful aggregator moment for Libya and its communities abroad. This research contends that Libya needs to look internally and externally for the answers of its future. Libyans living abroad are uniquely positioned to be a co-creator of this future.

This study has worked to reflect the voices and realities of Libyans living abroad. It has strived to put in place recommendations that are achievable and realistic for all involved. Through building relationships of meaning rather than transactions, then this research recommends that Libyan stakeholder set in motion a spirit of partnership and trust that can bring a new emphasis for engagement of Libyans living abroad. This will require an honesty and patience from all involved. It is achievable together.

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