



Supporting the future of Syria and the region

Brussels V Conference | March 2021

Civil society in the Syria crisis

Report on the online consultations for the Brussels V Conference on
“Supporting the future of Syria and the region”



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Intro

The European Union and the United Nations will co-chair the Fifth Brussels Conference on "Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region" on 29-30 March 2021. As last year, the high-level ministerial part of the event is adapted to the COVID-19 regulations and will thus be organised online allowing remote participation.

As inclusion of civil society is essential for the future of Syria as well as for the crisis response of the refugee-hosting countries, the European Union has held an online consultation through Upinion's platform to capture the voices of civil society and as a confirmation of the EU's commitment to work closely with civil society actors Syria and the region. A similar exercise was conducted through Upinion's platform in the run-up to the Fourth Brussels Conference held in June 2020. Additional efforts have been made to reach CSOs that were not reached through the EU's network in 2020, and consultation reports have been incorporated into this report to ensure a complete and inclusive participation of all actors involved in the Syrian crisis.

Given the protracted nature of the crisis and deteriorating conditions in Syria and the region as a result of economic crises and COVID-19, this consultation focused on longer term solutions and recommendations for the future.

The results of the survey were taken into due consideration to shape the discussions to take place between civil society active in Syria and the region, the EU, the UN and relevant international/regional stakeholders during the "Day of Dialogue with civil society" (29 March 2021). Participants of this consultation will also be invited to participate in real-time and address their questions before and during the panel discussions.

The outcome of this consultation will be communicated at the Brussels V Conference's Ministerial event¹ (30 March 2021) by selected CSO rapporteurs who have been nominated by the participants during the consultation.

¹ Link to conference website for more information:
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/93313/node/93313_en

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

CBO	Community Based Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG NEAR	Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiation, European Commission
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
EU	European Union
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
GoJ	Government of Jordan
HLP	Housing Land and Property
HQ	Headquarter
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
ISMS	Information Security Management System
MOIM	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TLS	Transport Layer Security
UN	United Nations
UN Resolution 2254	The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 calls for a ceasefire and political settlement in Syria.

Executive summary

For the second year in a row -due to COVID-19 restrictions- the EU conducted a digital outreach to civil society within Syria and the neighbouring countries to gather substantive input for the fifth Brussels Conference on the future of Syria and the region (29-30 March 2021). The EU received, through Upinion's platform and the thematic consultations held by the EU and the UN in the region, a total of 1.572 responses from organisations or individuals who shared their thoughts, concerns and recommendations on the future of Syria and the region.

The online consultation took place between 18 February and 2 March 2021 and resulted in responses from civil society representatives from Syria and the region, international NGOs, local authorities, academia, and individuals. This year, special attention was paid to the participation by local Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) in Syria. Additional outreach was therefore conducted through Upinion's local partner to reach another 103 CBOs outside the EU's network. At the same time, inputs were received from organisations throughout Syria and the region in the form of thematic consultations organised by the EU and/or UN agencies with CSOs, as well as an open invitation for relevant CSO networks representing a wide variety of actors to organize their own locally led consultations and share the key outcomes. This resulted in another twenty written responses representing a total of more than 200 organisations, with participation from more than 1.000 individuals.

Participants identified priority sub-themes under separate "domains" or frames of analysis: either "Resilience" or "Humanitarian". As Syria entered its 10th year of conflict, however, it has become clear from the quantitative and qualitative analyses gathered here that distinctions between the domains are not always possible to draw, given the profound linkages between and among these topics and the overarching nexus between humanitarian aid, resilience, development, and peace. Nevertheless, this report provides separate analyses of the findings of the separate domains before summarizing the recommendations made by participants in each theme, while noting the interconnections.

Priority sub-themes under Resilience

Participants operating inside Syria consider Livelihoods, Education and Social Protection/Social Assistance respectively as the most relevant themes, which should be the priority focus for the international community in the coming 12 months. Participants in the neighbouring countries echoed the selection of their Syria-based counterparts. Given that involvement of local actors was mentioned continuously throughout all the themes, the fourth most frequently chosen sub-theme, 'Support to local NGOs/CSOs and Grassroot organisations', has been discussed in detail as well.

Priority sub-themes under Humanitarian

Similar to the priorities under Resilience, participants from Syria and neighbouring countries selected Food Security & Livelihoods, Education and Protection as the key themes for the upcoming year. All priority themes were interlinked.

Key results and recommendations

Consistent with the findings last year, participants repeatedly called for **more continuous and more robust engagement between international policymakers and civil society in Syria and the region**. Also this year, far and wide, the need to **include and involve local organisations, especially in the design/decision making, execution, and evaluation of programmes - rather than only in implementation - has been mentioned extensively**. Involving local actors, using local talent and freeing funding to reach local organisations directly or, if necessary, through funding to international NGOs who can in turn build the capacity of local actors has been a cross-cutting issue throughout the whole consultation process. For all sub-themes, participants were clear: funding should be allocated **to local NGOs/CBOs and Grassroots Organisations directly, in addition to cash-vouchers and in-kind assistance for the humanitarian domain specifically**.

The overlap of the issues and recommendations that emerged in the survey in the Resilience and Humanitarian domains show the relevance of **the “triple nexus” of humanitarian aid, development, and peace**. With the conflict entering its 10th year, the protracted crisis still requires humanitarian support, but participants **increasingly emphasise the need to build the resilience and capacities of local actors** in order to reduce dependency on short-term international assistance, **increase social and human capital within Syria** and the diaspora, and empower local civil society.

Although resilience was heavily emphasised, participants urged that resilience and recovery should not come at the cost of **conflict resolution and justice**. Indeed, **participants from Syria frequently called for transitional justice and conflict resolution**, and expressed a desire for the **EU to play an active role** supporting civil society in achieving a **political solution**, including the process of drafting a constitution and holding elections. In this respect, participants suggested that the **EU and other international actors should focus their direct interventions on peace and justice efforts, which require political leverage, while providing resources to local actors to build resilience** and, where necessary, respond to humanitarian emergencies.

In addition to the continuing humanitarian crisis in Syria, **the deterioration of the social and economic situation in Lebanon is exacerbating the vulnerabilities and needs of both local populations and the refugees** from Syria. Without immediate emergency **assistance to local**

CSOs and concerted **engagement with the government** to resolve the crisis, **Lebanon is at risk of collapse**, generating mass displacement of both Lebanese and Syrian refugees.

Across many of the priorities, recommendations focused on the need for **local leadership, especially at early stages of programming**. Indeed, some participants expressed that a **lack of local leadership** has contributed to **programming that does not correspond to needs** on the ground, which has **eroded trust** between communities and international actors.

Many consultation participants indicated that support for **Livelihoods** should increase **access to labour markets**, especially in neighbouring countries where **structural barriers** to accessing the labour market **include work permits, legal residency, discrimination, and, in the case of Turkey, language barriers**. Respondents in **Lebanon and Turkey** stressed the difficulty of **obtaining and maintaining legal permission to work**, which can **render livelihood projects ineffective** by preventing the beneficiaries from using newly-obtained skills in the labour market. Respondents in **Jordan** stressed **unsafe conditions faced by workers, restrictive regulations for refugees seeking to open home-based businesses, and the limitations on the sectors in which refugees can work**, all of which undermine refugees' efforts to establish sustainable livelihoods for themselves. Inside **Syria**, participants often mentioned the **disconnect between training or education programs and genuine livelihood opportunities**. They recommended increasing investment in **livelihoods projects**, such as agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, and industry, which can be **self-sustaining and support the local economy**. They also noted that there is an urgent need to facilitate **access to financing, specifically for these local, self-sustaining initiatives** that will lead to more inclusive growth. Respondents frequently mentioned **women and youth** as key actors in the Livelihoods sector.

Also **within the theme of livelihoods, frequent linkages were made to social cohesion**. Participants in neighbouring countries and within Syria identified access to livelihoods as a key component of **mitigating social tension** and, where needed, restoring peace. Finally, **participants in Syria highlighted the risks of brain drain** and the loss of a generation of young people, either to **migration** or **disconnection from the labour market** due to prolonged unemployment and loss of hope. Some mentioned the risks of **recruitment to armed parties** of youth disconnected from employment.

For **Education**, respondents reported **three distinct types of barriers to access**. First, **physical and logistical barriers** were reported across Syria especially. These included the **destruction or reappropriation of school buildings and lack of infrastructure** (water, electricity, internet) in schools, leading to lack of safe spaces, overcrowding, and low quality educational outcomes. **Logistical barriers**, including the need to travel far from home to attend primary education or university, were also reported as having a disproportionate impact on women and girls. **In neighbouring countries, insufficient resources have led to the implementation of "second shift" systems** to teach refugee children. This system was widely criticised as inferior to integrated learning, and participants **urged integration** of classrooms as soon as possible. **In light of COVID-19** restrictions, participants in some regions urged **investment in technological solutions**

to ensure continued educational access, but **other participants noted that the underlying infrastructure** to make these solutions work (electricity and internet) **is not reliably available** in either Syria or Lebanon.

Second, many Syrian participants noted problems with **accessing recognition for educational achievement**, observing that **diplomas, degrees, and certificates are often not acknowledged** by competing powers across different regions in Syria and internationally. They called for **consistent recognition of diplomas** to encourage youth to invest in their education.

Finally, participants noted particular challenges for **vulnerable youth in accessing education**. These include a lack of **integrated, meaningful access for those with disabilities**, insufficient programs to enable **re-entry to education for children who have been disconnected from formal learning** (especially those who have entered the labour force or been married) and a **lack of emotional support** to children facing trauma and social pressure.

Respondents also highlighted the urgent need for **various forms of investment** - especially in the **protective elements of education**. Some suggested increased support to parents to enable them to send their children to school, such as providing financial incentives for parents.. Participants also recommended stronger **linkages between education and livelihoods**, including vocational training and apprenticeships, as well as ensuring the alignment of educational programmes with the labour market. Many reports from inside Syria mentioned a trend of **lower wages for teachers** and other education sector workers as compared to other humanitarian sectors, and the challenges this trend poses for **attracting and retaining talented teachers**.

In Protection, participants across all countries demanded **physical safety and security from relevant threats**. Inside Syria, this recommendation focused on **safety from conflict and arbitrary detention** as well as ongoing **attacks targeting civilians, humanitarian workers, and medical and educational infrastructure**.

In neighbouring countries, discussion on safety encompassed more private violence (including domestic, sexual, or gender-based violence) and **discriminatory violence** (including evictions, xenophobic violence and curfews). Respondents in neighbouring countries emphasized **the need for an expansion of legal residency and status regularisation mechanisms to protect refugees from arrest, harassment, and crime**, noting that individuals without status often cannot report criminal activity without fear of detention.

Participants in Syria and the region also highlighted the importance of **preventing forced returns**, and that the conditions of returnees should be closely monitored. **External reports uniformly identified current returns as non-voluntary, a finding echoed by survey respondents**. To prevent involuntary returns, **participants urged the exertion of diplomatic pressure on host countries** to halt forced returns (including those motivated by **coercive push factors**), **international return monitoring**, and improved **access to their HLP and civil documentation rights**, denial of which

currently motivates some spontaneous returns. Respondents from neighbouring countries also emphasised the need to **facilitate resettlement to third countries** in order to avoid non-voluntary returns.

Participants identified the **conditions** that would be necessary for a **voluntary, safe and dignified return**, including **protection of HLP rights and access to basic services** inside Syria, **physical safety** from **arbitrary arrest, detention, and war**, as well as **international safety guarantees and monitoring mechanisms**. Participants in multiple external consultations also emphasised the need to **preserve agency for displaced persons** and returning refugees, including **ensuring access to place of origin if the returnee chooses to return** there but **without mandating return to regions of origin**.

On Social Protection, many participants highlighted the need to focus on **building functioning systems, rather than merely delivering services**. These systems include functional, non-discriminatory **property documentation and protection regimes**, non-discriminatory **recognition of identity documentation**, and the development of **robust civil society** which can sustainably facilitate access to social services provided, in the long-run, by local authorities. The link between strengthening local civil society in Syria and Social Protection was mentioned repeatedly, as respondents see the role of **civil society as a liaison and check on the power** of local government to ensure non-discriminatory access.

In neighbouring countries, Social Protection requirements depend on the underlying relations between host and refugee populations. **In Jordan**, where refugees are relatively well-integrated into Social Protection systems, **respondents primarily noted the need to increase funds** for the systems overall and to further **strengthen integration**. In contrast, participants from **Lebanon and Turkey** noted sharp **increases in discrimination** against refugees during the COVID-19 crisis and the **fracturing of social safety net programs** overall under the strain of the pandemic. Participants from Lebanon especially expressed that **government ministries and security agencies** have key responsibilities to include refugees in Social Protection efforts, and **urged the EU** and other international actors **to ensure these government actors meet their responsibilities, including by conditioning funding** increases on improved performance and non-discrimination.

Although **health** was not chosen as a "top priority" in either domain, it **was frequently mentioned in cross-cutting ways**. In Syria, for example, **discussions of education frequently highlighted the need to invest in medical education and training of specialists and also nurses**. Comments on **livelihoods recommended healthcare sector jobs and the need to build functioning healthcare services** - and insurance systems - to create sustainable livelihoods. **Under protection, the targeting of medical staff was condemned frequently**. In neighbouring countries, participants focused on emergency healthcare assistance including COVID-19 relief.

On **civic space, the majority of** participants did not feel sufficiently considered/listened to and recommended **building the capacity of civil society organisations** while conducting advocacy and **capacity building with international organisations** to carve out increased civic space and protect the space which exists.

Methodology

Upinion's online platform

As one of the core objectives of the Conference is to offer a unique platform for civil society from inside Syria, the region and the diaspora, a participatory and in-depth online consultation through Upinion was created.

Upinion has developed a successful approach and online platform that allows organisations to securely stay in touch with people in crisis and host areas. For the purpose of this consultation, organisation-to-organisation connections were made (i.e., outreach from EU to CSOs) in addition to the organisation-to-individual outreach². It allowed for a cost-effective and efficient method to collect aggregated data and real-time feedback in which there was space for scripted dialogue. While information was obtained from civil society, messages were sent back to them about the results and next steps in the run-up to the Conference.

The methodology of Upinion has been extensively reviewed in the past. The organisation has the ISO/IEC 27001 Certification³, which is the international best practice standard for Information Security Management Systems (ISMSs) and follows GDPR regulations. The community platforms are organised in adherence to protocols that are geared to engaging with vulnerable groups, and comprise, amongst others, the following elements that are ensured in order to secure the privacy and security of research participants. The elements comprise Physical Data Storage; server Availability; Server Security; User Security; User Authentication; SSL/TLS Encryption; Organisational Security; Logging; Quality Management; Disaster Recovery; Data safe-keeping; Data Portability; Data Minimisation; Protection against Security Breaches. Detailed information of the protocol can be issued by the organisation. More information can be found at <https://upinion.com>.

Recruitment procedure

The EU and the UN shared the online consultation with their extensive networks within Syria and the region and other relevant partners (e.g. Member States).

² Upinion's core mission is to amplify voices of people in crisis situations. Its secure two-way communication platform enables organisations to connect with people in crisis and amplify their voices via a secure tool built on top of social media messaging apps like Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp. It helps organisations to make informed decisions, co-create interventions with the people they serve, adapt their programmes, and share valuable and reliable information that matters to people in crisis or by referring people to relevant services.

³ Link to the certificate, can be found here:

<https://upinion.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/k97591-01-c-upinion-netherlands-1.pdf>

In order to expand the consultation's outreach, an invitation to participate was disseminated through a variety of available channels, including EU and UN Social media (Facebook and Twitter). Outreach was done in three languages (i.e. English, Arabic and Turkish). An extra effort has been made to reach national coverage inside Syria. Reminders were sent out through the consultation period, 18 February - 2 March 2021. Upinion supported the digital recruitment process.

In areas where the internet connection is low, participation was not hindered, as Upinion's platform works on a 2G network. Also, a consistent internet connectivity was not a prerequisite because the questions are pushed similar to Whatsapp messages and will remain open until the respondent has a connection at some point to answer them.

Additionally, in order to increase the volume of inputs from local and community based agencies across Syria, Upinion contracted its partner organisation Basmeh & Zeitooneh for Relief and Development, to conduct additional outreach efforts across nearly all governorates in Syria. Basmeh & Zeitooneh utilised its network and the expertise of its field teams to spread awareness about the online consultations among grassroots CBOs and initiatives that were unlikely to be included in the EU outreach plan, and to bring to their attention the importance of participating. In total 103 CBOs have been reached (of which 75 confirmed that they have participated in the consultation). The table below summarises the number of CBOs and local NGOs reached by Basmeh & Zeitooneh with the goal of increasing participation of the survey by inside Syria actors:

Geographical area	Outreach in person to number of CBOs	Outreach through phone/ social media to number of CBOs
Northeast Syria	27	5
Northwest Syria	50	2
Government-controlled Syria	10	9

Additional written input by CSOs

Additional input was sought from organisations throughout Syria and the region in the form of thematic consultations between EU or UN entities and CSOs, as well as an open invitation for relevant CSO networks representing wide variety of actors to organise their own locally-led consultations and share the key outcomes to be included in the analysis for this report. Overall, twenty written responses were received from individual organisations, networks, and fora representing a total of more than 200 organisations, with a total of more than 1.000 individual responses.

Keeping civil society in the loop

During last year's Brussels IV Conference, numerous participants provided feedback and recommendations on the Conference consultations and process itself. These comments unanimously urged enhanced civil society engagement, especially highlighting the need for high-level discussions to include civil society, particularly Syrian civil society. Some participants suggested the creation of a permanent or periodic follow-up mechanism to track commitments made at Brussels and facilitate engagement between states making commitments and civil society.

The EU aims to keep the participants updated about the actions and activities that will roll out after the conference. After the closure of the online consultation (2 March 2021), participants who requested to be updated about the next steps ahead of the conference, have received feedback messages from Upinion, in addition to the social media channels of EU Delegations' existing networks and the mailings from EU-led communication teams. Through these channels, regular updates will be shared with the participants during and after the conference.

Also, the participants will be invited to provide real-time input during the Days of Dialogue on 29 March 2021.

General information about participants / primary results

Division by organisation

This year, the consultation focused even further on the inclusion of local community based organisations (CSOs). Last year, local CSOs were not a specific category to choose from (they were included in the 'local NGO' category). This year's efforts - the specific category and additional outreach inside Syria - has created a larger platform for them to be visible and raise their voice.


In total, **619 valid responses⁴** came in for the online consultation, from a total of **572 organisations** (i.e., before data cleaning the total of individual responses was 849)⁵. Note that the total number of individuals represented in the **external reports** exceeds 1.000, **resulting in over 1.500 responses in total** for the consultation. The sum of responses from the online consultation is higher than the sum of organisations, as a number of participants have answered for two (n=37), three (n= 8) or four (n=2) countries in which their organisation is active. The **majority of these responses are from local NGOs (33.9%), secondly are local CSOs (19.9%) and followed closely by INGOs (19.4%)**. Note that there is also a substantial group of participants who do not represent any organisation (11.4%), which consisted of consultants working on refugee matters, activists and representatives of network organisations.

See pie chart next page with more detailed information about the overall work areas of participants.

⁴ Disclaimer: not everyone filled in the second domain 'Humanitarian', in total 409 valid responses were received for this domain. It's likely that this difference in response rate between the domains has to do with the fact that many respondents integrated their humanitarian responses/recommendations in the resilience domain and did not want to repeat themselves in the humanitarian domain.

⁵ We continued with those participants who had at least chosen their priority sub-themes under Resilience. Those who had only provided information about their type of organisation, but did not provide input on the content, have been deleted, as well as 'doubles' (i.e., those who provided the exact same answers for the same country).


Figure: Division by organisation



Division by country

Even though many organisations were active in more than 1 country (see bar chart 'Division of the work area in the separate countries') by far, the **most input for this consultation has been provided for Syria (n=392), followed by input for Turkey (n=99) and thirdly, for Jordan (n=64)**. This year, there was only 1 response from Egypt and 4 from Iraq.

Figure: Division by country




Responses within Syria: division by governorate

Given the vastly different conditions on the ground in the different regions of Syria, including areas of active conflict and distinctive territorial control, survey participants were asked to identify in which areas of Syria they operate. **The most responses came from Aleppo (n=195), Idlib (n=159) and Al-Hasakah (n=103) respectively.**

As multiple organisations in Syria were active in different governorates, they could indicate for which area they would like to fill in the survey now. **Majority of the participants filled the**

consultation for North East Syria (SDF control) (n=102), followed by North West Syria (HTS control) (n=78) as well as Whole of Syria (n=77). It is worth mentioning that 16.3% of the participants/organisations filled the consultation for areas under Syrian regime, where additional outreach was conducted. See pie chart for more details about the input per geographical division:


Figure: For which area would you like to fill in the survey now?



Division of organisations by country

Within Syria, over a third of the participants were representing a **local NGO (34.8%, n=138)**, followed by **local community based organisations (25.0%, n=99)** and third, **international NGOs (22.0%, n=87)**.

Figure: Division by organisation within Syria



For **the neighbouring countries**, the responses from local community based organisations was lower (11.5%, n=42) and heavier on the response from **local and international NGOs (30.1% and 27.6% respectively)**. See detailed bar chart for more information about division of the work area in the separate countries.

Figure: Division by organisation within the neighbouring countries





Figure: Division of the work area in the separate countries



External reports from civil society

Similar to 2020, additional inputs were solicited from individuals and organisations working in the field. These additional external reports took the form of briefs prepared by organisations or networks of organisations as well as outcome documents from consultations held by the EU, UN delegations, and local networks specifically to gather civil society views for the Brussels conference. Although the number of these external reports received in 2021 was somewhat lower than last year, the number of participants that were represented in them exceeded last year (i.e. over 1.000 individuals) and the reports were highly technical, detailed, and specific to the

Brussels process, providing a valuable and contextualised view of the present situation and specific recommendations for the future.

A plurality of these reports and consultations were from organisations and individuals operating within Syria or members of the Syrian diaspora (9/20), with inputs also coming from Lebanon (4/20), Jordan (3/20), Turkey (2/20), and one from a coalition of international organisations and one from an individual international organisation.

The most discussed themes were **Livelihoods, Education, Health, and Social Cohesion, with substantial discussion also of Civic Engagement/Civic Space and Returns.**

On the topic of funding, an emphasis was placed on long-term and sustainable programming. Key actors repeatedly identified were local individuals and organisations; the need to engage with these actors at the design phase of programming, not merely implementation, was repeated in the external reports.

Results

The online consultation was organised around two domains: Resilience and Humanitarian, for which definitions are provided below. Each domain was divided into several sub-themes, and participants were asked - besides providing overall recommendations for the whole domain - to select up to three topics per domain that they considered “most relevant in the current situation and which should be the priority focus for the international community in the upcoming 12 months.” In total **2.025 responses were received for Resilience and 1.261 responses for Humanitarian**. This indicates that each respondent prioritised on average 3 themes per domain. If deemed relevant, comparisons between regional responses and regions inside Syria have been made.

Resilience Domain

The protracted crisis affecting people in Syria, Syrian refugees and host communities in the region requires support beyond humanitarian and life-saving interventions. Ten years into the crisis continued access to basic services, social protection, livelihoods, economic recovery, justice and civil rights continue to be priorities for the international donor community, which also contributes to strengthening the service delivery systems.

As described in an external report:


“Whilst basic humanitarian assistance ensures lives are saved, applying a recovery and resilience lens is critical to ensuring people can access their rights, overcome aid dependence, and turn the dividends of humanitarian interventions into longer-term building blocks for sustainable livelihoods, income-generating opportunities, and the ability to cope with future shocks. Furthermore, sustainable reintegration of displaced Syrians upon eventual return will depend partly on the availability of basic social infrastructure and services, a secure environment, and viable livelihood opportunities.”

The Resilience domain focused on questions about resources, actors, and strategies to address these protracted problems and long-term solutions.

Top 3 priority sub-themes

Overall, the three most selected sub-themes under Resilience were: 1. Livelihoods; 2. Education; and 3. Social protection/social assistance. See bar graph below with the overall sub-themes and the frequency with which they were selected by participants. .

Figure: Overall key priority sub-themes under Resilience



Inside Syria

As the highest number of participants come from within Syria, it is not surprising that the same themes as the overall top 3 are similar. **Livelihoods (64.5%, n=253 out of 392 responses), Education (56.4%, n=221) and Social protection (31.6%, n=124)** are respectively the most relevant themes that should be the priority focus for the international community in the upcoming 12 months. **The Support to non-governmental, community and grassroots organisations (31.4%, n=123) has received an almost equal amount of votes as Social protection and will be elaborated on too.**

Neighbouring countries

The neighbouring countries echoed the selection of their Syrian counterparts. **Livelihoods (62.2%, n=142 out of 227 responses), Education (48.9%, n=111) and Social protection/social assistance (48.0%, n=109)** emerged as the priority focus themes for the upcoming 12 months.

Priority sub-theme 1: Livelihoods

Respondents inside Syria and in neighbouring countries consistently identified livelihoods as a key priority for resilience. **Participants highlighted in particular the need to invest in self-sustaining, market-driven livelihoods programmes that could produce long-term livelihoods for beneficiaries and their communities.** They also closely **linked livelihoods with educational opportunities**, stressing that educational programming should lead to livelihood opportunities.

Inside Syria

Key observations and recommendations

Respondents inside Syria linked **livelihoods with social cohesion and transitional justice**, stressing that livelihoods are key to rebuilding trust in communities, reducing social tensions, diverting youth from destructive behaviours or extremism, and generating a shared future. One participant in a consultation in Northwest Syria emphasised:

“The importance of carrying out projects jointly addressing protection, education, and livelihoods, through vocational education; the importance of such projects will be highlighted in the reconstruction phase which is due to happen at some point, and which will require the youth to master professions and crafts, a process that would thus keep them busy and protect them from turning to extremism.”

Another participant echoed this linkage, observing:

“We should try to protect young people by providing job opportunities to them and recognising their degrees so that they do not feel hopeless and that their future is lost, in which cases they would be driven to join armed parties, which would in turn negatively affect the local and external communities.”

Key actors

According to the majority of participants in Syria, **local organisations (87%)** can have the most influence and impact in the area of livelihoods. These participants also highlighted **INGOs (62.2%) and UN (50.0%)** as key actors⁶. **There is a sense of self-reliance with regards to livelihoods, that is also captured in the results on resources and funding.**

In external reports, participants highlighted **local organisations as key facilitators** of livelihoods projects as well, while noting the need for external support from international NGOs and the UN. **Other key actors mentioned in this sector include women and youth.** Respondents expressed that it is essential to provide tailored livelihoods projects for women and youth to enhance their self-reliance, confidence, and capabilities to contribute to their society.

In connection to the livelihoods theme, external reports also mentioned the extreme **pressure on youth** - particularly educated youth - to leave Syria or, if they have already left, to stay away because of lack of opportunity. This lack of economic and employment opportunities and resultant **“brain drain”** was identified as a grave threat to the resilience of society as key actors - educated Syrian youth - increasingly settle outside the country.

Resources & Funding

In order for the key actors to actually create the desired impact, the following resources have been recommended: **1. Additional funding (82.8%), 2. Capacity building and expertise (68.2%) and 3. Support to institutional capacities (63.9%).**

⁶ As the respondents could select multiple answers, the percentages are not summing up to 100%.

In external consultations and answers to open-ended questions alike, participants consistently stressed **the importance of long-term, sustainable livelihoods projects** as the most impactful form of support in this area. One external report noted:

"The short implementation period of projects makes the evaluation process difficult. [Donors should] plan for the long term and focus on the youth, in particular in vocational training."

In the national consultation, participants stressed the need to **conduct research and analysis in order to create sustainable livelihood interventions**, including vocational training:

"On many occasions, the importance of vocational education/training was recalled. Careful research, carried out in a participatory manner, should identify gaps between current education provision and the needs of the labour market. Interventions should be comparatively long-term."

Some respondents noted specific forms for funding that could contribute to sustainability and long-term impact, suggesting:

"Establishing mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of livelihood programmes, by establishing a cooperative financial fund from the European Union to micro-finance local associations."

Similarly, participants in a consultation in Northeast Syria explained barriers to accessing resources for small organisations. They listed:

*"The difficulty for small organisations to get financial support, especially those that implement livelihood projects, since financing is done through personal relationships; the **lack of support for livelihood projects in the sectors of agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, craftsmanship, business incubators, and camps**; [and] the **lack of knowledge in the financing standards of international organisations**, especially in the livelihood sector, not to mention donors complicating these standards."*

Accordingly, participants identified **direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations as the highest priority channel of funding** through which livelihoods assistance should be directed, with 81.7% recommending this channel. The second highest priority channel reflects this conviction even more: 63% of participants recommended **increasing grant-based funding**, which may indicate a desire for **more streamlined and transparent funding processes**. Finally, participants recommended that **large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors should receive funding** (53%) - notably, this recommendation places these large international NGOs in a supportive capacity-building role rather than as service providers.

Neighbouring countries

Key observations and recommendations

Respondents across the region echoed many of the sentiments expressed within Syria, with some distinctions.

One issue that rarely came up in responses from within Syria but which, naturally, played a large role in the responses from neighbouring countries are **structural barriers to accessing the labour market including work permits, legal residency, discrimination, and, in the case of Turkey, language barriers**. Respondents in Lebanon and Turkey stressed the difficulty of obtaining and maintaining legal permission to work, which can render livelihood projects ineffective by preventing the beneficiaries from using newly-obtained skills in the labour market. Respondents in **Jordan stressed unsafe conditions faced by workers, restrictive regulations for refugees seeking to open home-based businesses, and the limitations on the sectors in which refugees can work**, all of which undermine refugees' efforts to establish sustainable livelihoods for themselves.

Key actors

Similar results with regards to the key actors on the topic of livelihoods were found in the **neighbouring countries**: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt reported that **Local organisations** (67.9%) are the ones designated to play a key role in this area, as well as INGOs (55.5%). **However, instead of the United Nations, preference was given to a more active role of the European Union (54.7%) as a key actor.**

Some additional actors were mentioned as well. Notably, in an external consultation in Jordan, participants listed not only local CSOs and international NGOs but also **private sector partners** committed to sustainable partnership, government ministries with the ability to implement long-term projects, and embassies.

In Lebanon, respondents mentioned the need to include municipalities in planning and implementation of livelihoods projects, as well as the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MOIM) to ensure the effectiveness of these programmes. Participants also urged for **livelihoods projects to be open to all nationalities, with Lebanese and Palestinian refugees as key beneficiaries too**, given the extremely high levels of desperation and social tension in the country today.

Resources & Funding

Neighbouring countries displayed a similar response like their Syrian counterparts with regards to the needed resources to support the positive change in the area of Livelihoods with a majority of respondents calling for **additional funding (68.2%), capacity building and expertise (59.8%) and support to institutional capacities (56.8%)**.

In Turkey and Jordan, respondents stressed **the need to move from short-term emergency humanitarian funding to a development model** in order to invest in projects with the potential to impact livelihoods in the future.

"[A] long term approach [is needed] to change the mindset and reach impact. A lot of projects are just aiming at one week training or registration, this does not help real long term employment, especially not for women. we need to focus on the real impact. What happens after our projects." (Quote from a participant from Turkey).

However, participants in external consultations in Lebanon were less likely to call for such a switch, instead emphasizing that:

"the focus should be kept on maintaining at least the current level of livelihood support to help the refugees overcome the crises and recover, while reducing the social and economic tensions in the long run."

Despite these differences in specific prioritisation among neighbouring countries, the recommended channels for additional funding remained consistent with the results from Syria: respondents recommended **direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations (68.2%), followed by grants (52.7%) and funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors (49.6%).**

Participants emphasised the need for multi-year, flexible funding to allow for appropriate planning and investment in projects as well as re-assignment of funds in case of dramatically changed circumstances (as in Lebanon over the past 14 months).

Table. Overview of results on Livelihoods - Inside Syria and Neighbouring countries

Theme	Key Actors		n	%	
Livelihoods	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	207	87.0%	
		2 International NGOs	148	62.2%	
		3 United Nations	119	50.0%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	93	67.9%	
		2 European Union	76	55.5%	
		3 International NGOs	75	54.7%	
		Resources		n	%
	In Syria	1 Additional Funding	193	82.8%	
		2 Capacity building and expertise	159	68.2%	
		3 Access to financing and investment	149	63.9%	
Neighbouring countries	1 Additional Funding	90	68.2%		

	2 Capacity building and expertise	79	59.8%
	3 Access to financing and investment	75	56.8%
	Funding	n	%
In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	188	81.7%
	2 Grants	145	63.0%
	3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	122	53.0%
Neighbouring countries	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	88	68.2%
	2 Grants	68	52.7%
	3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	64	49.6%

Priority sub-theme 2: Education

Participants selected Education as a priority sub-theme nearly as frequently as Livelihoods and the linkages between the two topics were consistently recognised. While external report participants noted the emergency need for basic support to primary education (see Humanitarian), participants also frequently highlighted secondary and university education as key to facilitating resilience and recovery both inside Syria and in neighbouring countries. As mentioned during a national-level consultation with Syrian actors:

“Donors often see support to university education as a luxury, preferring to prioritise other levels, but participants saw this as a strategic mistake.”

External reports expressed the need to **ensure access and proper support for all children and youth in education**, including ensuring integrated, meaningful **access for those with disabilities and providing emotional support to children facing trauma and social pressure**. Although these access and support issues overlap with the humanitarian domain, they were also described in resilience terms as priorities for avoiding marginalization of segments of Syrian society both within Syria and in the region.

Inside Syria

Key observations and recommendations

The issue of diploma, degree, and certificate recognition across different regions in Syria and internationally was raised repeatedly by participants in these consultations. They noted that political disagreements and territorial control influence the recognition of educational attainment, which severely impacts the motivation of students at all levels to remain in school and complete their degrees. One participant from NW Syria summarised the barriers and their impact on students thus:

“The lack of recognition of academic degrees issued by universities in the region makes young people feel frustrated and that the process is absurd, and that they do not have a future.”

In line with this observation, participants described the costs to social cohesion of this loss of hope, noting that youth whose educational opportunities are stunted by these disagreements may *“feel hopeless and that their future is lost, in which cases they would be driven to join armed parties, which would in turn negatively affect the local and external communities.”*

Key actors

Once again, participants selected **local organisations (including NGOs, CSOs, and CBOs) as key actors** at a high rate (79%). However, a greater percentage emphasised the **role of the UN** (61% compared to 50% in Livelihoods); participants also identified **international NGOs** (55.6%) as important actors.

Resources & Funding

An overwhelming majority of participants (81.2%) expressed that **additional funding is necessary to achieve positive results in education**; results were again supportive of **capacity building and expertise (68%) and support to institutional capacities (58%)** as resource priorities.

In external reports, respondents stated that **physical barriers to attending university or other higher education are higher for women**, who may be discouraged from leaving their families to pursue education in another town or city and for whom financial barriers including transportation or housing may be greater. Participants noted a relative **lack of access to scholarships for women**.

Another physical barrier to sustainable education access mentioned in consultations is the **destruction or reappropriation of school buildings and lack of infrastructure** (water, electricity, internet) in schools, leading to lack of safe spaces, overcrowding, and low quality educational outcomes. The high priority placed by respondents on **“support to institutional capacities”** may thus also relate to these shortfalls of infrastructure, indicating the need for support to literally, physically rebuild educational institutions.

Funding priorities remained consistent on this topic, with participants prioritising **direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations** (73.5%), then **funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors (59.7%) and finally, grants (59.2%)**. Several participants in external consultations noted that in practice, scholarship funding is not available on an equal basis for women inside Syria or students in the Northeast.

Neighbouring countries

Key observations and recommendations

Participants across the region also emphasised the **linkages between education and livelihoods** in prioritising this theme. Participants from Jordan and Lebanon noted **the insufficiency of the “second shift” system for delivering primary education to refugee children**, stating that these “second shifts” frequently resulted in lower teaching contact hours and poor quality instruction. In Jordan, education within camps was regarded as even lower quality than the “second shift” format. In Turkey, respondents raised concerns about a “lost generation” of refugee children disconnected from education and livelihoods, especially due to COVID-related disruptions to education access: In describing the problem of disrupted refugee access to education, one external report noted:

“The priority should be to help refugees become productive and self-reliant, whether they stay in Turkey, return to Syria or move elsewhere.”

Key actors

Participants once again identified **local organisations and the UN as key actors** in this sector (70.2% and 64.4% respectively) but identified local authorities as key actors more frequently than participants in Syria did. This may be because of the delicate position of authorities in Syria or shifting political control, or it may reflect the relatively higher official barriers erected to control Syrian refugee attendance in school in neighbouring countries compared to the relatively open enrollment of Syrians inside Syria.

In addition to identifying local organisations as key actors in this sector, participants highlighted the need to include women in educational opportunities to increase self-reliance and enable them to contribute their skills to the marketplace.

Resources & Funding

Respondents in neighbouring countries selected identical prioritisation of resources to those selected inside Syria: **additional funding (76.0%), capacity building and expertise (59.4%), and support to institutional capacities (57.3%)**.

Participants in Turkey noted in external reports that **Turkish language instruction** - for both children and adults - is key in developing social resilience and sustaining positive relations among communities as well as facilitating access to livelihood opportunities. On the other hand, there was a need noted for Arabic language instruction for refugees, particularly young refugees growing up in Turkey, who may wish to return to Syria.

Respondents from Turkey also cited the **need for education to enhance job opportunities**, especially among those who have been marginalized from the labour market:

“Vocational education should be ‘fine-tuned’ and have a greater focus on women’s skills to increase their appeal to local labour markets and their chances to become more self-sufficient.”

Likewise, key funding channels focused first on local NGOs (67.4%), then on grants (57.6%) and funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors (55.4%). Turkish respondents emphasised that funding should be flexibly allocated to allow for re-purposing in the face of shifting circumstances; for example, during the COVID pandemic, organisations were obliged to reallocate funding to supply tech devices that students could use to access remote schooling. In contrast, respondents from Lebanon and Jordan noted that provision of internet-enabled devices would be insufficient to enable remote schooling in those contexts, given gaps in essential infrastructure (internet and electricity).

Table: Overview of results on Education - Inside Syria and Neighbouring countries

Theme	Key Actors	n	%	
Education	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	162	79.0%
		2 United Nations	125	61.0%
		3 International NGOs	114	55.6%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	73	70.2%
		2 United Nations	67	64.4%
		3 Local authorities	61	58.7%
	Resources		n	%
	In Syria	1 Additional Funding	160	81.2%
		2 Capacity building and expertise	134	68.0%
		3 Support to institutional capacities	116	58.9%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Additional Funding	73	76.0%
		2 Capacity building and expertise	57	59.4%
		3 Support to institutional capacities	55	57.3%
	Funding		n	%
	In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	144	73.5%
2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors		117	59.7%	
3 Grants		116	59.2%	
Neighbouring countries	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	62	67.4%	
	2 Grants	53	57.6%	

	3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	51	55.4%
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Priority sub-theme 3: Social protection/social assistance

The third most frequently-selected priority theme within the Resilience domain was Social Protection/Social Assistance. Similar to Protection (see Priority Sub-theme 3 under the Humanitarian domain), **Social Protection encompass policies and programmes to ensure the rights of individuals and reduce exclusion, discrimination, and exploitation.** But in contrast to Protection, which in a humanitarian setting aims to protect individuals from conflict or a displacement situation, Social Protection refers to the provision of social safety net services - which would be found in stable states as well as conflict-affected states - and includes issues such as the provision of social benefits, alleviation of poverty, and anti-discrimination efforts.

The section below summarises how participants described the issue of Social Protection and Assistance, and their identification of key actors, resources, and funding needed to address the issue.

Inside Syria

Key observations and recommendations

On this topic, many participants in external consultations highlighted the need to focus on **building functioning systems, rather than merely delivering services.** Needed systems of Social Protection include functional, non-discriminatory property documentation and protection regimes, non-discriminatory recognition of identity documentation, and the development of robust civil society which can sustainably facilitate access to social services provided, in the long-run, by local authorities.

Survey respondents expressed that programmes across multiple sectors should aim to transition from direct service delivery to a system in which the **basic needs of people are met by participatory local government:**

“it is necessary to work on the economic environment, support education, health and work towards further development of local governance and enhance the participation of the local community effectively and participation of women and youth and enhancing the role of transparency”

Some respondents cited the **need for transitional justice to enable equitable and trusted systems of Social Protection:**

“transitional justice to ensure the provision of a secure environment that will allow the improvement of conditions for a dignified life”

On property, a participant from Northwest Syria noted:

“the need to protect the property of the refugees, IDPs and forcibly displaced persons, especially after the promulgation of laws that legalise their seizure, such as Law No. 10. It is therefore a must to support real property documentation programmes.”

Likewise, participants highlighted the importance of access to and recognition of legal documentation to ensure access to social services throughout Syria, stating a high priority for *“protecting the rights of families to have identity papers and ensuring their civil rights in (inheritance - education - elections in the transitional period), specifically the people living in camps.”*

Key actors

The key actors identified under this theme were the same as in many areas, but the strength of **respondents’ preference for local organisations is striking: 83.9% listed local organisations as the key actors in this area, compared to 51.7% for INGOs and 50% for the UN.** This overwhelming identification of local actors as the key to achieving Social Protection reflects the essential role that these actors play not only in service delivery but in holding power accountable and translating social goals into policy.

Resources & Funding

Respondents identified an urgent need for **more funding** with 82.8% selecting this resource as the most important. **Also selected were capacity building and expertise (63.8%) and support to institutional capacities (50.9%).**

Within this need for funding, participants from the Northeast of Syria identified a shift in funding priorities which had negatively impacted their operations:

“...funding is discontinued for organisations working on peace and democratic transition, which makes it necessary to change their work strategy to be more relief, health, or farming-inclined.” This shift negatively impacts long-term efforts to secure Social Protection through local governance rather than international aid. These participants likewise noted that “Projects pertaining to transitional justice, the rule of law, transparency and elections receive very little funding which is otherwise directed to service groups that make up a very narrow category of society.”

Although respondents still preferred **direct funding to local NGOs** or community based organisations (77.6%) as the preferred channel for additional funding, they also expressed the need to **fund large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors** (59.5%). The third most frequently selected mechanism for additional funding was **grants** (55.2%).

Neighbouring countries

Key observations and recommendations

There were **stark differences between neighbouring countries on the topic of Social Protection**, which may be attributable to realistic calculations on the prospects for local integration of refugees into Social Protection systems as well as the state of these systems overall. **Whereas Jordan has taken remarkable strides towards including refugees in its existing social safety net, in Lebanon, the social protection system remains fragmented, with refugees benefiting from specific social protection programmes, entirely dependent on external donors, with low predictability and limited sustainability.**

External reports from Jordan note the relatively robust efforts to expand and strengthen Social Protection to include refugees as well as vulnerable Jordanians and Palestinians:

“GoJ has committed to maximizing the use of cash support as an efficient and effective modality for social protection.”

Jordan has likewise extended validity of certain forms of documentation to ensure continued access to social benefits, and adopted online case management systems for SGBV and child protection services and court procedures to facilitate access - by refugees and others - to these services even during COVID-19. External reports note, however, the imposition of discriminatory movement restrictions against refugees, purportedly to halt the spread of COVID-19 but which are disproportionately imposed against refugees as compared to similarly situated Jordanians.

In Lebanon, provision of Social Protection remains woefully inadequate and poverty rates have skyrocketed among both local and refugee populations. As noted in an external report, while:

“Most refugees were already living hand-to-mouth prior to the latest and most severe COVID-19 lockdowns. UNHCR now reports that 89% of Syrian refugees are living under the poverty line, a stark contrast to last year’s estimate of 55%. As such, refugees have been surviving mostly on what they could earn through informal ad hoc jobs and humanitarian assistance.”

And far from strengthening and integrating Social Protection mechanisms to mitigate poverty, the Lebanese state interferes with delivery of services:

“Refugee-led NGOs often fear staff members being stopped at checkpoints and harassed due to their legal status or nationality, and some assert that refugees are more likely to be stopped and more heavily fined than their Lebanese counterparts for violating curfews and social distancing protocols.”

Continued lack of protections for, and discrimination against, LGBTQ+ individuals was noted by participants in Lebanon, with particular dangers for refugees who are LGBTQ+ and face social exclusion related to each of these components of their identity.

Overall discrimination against refugees was reported to have worsened considerably in both Lebanon and Turkey during the COVID-19 crisis. External reports from Turkey noted:

“The pandemic has had a discriminatory effect or, rather, worsened the existing discrimination.”

Likewise, **respondents across all three countries noted a lack of progress on Social Protection mechanisms for persons with disabilities.**

Key actors

In contrast to responses from within Syria, **participants in neighbouring countries identified local authorities as key actors** in delivering Social Protection - a difference which may reflect the relatively stable governance of these countries compared to the divided governance of Syria. Still, **the largest percent of respondents (77%) identified local organisations as key actors** again, **with 64% each identifying local authorities and international NGOs** for a shared second place.

Respondents from Turkey noted the importance of ensuring robust relationships between local organisations and international actors in this sector, advising:

“Institutional donors and IFIs should also benefit more ... and gather useful inputs from the ‘ground experience’ of local NGOs and UN organisations.”

In Lebanon, respondents identified key roles for government ministries and security agencies, calling for them to play appropriate roles in the prevention of discrimination and extension of Social Protection to all residents of Lebanon. For instance:

“The Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) [must] closely coordinate with Municipalities to protect both the Lebanese host and refugees communities from tensions and conflicts, and to ensure that Municipalities are not implementing any discriminatory measures against refugees or foreigners during or beyond lockdown periods.”

Resources & Funding

Here too, participants in neighbouring countries recognised the key role of governments in ensuring Social Protection; although **additional funding was again selected most frequently (79%)**, the second most recognised resources needed were the political will of the host country and capacity building and expertise each receiving 57%.

According to participants from Turkey, future assistance should also support the Government to help increase its capacity for both protection and job creation. Wider support should target and expand the fiscal space of government programmes for social assistance and social protection:

“Easing criteria for the access to work permits is one important step [in combatting discrimination]. Furthermore, all concerned stakeholders, i.e. international donors, should

seek alternative ways to support beneficiaries' self-reliance and foster their inclusive recovery, i.e. through social cooperatives and micro-credit."

Participants from Turkey further stressed the need to balance assistance to refugees and the host community, and to employ aid mechanisms that can support social peace:

"Only a balanced distribution of the available resources can prevent further crisis and tensions within local communities. Here again, **understanding the reality on the ground and "measuring" the needs among the population and the economic operators is a precondition when designing assistance.** For example, support mechanisms, such as microcredits, could help to boost local economy and be conducive to social peace especially if equally distributed between "refugees" and Turkish residents."

Respondents from Turkey also noted the perverse incentives generated by insufficient social protection programs, explaining:

"Furthermore, benefiting Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) is one among the reasons that induces refugees to avoid registration. The amount is insufficient to cover their basic needs and currently helps to fill only about 20% of a family basic needs basket. There should be an **effort to re-focus and replenish the ESSN provision.** Furthermore, if ESSN must concretely help people meet their basic needs, it should not only be restricted to refugees but allow Turks in need to benefit from it."

In Jordan, external reports emphasised the need for long-term, flexible funding to enable continued integration of refugees into existing Social Protection resources and to expand these for all residents. Participants recommended:

"Long-term development projects that address the protracted nature of displacement and deal with socio economic challenges and vulnerability in a sustainable manner rather than solely emergency response."

The most reported funding mechanisms that have been mentioned by participants in Syria, have been echoed by the neighbouring countries. The focus is on strengthening the local community based organisations (both in funding and capacity building).

Table: Overview of results on Social protection/Social assistance - Inside Syria and Neighbouring countries

Theme	Key Actors	n	%
Social protection/social assistance	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	99 83.9%
		2 International NGOs	61 51.7%
		3 United Nations	59 50.0%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	77 77.0%
		2 Local authorities	64 64.0%

	3	International NGOs	64	64.0%
		Resources	n	%
In Syria	1	Additional Funding	96	82.8%
	2	Capacity building and expertise	74	63.8%
	3	Support to institutional capacities	59	50.9%
Neighbouring countries	1	Additional Funding	79	79.0%
	2	Political will of host country	57	57.0%
	3	Capacity building and expertise	54	54.0%
		Funding	n	%
In Syria	1	Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	90	77.6%
	2	Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	69	59.5%
	3	Grants	64	55.2%
Neighbouring countries	1	Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	75	75.0%
	2	Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	54	54.0%
	3	Grants	46	46.0%

Sub-theme 4: Support to and involvement of civic engagement

As a fourth priority sub-theme, **participants from inside Syria chose ‘Support to NGOs, CBOs and GOs’**. This priority was clearly reflected throughout the consultations as participants repeated, across issue areas, the importance of close consultation with and support for local organisations.


External consultations from regime-held areas noted the key role of local organisations, stressing, “[The] importance of building trust in the community... this requires transparency and credibility in the CSOs’ work.” These participants called for CSOs to play a role in “Monitoring of political performance (especially the electoral process and the budget process) and transmitting society’s problems to the authorities. Civil society has a role in encouraging engagement of all stakeholders in community development.” Participants expressed, however, that trust and awareness between CSOs and the general public is still lacking: “[We need] awareness-raising of the role of civil society in local development among both the state institutions and the people.”

Respondents stressed the need to rebuild social structures and trust among communities, especially between returnees and communities who remained in place as well as between displaced persons and the communities where they have settled, whether temporarily or permanently. Survey respondents noted:

“Civic space and bottom up peacebuilding and transitional justice have to be prioritised more. low profile support to local civil society is needed in these fields. a larger part of aid has to go through independent syrian organisations.”


It became clear that the majority of respondents (62.2%) found that civil society is not sufficiently consulted yet on assistance priorities:

Figure: Is civil society sufficiently consulted on assistance priorities? - Overall



Local community based organisations rated this non-involvement even slightly higher (68.3%) than the overall outcome:


Figure: Is civil society sufficiently consulted on assistance priorities? - Local community based organisations:



Neighbouring countries

In neighbouring countries this sentiment is shared (66.9%), while in Syria the result is slightly lower at 59.8%, but due mostly to an increase in respondents opting not to answer (“I don’t know” or “I prefer not to answer”). This may reflect sensitivity around the issue of local NGO consultation within Syria..

Figure: Is civil society sufficiently consulted on assistance priorities? - Inside Syria:



The selection of this priority may also reflect the increased outreach efforts of the EU in this cycle, extending beyond the EU’s network to include CSOs and GOs not previously reached. Their selection of priority may reflect a sense that they have not been consulted or supported in the past, but wish to remain engaged in future. A detailed breakdown of the key actors, resources and funding is described in the table below.

Table. Overview of results on Support to NGOs, CBOs and GOs - Inside Syria and Neighbouring countries

Theme	Key Actors	n	%	
Support to non-governmental, community and grassroots organisations	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	84	76.4%
		2 European Union	80	72.7%
		3 United Nations	72	65.5%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	31	75.6%
		2 European Union	25	61.0%
		3 United Nations	22	53.7%
		Resources	n	%
	In Syria	1 Additional Funding	91	84.3%
		2 Capacity building and expertise	87	80.6%

	3 Support to institutional capacities	78	72.2%
Neighbouring countries	1 Additional Funding	33	84.6%
	2 Political support	20	51.3%
	3 Support to institutional capacities	20	51.3%
Funding		n	%
In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	92	87.6%
	2 Grants	71	67.6%
	3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	70	66.7%
Neighbouring countries	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	33	84.6%
	2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	25	64.1%
	3 Grants	20	51.3%

Remaining Resilience sub-themes

The remaining sub-themes were not selected as priority themes, but nevertheless reveal valuable information in terms of key players and funding needs that may influence the direction of the Brussels V Conference. For this purpose a table with an overview of results are presented under Annex I. A comparison of the data between Syria and neighbouring countries is made below.

Comparative analysis of remaining sub-themes

With regards to **Health and COVID-19 response/vaccination**, neighbouring countries rely more than Syrian counterparts on local authorities as key actors to bring positive change in this area. Also, respondents from neighbouring countries request funding to go to the United Nations as opposed to Syria, where funding for Health care should be directed directly to local organisations.

Due to the state of the conflict and opposing authorities, there are differences in Health needs inside Syria, depending on the area of response. However, across regions, participants reiterated *“the need to focus on systems in the healthcare sector and on governance, rather than on service provision. In this connection, they spoke about strategic planning and holistic approaches to the sector as a whole, including longer term interventions. They also mentioned the importance of working at the community level with a number of different stakeholders, including doctors and other healthcare professionals, the private sector, and academia.”*

In Syrian regime controlled areas the designated key actors who can bring about positive change are the United Nations and the European Union, while the other areas brought forward

the local organisations as key players in this field. In addition, **in North-East Syria, the local authorities are being called upon to play a key role.**

In terms of resources, participants from **North-East Syria (SDF control) recommend support to institutional capacities and facilitation of physical access**, while **participants from Syrian Regime controlled areas and North-West Syria (HTS control) emphasise capacity building and expertise more than in the other areas.** The responses on funding are similar, regardless of the area of activity; all funding should either be directed to local organisations and/or to the United Nations.

Within the field of **Governance, visible differences in perspectives are laid out between Syria and neighbouring countries.** Syria calls upon local organisations and local authorities, while neighbouring countries are more outward-facing, calling upon UN, EU and International NGOs for change. In this regards, funding is also perceived differently: **Syria wants local organisations (NGOs and CBOs) to be supported directly**, or otherwise funding to large NGOs who can then provide support and capacity building to local actors, while neighbouring countries see funding to large consortia of NGOs and from UN as the most efficient channel to improve the prospects of the field of governance.

Gender equality and women's empowerment is linked with a variety of sub-themes, including Livelihoods, Education and Social protection/social assistance. Here too, support for civic engagement, with women as leaders, are seen as key actors and for both areas (Syria and neighbouring countries), additional funding and capacity building to increase civic/local female engagement is mentioned frequently. Compared with the host region, in Syria the Support to institutional capacities is seen as a means to improve this sector, while in neighbouring countries Access to financing and investment is seen as a vital resource to increase women empowerment.

In the field of **Justice and accountability**, respondents from both Syria and Neighbouring countries are in agreement on the key actors, namely international players as INGOs, EU and UN. What is missing is the political will of either authorities inside Syria or of host countries to support justice and accountability.

In Syria, local authorities are reported as the key actors in the field of **Security**, besides UN and EU. More political support is needed to achieve long-lasting security and conflict resolution.

Not surprisingly, for **Community level integration** to become a success, all local actors should be involved, from local organisations, to local communities and local authorities. Additional funding and capacity building is needed for this to happen, and should focus on funding and involving local NGOs directly, or by providing grants and/or funding to large NGOs who can support the

local organisations. There was no distinction between responses in Syria and neighbouring countries on this matter.

Return and reintegration

Additional questions were asked regarding the issue of return and reintegration in order to shed light on this complex topic. At present, refugees are confronted with significant pressure to return to Syria while the conditions for their return in safety and dignity remain absent; meanwhile, possibilities for resettlement, onward migration, or integration have continued to shrink.

Participants from Syria reported that they rely on local actors (i.e. local communities, organisations and authorities) to play a key role in influencing returns. **Participants from a government-held area elaborated on the proper role for local civil society, which they saw as “Monitoring the return process; Advocating for safe and dignified return; Provision of information to returnees; Psychological support for returnees; [and] Cohesion activities between IDPs/returnees and host communities.”**

What is missing according to Syrian respondents is Political support, Facilitation of physical access and Support to institutional capacities. Participants from a government-held area noted the absence of both services (institutional capacities) and social and political support for returnees:

“Hate speech towards the displaced, including towards civil society activists who work on the issue; Lack of preparation for the process from a community point of view, and by the active organisations in the area. Recriminations between those who stayed and those who left; [and] Lack of educational opportunities for returning children and economic opportunities more broadly.”

A rapporteur for one national consultation noted the pain and frustration at play in this topic, observing *“The tone of this meeting was markedly different from the other meetings, reflecting the level of frustration felt by participants at discussing a topic which can only really be resolved by finding a political solution, which is nowhere in sight.”*

Others highlighted issues that require attention in the present in order to facilitate returns in the future. *“Several speakers drew attention to the need to find a mechanism to preserve the human capital of the Syrian refugees in exile. They spoke of people with university education working as waiters and decried the fact that these people would have lost their skills by the time they could return to Syria.”* These comments underscore the need to **increase access to livelihoods commensurate with refugees’ skills not just to ensure self-sufficiency while displaced, but to strengthen the future of Syria.**

A frequent topic mentioned in relation to returns are HLP rights, and the role of government coercion and demographic engineering in determining access to property rights upon return:

“Expropriation of property is a major issue with an increasing tendency noted on the part of the regime to resort to the property ownership issue as a means of meting out punishment, e.g. family members of someone refusing military service could be deprived of the property.”

Neighbouring countries see a more visible role for the UN and EU in negotiating the issue of return, reflecting the high-level discussions that are required to protect refugees’ right to safe, dignified, and voluntary return. Participants in these countries likewise request more political support. They also recommend funding to be directed to Development agencies so support return and reintegration, whereas their Syrian counterparts would rather see direct funding to go to local NGOs or community based organisations.

Although international actors were designated as “key,” participants did not see their current role as uniformly positive. Instead, in external reports, participants described the activities of some international players as problematic for refugee protection. In the context of pressure from host governments for refugees to return to Syria, some speakers disputed the designation of Turkey as a safe country for refugees, and called for the EU and governments to instead *“lobby neighbouring host countries ... to enable Syrian civil society organisations to support Syrian refugees”*

In addition, participants in multiple external consultations referred to **the need to preserve agency for displaced persons and returning refugees**:

“Donors were accused of taking away agency on the part of IDPs. Vulnerable groups, in particular, should have alternatives and be able to make choices affecting their own futures, such as place of residence.”

Similar to last year’s consultation for Brussels IV, **participants identified certain conditions that would be necessary for a voluntary, safe and dignified return** (even in the absence of a political solution). And, similar to last year, the largest portion identified **physical safety and security as essential to voluntary returns (88.1% of respondents from Syria and 81.8% of the neighbouring counterparts)**. Participants also stated that there should be **respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms** (64.3% of the Syrian respondents and 68.2% of the neighbouring countries chose this condition).


In contrast with last year, 78.6% of the **respondents from Syria ticked ‘Access to decent basic services by local authorities (i.e. justice, health, education)’** as the second most important condition for safe and voluntary return, **while 59.1% of the respondents from neighbouring countries stated that there simply can be no voluntary, safe and dignified return without a political solution**. See bar graph below for more details about conditions. To this point, respondents from Turkey asserted:

“A political solution needs to be found inside Syria, and a safe environment should be sustained for Syrian refugees to go back to their homes.”

Interestingly, **respondents from Turkey also noted the need for Arabic language education within Turkey for those who wished to eventually return.** This reflects the extremely protracted nature of this crisis - ten years on from the beginning of the conflict, many refugee children have never lived in a predominantly Arabic-speaking context and would require language instruction in order to return to their country of origin.

There is a higher tendency in Syria to perceive returns as non-voluntary (and also in a manner intended to screen returnees for ‘loyalty’) versus voluntary; **37.2% of the participants inside Syria are of mind that returns are indeed non-voluntary, while only 14.0% perceives them as voluntary.** The sensitivity of the topic is apparent in these answers, as almost ¼ (23.3%) of the Syrian participants preferred not to answer this question and an equal share did not know whether returns were taking place on a (non-) voluntary basis. See pie chart for detailed numbers:

Figure: (Non-)Voluntary Return and Reintegration - Inside Syria




Compared to Syria, the participants from the **neighbouring countries had conflicting ideas about the return process:** in total, 32.1% of the participants perceive returns as non-voluntary, while an equal percent (35.7%) sees the return as a voluntary act.

External reports uniformly identified current returns as non-voluntary:


“Currently there is no voluntary return, only a forced one, either resulting from lack of services and discrimination in neighbouring countries or changes in the European Union states’ policies, such as not extending residencies and other policies threatening deportation.”

Figure: (Non-)Voluntary Return and Reintegration - Neighbouring countries



Significantly, the majority of participants from Lebanon reported that returns were currently involuntary; almost 60% (57.1%) of the participants from Lebanon reported that returns are taking place on a non-voluntary basis. This reflects the policies implemented in Lebanon in the past two years, including border pushbacks and increased arrests with summary deportations not overseen by the judiciary. See pie chart for detailed results.

Figure: (Non-)Voluntary Return and Reintegration - Lebanon



The higher proportion among neighbouring country participants asserting that returns are mostly voluntary reflects the complex dynamics of return decision-making. Participants in neighbouring countries attribute increased returns in whole or in part to the deterioration of conditions in countries of asylum; however, some participants described these returns as partially or wholly voluntary.

Of the external reports from neighbouring countries that addressed return, the overwhelming majority characterised current returns as mostly or wholly involuntary. An external report urged:

“All governments hosting refugees and asylum seekers should uphold non-refoulement and commit to a moratorium on summary deportations of Syrian refugees and explicitly limit any coercive measures which incentivise return.”

To prevent involuntary returns, the following priorities have been identified by the respondents: 1. Exert diplomatic pressure towards host countries so as to avoid non-voluntary returns, 2. Monitor returnees’ protection and safety (including through IT/technological means) and 3. Provide financial or legal support for the provision of civil documentation and/or HLP rights. Syrian external reports agreed with the high priority of international diplomatic pressure, expressing that, *“The international community and the United Nations must play an important role in monitoring this return.”* Likewise, incidents of property expropriation were raised by the Syrian diaspora in external reports as both a barrier to return and a driver of premature returns (to attempt to reclaim property):

“There are many cases of property expropriations by the Syrian government or the de facto authorities in all Syrian areas.”

The answers for neighbouring countries were the same as those from Syria, with the exception of the third option. **Host countries reported ‘Facilitating resettlement when returns are not an option’ as another viable option to counteract non-voluntary return.**

The emphasis on resettlement and complementary pathways was echoed in external reports from neighbouring countries, who urged that:


“EU member states should increase the number of resettlement places for Syrian refugees, commit to improved responsibility-sharing between member states, uphold the right to asylum, continue to provide pathways to resettlement.”

Additional theme: Peace process

An additional theme to the consultation was about the Peace Process. Participants were asked about their perceptions of the peace process including their level of awareness of the process.

Over half of the participants of the consultation (52.6%) find themselves ‘sufficiently’ to ‘very well informed’ about the current state of the peace process; compared with 37.8% who do not feel (at all) informed (enough). See pie chart below for a breakdown of the numbers.

Figure: How well informed do you feel about the current state of the peace process? - Overall



Participants from **inside Syria** feel better informed about the current state of the peace process compared with the average total; here a total of **60% of respondents reported themselves as up to date about the status quo of the peace process**. This is **in contrast with the responses from neighbouring countries** where only 37.4% reported having enough information about the peace processes on Syria.

Nevertheless, respondents from inside Syria expressed *“the fear of refugees that they would be excluded from the process of finding a political solution,”* reflecting that, while refugees, IDPs, and affected persons in Syria may feel well-informed (perhaps due to their own consistent efforts to keep abreast of developments), they do not feel sufficiently involved or consulted on the substance of the peace process. In addition, *“many participants drew attention to the sense of powerlessness that refugees in neighbouring countries felt. They would like to contribute to a solution, whether that be in economic terms or in political terms, but they are excluded from the decision-making process. Participants called for the empowerment of refugees.”*

Figure: How well informed do you feel about the current state of the peace process? - Inside Syria:





Figure: How well informed do you feel about the current state of the peace process? - Neighbouring countries:



Priorities for conflict resolution

The 3 most reported priorities for conflict resolution in Syria that could improve the peace process are **1. Political solution/Peaceful transition of power/Elections** **2. Activating the role of the Syrian civil society/more consultations with the local community (under international protection).** **3. Stopping the armed conflict in all areas/conflict resolution** - referring to the need for a full and stable ceasefire in order to really engage in peace negotiations.

External reports noted the importance of **funding transitional justice and rule of law projects** to enable conflict resolution and their perception that these projects are relatively underfunded: Projects pertaining to transitional justice, the rule of law, transparency and elections receive very little funding which is otherwise directed to service groups that make up a very narrow category of society.

In a national-level consultation, participants urged the EU to exert diplomatic pressure to bring peace and ensure an inclusive transition: *“Speakers called for the EU to play a greater role in the political process.”*

An external report from Northeast Syria expressed **the need to increase the scope for local organisations to influence the peace process:** *“The role that is given to the civil society must be far broader than it currently is in order to ensure links between the people, local communities, local authorities, and other parties to the Syrian conflict.”*

Humanitarian domain

The Syrian crisis continues to generate humanitarian needs unparalleled in scale and complexity. In Syria, around 13 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, and 6.6 million are internally displaced. Across the region, life-saving emergency needs continue to rise, with large-scale, protracted displacement to neighbouring countries while increasing socio-economic vulnerabilities and the COVID-19 pandemic are further exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation.


Within this domain, topics were addressed from the perspective of immediate humanitarian aid and assistance, in contrast to the resilience domain, which focused on longer-term needs and possibilities. Thus, the livelihoods theme in the resilience domain focused on the creation of self-sustaining and empowering opportunities to build the future of Syria and the surrounding countries. Under the humanitarian domain, in contrast, the focus of the livelihoods theme is on meeting the immediate requirements of individuals for work, income, and basic needs.

Nevertheless, there was significant overlap between the sub-themes selected under each domain, reflecting the triple nexus between humanitarian aid, development and resilience, and conflict resolution.

Top 3 priority sub-themes

Overall, the three most selected sub-themes under Resilience were: 1. Food security & Livelihoods; 2. Education; and 3. Protection.

Figure: Overall key priority sub-themes under Humanitarian



The overall top 3 priority themes were selected by participants from **inside Syria and the neighbouring countries**. Below are the detailed responses from both Syria and neighbouring countries on these 3 topics with regards to key actors, resources and funding.

Priority sub-theme 1: Food Security & Livelihoods

Economic collapse inside Syria and Lebanon has led to widespread and dramatically increasing poverty, with lack of paid work as a key driver. In Jordan and Turkey, challenges related to access to sustainable livelihoods also persisted throughout 2020 and early 2021. In all contexts, COVID-19 emergency measures including lockdowns exacerbated urgent needs.

Key observations and recommendations

Participants were asked to select a focus area for the overarching theme Food Security & Livelihoods. **The plurality of respondents within the theme opted to focus more narrowly on Food security (37.0%), followed by Non-formal vocational training (19.1%).** Another 19.1% did not want to specify any particular issue.

External reports echoed the emphasis on food security and nutrition within the broader theme. Participants from government-controlled areas noted “The dramatic increase in poverty across Syria [and] the rise of malnutrition,” while participants from the Northwest observed a further link between livelihoods, food security, and health: *“Nutrition projects are linked to health and livelihoods, it is thus not possible to talk about a good health situation in light of the decline in income and while having people living in camps.”*

The extent of the compounding Livelihoods and Food Security crises was summarised by an NGO forum operating throughout the country:

“The COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated an ongoing economic collapse, leaving at least 80% of people below the poverty line, with 9.3 million people now food insecure – a higher recorded number than at any other point during the war – and a further 2.2 million at risk. Ongoing fuel shortages ... have led to hours of queueing outside gas stations reducing the time in which daily workers can earn money. With the majority of households dependent on daily wage earners, this has a devastating impact, especially coming on the heels of the public health measures taken in the first half of 2020 which halted access to work for many. Fuel shortages also increase transportation and agricultural input costs, raising prices of basic commodities.”

Inside Syria

Key actors

According to the participants from Syria, the following actors are the best placed to work efficiently in this specific sub-topic to have the most impact: **Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs) (84.5%), International NGOs (58.4%) and the European Union (49.1%)**⁷.

Respondents from government-controlled areas also identified youth and elderly people as capable of contributing significantly to both the design and implementation of livelihoods programming, to the mutual benefit of the programmes and the local actors.

Resources & Funding

Respondents not only selected **Additional funding** with the greatest frequency (86.9%) but their second and third priorities further underscored the urgent need for **cash assistance in various forms: Multi-purpose cash assistance was selected by 61.3% of respondents and Cash-based transfers assistance by 51.3%**. This latter selection may, depending on how respondents interpreted the option, reflect also the need for support from the international community to enable cash transfers into the country, given significant barriers from sanctions and bank de-risking:

“Challenges to NGOs’ ability to pay bills or salaries in hard currency (e.g. Euro, US Dollar) or regularly import certain items, in part due to the complexity of US and EU sanctions, in a timely manner is limiting their capacity to expand operations...Furthermore, as banks attempt to avoid falling afoul of a mishmash of sanctions regimes and anti-terror legislation compliance measures, increased levels of de-risking means that humanitarian exemptions are often not respected, let alone fully operational. As such many agencies working across Syria are already experiencing or are at risk of experiencing severe difficulties in receiving money granted to them for their activities.”

Respondents agreed that the additional funding should be **directed to local NGOs first** (80.0%), or **otherwise to large NGOs who can then provide support to the local NGOs/actors** (57.5%).

Participants emphasised the emergency conditions confronting local NGOs with regards to funding livelihoods projects in the face of the economic collapse and COVID-19 crisis, estimating *“More than 60% of organisations are in the process of closing down, due to the withdrawal of local community workers and going towards international organisations instead, following the economic crisis.”*

External reports urged donors to immediately increase available funds and to award them particularly to local CSOs: *“Given that the amount of funding for the sector was decreasing, while*

⁷ As the respondents could select multiple answers, the percentages are not summing up to 100%.

needs remained the same or increased, some speakers call for a reduction in the involvement of international NGOs in favour of increased funding for local NGOs whose costs were lower."

Some asserted that *"grants in the livelihoods sector are politicised based on the political perceptions of the donors. Projects are not offered based on the needs of each region, but rather based on the preconceived ideas of the donor itself as to the channelling of assistance to and implementation of projects in specific areas."* They also noted that *"The short implementation period of projects makes the evaluation process difficult."*

Neighbouring countries

Key observations and recommendations

Whereas participants in Syria opted to focus on Food Security, if they selected a focus area, the choice for neighbouring countries was **'Employment'**. This may be because of the sheer desperation of the situation in Syria as well as the extremely limited employment opportunities available there, given the economic crisis. Although the labour market is tight in neighbouring countries as well, **participants noted particular barriers to access - such as inability to obtain work permits - rather than an overall absence of jobs.**

External **reports from Jordan noted the extremely negative impact of COVID-19 lockdowns on refugee access to work and livelihood opportunities**, including job loss due to the shutdown of the tourism sector, restrictions on refugees' ability to engage in home-based work due to regulations, and camp lockdowns and other movement restrictions which impacted access to work.

Likewise, participants from Turkey noted drastic loss of employment leading to emergency coping strategies: *"Many [refugees] have lost their jobs during the pandemic and have become desperate. Some started selling their own furniture or, worse, their own organs."* Indeed, both external reports received from Turkey noted the risk of organ trafficking as well as other *"extreme coping mechanisms"* like engaging in sex work/survival sex.

Reports from Lebanon observed similar patterns: *"refugees have been surviving mostly on what they could earn through informal ad hoc jobs and humanitarian assistance. A large percentage of those employed irregularly worked in agriculture and construction, but construction work has stalled due to the economic crisis and various lockdowns."*

Key actors

Participants in the neighbouring countries see **Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs) (73.7%) and International NGOs (52.6%) also as they most important key actors** to bring a positive change in the area of food security & livelihoods. However, they choose local authorities (60.5%)

as the third actor to play a leading role in this area, rather than the European Union which was selected by respondents from Syria.

This selection may reflect greater expectations of or reliance on the relatively stable governments of neighbouring countries as opposed to the divided governance in Syria. It may also reflect the fact that, in surrounding countries, governments impose limitations and restrictions on refugee work through the allocation of work permits, sector restrictions, and other means. They therefore have a key role to play in removing official barriers to work. Indeed, the issue of work permits was raised in every external report from neighbouring countries which mentioned livelihood issues.

Another set of key actors identified by respondents from Turkey are women. These respondents noted that women have borne the brunt of pandemic-related job loss and urged support for these workers *“who have been hit hardest by job losses resulting from the pandemic.”* In contrast, some participants in Jordan expressed that male workers have been the hardest hit by pandemic job losses, both because of the sectors affected (construction, tourism, daily labour) and because men are more likely to be their family's breadwinners.

Resources & Funding

The first two selected resources are similar to responses for Syria (**Additional funding, 69.7% and Multi-purpose cash assistance, 59.2%**). However, **Support for resilience and risk mitigation (46.1%) was selected third**, instead of Cash-based transfers assistance that was chosen by respondents from Syria, since the unique challenges of transferring cash to Syria are not present in (most of) the neighbouring countries.

Again, additional funding should be directed towards local NGOs (60.5%) and to large NGOs who can provide support to local actors (60.5%). Difference with Syria is that the neighbouring countries opt for multi-annual funding (50.0%) over multi-donor pooled funds.

Participants in Lebanon in particular noted the extraordinary urgency of providing additional, flexible funding to local organisations - in hard currency - to mitigate the disastrous economic conditions and compensate for lost livelihoods:

“Donors should ensure flexible funding for NGOs in the context of the COVID-19 and economic crisis in Lebanon, in terms of reallocation of existing budgets, allowing staff to adjust to the current circumstances, adapt programming, acquire new skills, invest in tools and procedures for safety and risk management. Considering the depreciation of the Lebanese Lira, the Government of Lebanon should ensure that NGOs providing cash-support and other life-saving aid are able to access the full value of their grants from donors.”

Priority sub-theme 2: Education in emergencies

Humanitarian education issues were highly prioritised within Syria and across the region. In this domain - in contrast to the Resilience domain - participants primarily discussed basic education and urgent unmet needs including safe learning spaces and textbooks. Participants also noted the massive learning and access gaps imposed by Coronavirus-related school closures. These barriers include a lack of tech devices with which students can access online learning but also infrastructure barriers, including lack of reliable electricity and internet service which would be required for remote learning even if devices could be provided.

Child protection concerns were discussed in this area too, with school dropouts flagged as indicators of child labour and marriage, and the inability to attend school linked to increasing rates of violence against children.

The sections below describe participants' perceptions and recommendations regarding the needs of education.

Inside Syria

Key observations and recommendations

Participants from Northwest Syria raised concerns about ongoing instability and violence inhibiting education: *"The instability of the areas located along the two lines of conflict is negatively affecting the education of children living in those areas"*. Participants from government-controlled areas noted that violence, stress, and conflict infiltrate the school environment itself, highlighting, *"[an] increase in violence among new children in schools, and the need for safe spaces for them to release this anger inside them."* They also raised the issue of protection threats related to school dropout: *"The stressful living conditions due to the economic sanctions and the absence of additional living resources, which increased the rates of school dropout, child labour, and forced marriage for young girls."*

Participants across Syria - but especially in the Northeast and Northwest - noted a lack of physical infrastructure for education, including the destruction of schools in clashes and the repurposing of school buildings for shelters or other emergency needs. Even participants from government-controlled areas noted *"A large number of schools and educational facilities were out of work due to total or partial destruction, or because they were used as shelters."* In addition to the lack of devices that could facilitate remote learning during the Coronavirus pandemic, the lack of basic infrastructure (e.g. reliable electricity and internet) which would be required to make these remote learning solutions realistic were mainly stressed

Key actors

The key actors to work on emergency education were identified as Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs), 83.6%, followed by the United Nations, 60.5%, and International NGOs, 53.3%.

Resources & Funding

Participants again appealed for Additional funding to meet these urgent needs (89.4%) (through Direct funding to local NGOs (72%); multi-donor pooled funds (57.3%) and funding to large NGOs who could provide support to local actors (55.3%)). Also Multi-purpose cash assistance (52.3%) and Support for resilience and risk mitigation (42.4%) were needed resources.

Participants highlighted the **lack of specialised resources for students with disabilities or specialised needs**. A participant in the Northwest observed *“The lack of special programmes, namely educational programmes, for children with special needs, although such children are present in large numbers in North West Syria.”*

Many external reports from inside Syria mentioned a trend of lower wages for teachers and other education sector workers as compared to other humanitarian sectors. This leads to a loss of human capital from this sector to other sectors, lower quality in education delivery, and requires some teachers to seek additional sources of income to supplement their wages. Participants in central government-controlled areas of Syria noted:

“The extremely fragile economic situation affecting teachers and workers in the educational sector, which forces them to search for additional work and shifting their focus from education.”

Neighbouring countries

Key observations and recommendations

As was the case last year, participants from Lebanon noted the withdrawal of children from school in order to enter the labour force or to be married. This trend has increased greatly, however, due to the economic crisis in Lebanon and COVID-19 lockdowns; children are perceived as less likely to be stopped for curfew or other violations, so may be sent to work instead of an adult in cases of lockdowns.

COVID-19 lockdowns have directly impacted children’s access to education as well, with a huge number of students unable to access remote learning due to lack of technology, electricity, internet., or all of these. As in Syria, participants in neighbouring countries (especially Lebanon) noted that emergency coping strategies interfere with simple solutions to these problems - tech devices provided to students may be repurposed for livelihood or basic needs provision by parents, while the weakness of the internet and electrical grid limit their usefulness.

In **Turkey, external reports stressed the protective aspects of education:** *“The inter-connected impact of the pandemic on access to education for children, livelihood opportunities, and tensions within families as well as domestic violence was noted by many participants.”*

In Jordan, reports noted the extremely high rates of Syrian children who are disconnected from formal education options - 40% - and the complexity and limits of existing re-entry programmes. Like in Syria, participants noted the extreme scarcity of specialized services for children with disabilities, leading to high rates of complete disconnection from education: *“Children with disabilities make up approximately 10% of all school age children, but almost 80% do not receive any form of education.”*

In both Lebanon and Jordan, the relatively low quality and decreased teaching contact hours of second-shift schools were noted.

Key actors

Again, although participants identified **Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs) as top key actors** in this sector (73.2%), they placed a greater emphasis on the role of local authorities (54.9%) than those in Syria did. As in other sectors, this is likely due to a combination of the relative stability of local governance in these locations as compared to Syria, as well as government-imposed barriers to education (such as restriction of Syrian students to second-shifts) which raise the importance of these actors in discussions of access to education. Participants in Lebanon specifically noted the role of ministries in ensuring access: *“The [government of Lebanon] must increase cooperation between the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labour, and Ministry of Education to identify solutions to reduce barriers to accessing education, including the cost of school transport and materials.”* The third key actor identified was the United Nations (49.3%)

Resources & Funding

Resource needs focused again on Additional funding, with 74.3% selecting this as a missing resource. 51.4% selected Multi-purpose cash assistance as a key resource for education, with some respondents in Turkey specifically recommending the use of incentives, potentially including cash, to encourage Turkish language education.

In Turkey, respondents noted *“Families do not have access to technology to engage in various activities”* and recommended *“Flexibility from humanitarian donors is required to support vulnerable members of host communities and support the rising level of needs (e.g. device distributions to facilitate access to education, protection services, remote activities, etc.)”*.

Respondents in Jordan, in contrast, noted that the barriers to remote learning specifically are multifaceted and would require long-term intervention: *“Vulnerable students have been*

disproportionately impacted by COVID-19 related school closures given the barriers they face to distance learning, such as poor internet connectivity, lack of suitable electronic devices, an absence of study space and/or no learning support at home, threatening to push them further behind in their studies.” These external reports therefore identified a need to increase the quality, professionalism, and contact hours of in-person teachers to improve education outcomes, specifically calling for teacher contracts to be formed on an annual basis rather than daily or service-based contracts.

Funding recommendations again focused on direct assistance to local CSOs.

Priority sub-theme 3: Protection

As discussed above (see Priority sub-theme 3 in the Resilience domain), Protection efforts aim to ensure individuals' access to their basic rights within a humanitarian setting - in other words, to protect them from conflict and its consequences including displacement and the lack of rights associated with it. These efforts can include issues of documentation, legal residency, and work permits; cash-based assistance designed to mitigate threats to individual welfare; anti-discrimination efforts; legal aid and protection from detention, arrest, or deportation; and combatting sexual and gender-based violence and violence against children. Resettlement and other durable solutions can also be considered under the umbrella of Protection. Given the ongoing International Humanitarian Law violations in Syria (see most recent report Col for instance) and the protection concerns this poses to Syria's population, a separate question about IHL was posed to all participants answering from Syria. The answers to this question will be analysed at the end of the 'inside Syria' section.

Inside Syria

Within this sub-theme, respondents could choose a more specific sub-theme to answer the rest of the following questions. **For respondents from Syria, the most selected sub-sub themes were: prevention and response to violence (28.4%), child protection & children (formerly) associated with armed forces and armed groups (CAAC), (17.6%) and sexual and gender-based violence (16.2%).**

Protection challenges were a frequent topic in external reports as well, with consultations noting *“Security remains the major concern for returnees, especially for women. One speaker stated that the idea of return was synonymous for her with the notion of being arrested.”* Some participants in the Northeast expressed that the current conditions point towards an increase, not a decrease in violence and social tension: *“The current direction is towards social fracture due to the lack of a suitable environment for social cohesion, and the financial collapse in the region, which have led to increasing the burden borne by the internally displaced...”*. Respondents in the Northwest identified media professionals as well as women and children as needing particular protection: *“Media*

professionals in the region are exposed to many violations and dangers, and they need to be protected”.

Key actors

The selected key actors in the realm of Protection were first of all **Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs) with 79.7% selecting these organisations**. The next mentioned actors were the United Nations and International NGOs with both 55.4% of the respondents opting for these international players.

Resources & Funding

With regards to resources, Additional funding (80.1%) and Support for resilience and risk mitigation (57.5%) appeared as the most chosen options. The call for further civic actor engagement was apparent; 49.3% of the respondents see this kind of engagement as a need to positively influence this sector. The choice for more civic involvement is also echoed in the ways that funding should be divided: The majority of the response opted for Direct funding to local NGOs (76.0%), followed by Multi-donor pooled funds (49.9%) and Funding to large NGOs who can provide support to local actors (45.9%).


Additional resources were mentioned in consultations, including documentation assistance to preserve HLP rights and access to services for displaced persons and returnees.

International Humanitarian Law⁸

The effects of armed conflict are immense, and the main concerns that participants from Syria have **regarding the respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)** are **Attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructures** and **Attacks on humanitarian and healthcare workers**, followed by lack of access to humanitarian assistance and Lack of information regarding IHL. See bar chart for detailed response:

⁸ As the 'Law of armed conflict' only applies for inside Syria currently, these additional questions were reserved for participants answering for Syria only.

Figure: International Humanitarian Law: What is/are your main concern(s) regarding the respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Syria?



To address the above mentioned concerns, **Accountability & Justice, as well as Implementing international legal literature, increase knowledge on IHL and** thirdly, **ensuring International humanitarian protection for civilians** have been recommended.

Figure: International Humanitarian Law: Recommendation(s) to address concern(s) regarding IHL?



Neighbouring countries

Key observations and recommendations

As in Syria, respondents prioritised the **prevention and response to violence as the top priority within Protection**, with (25.9%) selecting this focus. **A close second was documentation, status,**

and protection of individuals at 24.7% , with prevention of sexual and gender-based violence at 12.3%.

Multiple instances of discriminatory mass violence were reported in Lebanon in the last year: *“the alleged murder of a Lebanese man by a Syrian refugee in the town of Bcharre led to acts of retaliation by several Lebanese locals against the town’s Syrian residents,”* culminating in discriminatory vandalism and physical abuse. *“Rather than renouncing the violence and calling for the attackers to be held accountable, town authorities urged all undocumented Syrian residents to leave Bcharre and for their homes to be arbitrarily searched for weapons,”;* searches which were carried out in violation of due process. In Minieh, North Lebanon, *“an entire camp was burnt down by Lebanese civilians after a dispute over wages between workers from the camp and their Lebanese employer.”*

Likewise, respondents from Lebanon reported overall increasing levels of violence: *“Stressors resulting from the economic situation and COVID-19 lockdowns have been impacting societal and familial tensions, leading to a rise in sexual and gender-based violence.”* Calls to domestic violence support lines have increased dramatically in the last year, and several instances of severe child abuse resulting in death or hospitalisation have been reported.

In **Jordan and Lebanon, external reports stressed the need to increase access to legal residency and status regularisation mechanisms:** *“an estimated 80% of Syrian refugees over 15 do not have legal residency”* in Lebanon, due in part to *“significant political, structural and institutional obstacles to legal status,”* including high fees and unclear procedures. In Jordan, a short-term project to regularise refugees with irregular status was concluded in April 2019 and no prospects for legalisation have been undertaken since; as a result, thousands of refugees are currently undocumented and unable to access services.

In Turkey, although legal status was mentioned less frequently, respondents noted the need to increase legal aid provision to ensure refugees are protected in any encounter with authority and can defend their rights.

Key actors

Similar key actors were mentioned as in Syria. However, in external reports, respondents identified key roles for ministries, security agencies, and municipalities in upholding Protection, including instituting non-discriminatory policies, streamlining documentation processes, and training security officers to recognize and appropriately respond to gender-based violence. A report from Lebanon also called on the Lebanese parliament to raise the legal age of marriage to protect children from early marriage.

Resources & Funding

As usual, **Additional funding was identified most frequently (81.8%) as the most needed resource, followed by Multi-purpose cash assistance, 51.9%, and Support for resilience and risk mitigation, 51.9%.**

This priority was reflected in reports from Lebanon, where respondents expressed that *“the scope of immediate cash needs is broad and it is growing. It was underlined that there is a need that diverse actors are prepared to directly address gaps in social safety nets. Income poverty is a driver of other forms of violence and deprivation.”*

A Jordanian external report advocated for increased resources for legal aid and the establishment of a national system of legal aid with free services for all residents, including Syrian and other refugees.

Funding priorities followed the same pattern as other sectors, with highest priority given to Direct funding to local NGOs, followed by funding to large NGOs who can support local actors. The third most-recommended funding strategy was multi-annual funding, reflecting the need to make longer-term plans.

From Lebanon, participants advocated for long-term flexible funding. Respondents in Turkey suggested unorthodox protection mechanisms *“such as microcredits, [which] could help to boost local economy and be conducive to social peace especially if equally distributed between refugees and Turkish residents.”*

Finally, **external reports from all three neighbouring countries identified resettlement pledges and follow-through as key resources needed to ensure protection of the most vulnerable:** *“States should set targets for a substantial increase in resettlement pledges and access to complementary pathways.”*

Remaining Humanitarian sub-themes

For the remaining sub-themes the table under Annex II provides a detailed breakdown of the results, for both Syria and Neighbouring countries. Comparative analyses of these results are discussed below.

Comparative analysis of the remaining sub-themes

In the area of **Health and nutrition**, participants from both Syria and Neighbouring countries highlighted **Primary health care** as their most pressing concern, along with **Response to COVID-19 pandemic**. In Syria, the Health and nutrition needs are reflected in the kind of resources that are requested; namely in-kind assistance in the form of medical supplies and food

rations as well as diplomatic interventions to ensure the continuation of humanitarian aid access.

In all areas of Syria, **participants saw local organisations as the key players in the Health and Nutrition sector**, followed by International NGOs. Participants in Syrian regime controlled areas and from North East Syria (SDF control) also noted the key role the UN is playing in this field, whereas in Turkish controlled areas, the European Union is identified as the key actor. In Neighbouring countries, there was also mention of the role of local authorities to increase access to - and quality of - healthcare.

Additional funding is needed in this sector in all areas inside Syria, with direct funding to local NGOs selected most frequently as the best method of delivery. Indeed, **participants in external consultations urged cost-savings through localization**: *“Given that the amount of funding for the sector was decreasing, while needs remained the same or increased, some speakers call for a reduction in the involvement of international NGOs in favour of increased funding for local NGOs whose costs were lower.”* Respondents in North East Syria (SDF control) also saw funding to large consortia of NGOs as a means to improve the health sector. In contrast, North West Syria (HTS control) preferred Funding to large NGOs who can provide support to local actors and Multi-annual funding.

Notably, respondents from **neighbouring countries frequently reported that Mental health and psycho-social support require an emergency increase in resources**, with participants in Turkey expressing: *“The full extent of the psychological effects of COVID-19 [including job loss and deteriorating economic conditions] are not understood. Psychosocial support programmes must be increased.”* Participants in Jordan also mentioned the need for reproductive healthcare services to be expanded.

In Lebanon, the need to support imports of key medical supplies and equipment was mentioned repeatedly. These resources include supplies used in clinical settings (medicines, sterile equipment), COVID-19 mitigation supplies (masks, gloves, sanitizers, vaccine), and retail health products including, in particular, female health and hygiene products which have grown prohibitively expensive with the lira depreciation. Challenges related to infant nutrition were also reported, including *“alarmingly increased incidents of unsolicited, untargeted donations of breastmilk substitutes that further compromise breastfeeding rates and pushes [vulnerable households] into financial coercion.”*

In **Jordan, participants urged the provision of emergency obstetrics and neonatal care, post-operative care, and mental health treatment.** In a positive development, Jordan has included refugees along with its citizen population in COVID-19 response. Unfortunately, other

neighbouring countries have not followed suit: *“Jordan alone among neighbouring countries has made provision for refugees as part of its vaccination programme.”*

For **Shelter and settlements**, participants once again expressed broad agreement on the key actors in the sector and the missing resources and funding. However, they also noted distinct issues. In Syria, there were relatively fewer mentions of emergency shelter needs than in Neighbouring countries (though a related Resilience issue, HLP rights, received ample attention in Syria). However, respondents noted the extremely poor conditions in IDP camps.

In this context, Syrian participants stressed the **Health** impacts of inadequate **WASH** infrastructure in camps: *“[There is] a significant decline in the various basic services that are related, in one way or another, to health, including sewerage systems, clean water, electricity, and others.”* In another consultation, respondents expressed that inferior shelter conditions in camps *“increased the burden on the healthcare sector by virtue of poor hygiene conditions.”* These respondents called for funding and in-kind donations to improve WASH infrastructure in camps in particular.

In Neighbouring countries, participants highlighted the challenges of refugees in urban settings as well as camps with regard to Shelter. **In Lebanon in particular, respondents noted the risk of eviction and inability to pay rent as challenges confronting refugees**, and recommended engagement with landlords to ensure access to safe shelter. These respondents also called for the government of Lebanon and donors to work together to ensure that the full value of aid reaches recipients, despite the depreciating lira. They specified that these resources should include *“food boxes, winterization materials, and shelter support.”*

In Lebanon, many respondents identified municipalities and water establishments as key WASH sector actors: *“Water safety planning in the country is therefore needed, whereas the government and water establishments have to be supported by the NGOs in this regard.”* They also described the unacceptable WASH conditions in ITSs: *“[A participant] stressed poor water supply in the camps and the reliance on truck deliveries. People in ITS are resorting to unsafe water sources due to the lack of alternatives.”* However, the participants noted an *“excessive focus on the situation in the informal settlements and the emergency response,”* and a corresponding lack of focus on water and WASH issues in urban settings and longer-term strategies to address infrastructure: *“The participants have called for a whole-of-population approach to water challenges, without singling out communities...”*

In Jordan, respondents noted important **WASH**-related COVID-19 awareness campaigns from both UNHCR and the Ministry of Health, but observed continued challenges in ensuring their effectiveness.

Participants from Syria were also asked to provide their ideas around **Assistance to spontaneous returnees and IDPs**. Here, both local and international actors are regarded to play a role in the assistance of spontaneous returnees and IDPs: **Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs) (87.5%) and International NGOs (84.4%), followed by -to a lesser extent - the European Union (53.1%)**. Some respondents noted the risk of conflict in cases where local communities are not prepared to accept returning refugees or IDPs: *“There have been cases of host communities not being willing to accept returnees. In this context, some speakers drew attention to the important role for civil society organisations in raising awareness and promoting social cohesion.”* Participants also urged NGOs and CSOs to increase awareness around the preservation of property-related documents - including non-traditional documents such as electricity bills or other means of proving ownership - in light of challenges faced by returnees in accessing their HLP rights.

Recommendations

Within the domains above, participants expressed a few clear and repeated priority recommendations, which were consistent across themes and domains:

- **Focus on local actors**
- **Provide additional funding**
- **Direct this funding to local actors as much as possible, with appropriate support**

These recommendations emerged through both the survey and the external reports, where participants noted some of the reasons for this consistent advice: local actors understand the context best, including what is and is not possible; nothing can be done without resources to support it; and at each layer of separation between donor and beneficiaries, the risk of inefficiency, waste, and lack of realism increases. The consistency of these recommendations send a **clear message: consistent investment is needed to achieve sustainable livelihoods, education, protection, civic engagement, healthcare, shelter, governance, justice, gender equality, stability and peace, or durable solutions.**

However, the consistency of these results does not mean that there were not specific additional recommendations offered. Underscoring the value of engaging directly with local civil society, participants provided detailed and technical recommendations on each theme. Key recommendations - offered in addition to the three overarching imperatives identified above - are provided below.

Resilience

As described in the Results section above, respondents generally advised increased localisation and funding to achieve Resilience goals.

A few recommendations were consistent both within Syria and in neighbouring countries: Participants almost unanimously noted the urgent need to **engage with local actors specifically at the design stage of project planning and at the evaluation and monitoring phases.** These respondents recommended that donors and partners seek input from local partners - and genuinely engage with this input, including by changing planned projects where appropriate - before the implementation stage when many projects are introduced to beneficiaries and local implementing partners. Respondents noted the savings in financial and community trust terms that such early and earnest engagement could bring.

Respondents from across the region also advocated for an **increase in flexible learning opportunities** to allow for the reentry and reintegration of children who have left formal education for any reason, including child labour and child marriage.

Finally, participants in Syria and neighbouring countries alike requested detailed feedback on the results of the Brussels Conference, noting the **need to receive concrete outputs from both preparatory meetings and the Conference itself, with a timeframe and clear statements of what was agreed by whom. Participants in some consultations recommended more frequent dialogue between civil society and the Brussels process. They also recommended monitoring frameworks and active evaluation of outcome implementation.**

Inside Syria

Although **Health was not selected as a Resilience priority sub-theme with as high a frequency as Livelihoods, Education, and Social Protection, many recommendations on all three of these themes centered on Health.** In particular, participants repeatedly stressed the need to **focus on “systems not services” in the health sector.** This means investing in healthcare infrastructure at every level. Accordingly, participants recommended implementing **training programmes** for nurses, doctors, medical specialists, and technicians in order to staff a self-sufficient health system, and for **strong labour rights for medical staff** to negotiate contracts, unionize, and receive social protection. They advocated for **enhanced healthcare educational opportunities,** especially to address preventative medicine, secondary, and tertiary care. **They advised the creation of health directorates to improve governance of healthcare across the country.** The recommendations focused especially on the needs of staff, noting pressures to emigrate and recommending aggressive investment to prevent human capital flight. Finally, many recommended **long-term investments in emergency and pandemic response capacities,** to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and prepare in case of further emergencies (for further COVID-19-specific recommendations, see Humanitarian domain below).

On **Livelihoods, participants highlighted in particular the need to invest in self-sustaining, market-driven programmes that could produce long-term employment for both the participants and their communities.** They also closely linked livelihoods with educational opportunities, stressing that **educational programming should lead to livelihood opportunities.**

Also on the topic of Livelihoods, participants strongly recommended **tapping into local talent pools to staff projects** - including in the evaluation and design phases of projects - to put local talent to use, reduce pressure to emigrate, and to produce better, more tailored results. While several respondents singled out youth in recommending local talent inclusion, others noted the need to include older persons including retirees, to take advantage of their wisdom and experience. Many participants recommended **targeting Livelihoods outreach to women in particular,** and focusing on sectors in which women are already somewhat active as well as opening new sectors.

Many participants recommended that **international and local actors alike should invest in fostering healthy, robust civil society spaces**. In particular, participants from government-controlled areas noted the need for secure spaces in which to freely exchange views and reach consensus on social issues. In connection with this, **the need for support of independent media** was highlighted. In addition, many respondents advised that **social cohesion efforts should identify and collaborate with trusted local actors** including tribal leaders, high-profile social and scientific figures, and women in order to maximize their impact.

Many respondents urged **awareness-raising programmes on HLP** and the importance of securing and retaining documents to prove ownership of property. It was suggested that documentation efforts should expand to include informal or non-traditional forms of documentation such as electric bills. Participants noted that women in particular risk losing property rights but encouraged cooperation with local feminist organisations, which have been active in documenting women's property rights and violations thereof. More generally, participants urged **the documentation of property damage, expropriation, and destruction to enable eventual compensation and justice efforts**. Respondents recommended engaging directly with IDPs on property rights, to ensure that those who wish to return to their places of origin have appropriate documentation to do so. Finally, participants urged the EU and other international actors to **exert political pressure on the Syrian government and other parties to the conflict to respect property rights and refrain from adopting policies**, such as Law No. 10, which infringe on these rights.

On the issue of **Returns**, respondents counseled that **the conditions for safe, voluntary, and dignified returns are not yet in place**. In accord with this reality, they advocated for **the protection of the rights of eventual returnees in ways that do not place pressure on refugees to return prematurely**. These efforts include property protection (see above) as well as the provision of accurate information to refugees abroad and any returnees, and programmes to develop social cohesion among returnees, IDPs, and communities who stayed in place. There were particular recommendations for **anti-hate speech campaigns to counter social tensions and the need to invest in economic and educational opportunities in communities receiving returnees** to further reduce tensions. Previous residents of camps, particularly al Hawl, must be reintegrated into communities and programmes to reduce social stigma must be undertaken. It is also essential that returnees do not face punitive consequences in terms of legal status or social benefits on the basis of their returnee status. In addition, participants recommended **strong, international monitoring of the conditions of returnees**.

On the issue of voluntariness, respondents stressed that **returns "for the sake of return" should be discouraged rather than encouraged** by international actors, and noted that **"return" should mean to the area of origin, not simply to Syria**. However, respondents also advised that returnees have the right to choose their area of return and so should not be forced to return to

their area of origin if they prefer another region. Participants particularly in the diaspora noted an increasing risk of involuntary returns from EU countries due to changing policies and urged **EU countries to uphold the principle of non-refoulement.**

Respondents also voiced recommendations **on the political level, advocating for international support for the rights of refugees, returnees, and IDPs to participate in any political processes including the Constitutional Committee and elections.**

Finally under the Resilience domain, Syrian respondents urged the **implementation of transitional justice measures** to bring the perpetrators of war crimes to justice and to heal society. Specifically, they noted the need for accountability for perpetrators of atrocities in Tell Abyad, Ifrin, Ras Al Ayn, Der Ezzor, and Raqqa. They advised the release of forcibly disappeared and incarcerated persons and for international actors to take action on the issue of disappearances.

Neighbouring Countries

Resilience recommendations from neighbouring countries echoed other segments of the consultation: respondents identified the need for increased funding and increased local engagement at all project stages and across all sectors. In addition, they made specific recommendations.

Respondents from all neighbouring countries emphasised **the need to increase access to work permits** - including calling for political pressure from the EU, UN, and other international actors to achieve this - in order to increase access to Livelihoods. **Participants in Lebanon specifically urged donors to condition additional aid to government agencies on demonstrated improvements in service provision**, including residency and work permit processing time improvements. Lebanese participants also advocated for the implementation of International Labour Organisation (ILO) recommendations on the adoption of a flexible work permit system. Jordanian respondents likewise called for monitoring of the implementation of flexible work permits. In both countries it was recommended to open further sectors of the economy to refugee workers.

Neighbours further advised **a shift from a humanitarian mode of Livelihood programming to a development mode, with a focus on sustainable job creation for women in particular.** In Turkey, it was recommended that Livelihoods programmes focus on the agricultural and care economy and to promote women's self-employment and participation in cooperatives.

In Jordan and Lebanon, support for robust and workers' rights-centric monitoring and inspections were advocated to ensure safe and dignified work conditions. Several respondents from Jordan also specifically recommended the expansion of options for refugees to open

home-based businesses in order to increase self-sufficiency and economic activity. For example, some urged

“support to local micro-businesses along with short-term fundraising efforts to help individuals work from their houses in areas that are more likely for them to receive funding from potential donors. The micro-businesses could be related to cooking and selling food, including organic food; delivery services; natural handmade products; recycling; etc. They noted that this would contribute to poverty alleviation and help some of the poorest refugees living in urban and rural areas to secure their basic needs.”

On **Education**, most recommendations from neighbouring countries were made within the Humanitarian domain, but respondents noted a few key action points to advance Resilience. These included a recommendation to **develop inclusive and adaptive curricula, including for children with disabilities**, to ensure full inclusion of these individuals in society. Respondents also recommended **integrating mental health services into regular educational curricula to improve both educational outcomes and social welfare**. Providing **coaching and training for teachers and principals** was advised in order to improve educational quality. Finally, participants called for support - through scholarships and political encouragement to host governments to lower barriers to entry - to secondary education, vocational programmes, and university education.

Participants finally urged donors to exert financial and political pressure on host governments to maintain and expand civic space. These respondents noted **tendencies, particularly in Lebanon and Turkey, of shrinking space in which CSOs can operate and in which civic debate can take place on refugees and other issues**. Respondents advocated for donors and the EU to use their leverage to support civil society, in order to maintain a healthy civic environment.

Humanitarian

Participants' recommendations to the international community on this topic centered on the urgent need to **involve and support local organisations and actors**. They also urged the continuation and expansion of aid, and for donors to allow for a more equal distribution of this aid across Syria and neighbouring countries.

Inside Syria

Respondents urged an overall scaling up of emergency basic and protection assistance, both in cash and in-kind, to deal with the cascading crises confronting the country.

Underscoring the extremity of the emergency, under the theme of **Livelihoods and food security**, Syrian participants recommended **immediate food aid for the population above all else**: *“Feed them, then start with any other socioeconomic development approaches. No humanitarian focus without food security.”* Another participant observed the same, and gave the same advice: *“Syrian*

society now suffers from a severe shortage of food safety and the deterioration of the living conditions. [Food] security must be immediate and [entail] serious intervention to reduce the bad situation of the Syrian people.” Beyond food security, participants recommended Livelihoods projects that focus on providing stable sources of income: “The priority is to provide decent job opportunities, stability in income, then people will look at other humanitarian needs.”

Under Protection, respondents recommended training for civil society and humanitarian workers to increase their capacity to protect the most vulnerable: “We need to train staff in all sectors of humanitarian work to address the protection of children and women in need,” with the protection of children particularly emphasised.

Respondents also recommended **investments in property and civil documentation support in order to increase refugees’ and IDPs’ access to their property rights and social services:** “The need to protect the property of the refugees, IDPs and forcibly displaced persons, especially after the promulgation of laws that legalise their seizure, such as Law No. 10. It is therefore a must to support real property documentation programs.” They further recommended “Protecting the rights of families to have identity papers and ensuring their civil rights in (inheritance - education - elections in the transitional period), specifically the people living in camps.”

Humanitarian access issues were highlighted, as well as the crucial need to **renew UN Security Council Resolution 2533** in July 2021 and to reopen the crossings at Bab al-Salam, Al Yarubiyah, and Al-Ramtha. **Participants in regime-controlled areas in particular advocated for equal aid distribution across all of Syria,** and those operating across different regions urged a Whole of Syria approach with inter-hub planning to ensure consistent cross-border and cross-line access.

Under **Education, Syrian participants recommended the provision of basic supplies,** including textbooks and robust, up to date curricula. They also advocated for **increased support to physical infrastructure for education,** noting lack of heat and overcrowding due to influxes of IDPs in some areas and destruction or repurposing of school buildings, as well as the need to promote physical distancing during the pandemic. Conditions in camps were identified as much worse, and participants accordingly recommended **extraordinary investment in camp infrastructure.** Furthermore, the low wages of teachers were repeatedly mentioned as a driver of low-quality education, and respondents recommended for **wages to be increased and the sector to receive assistance in capacity building.** Offering lower wages within the Education sector compared to other humanitarian sectors can set back efforts to improve emergency education in Syria, and donors should ensure comparable wages across sectors.

Many participants stressed the need to prioritize **integrated, meaningful access for people with disabilities** - especially given the large numbers of children and youth who have been injured in

war - and recommended providing increased psycho-social support to children facing trauma and social pressure.

Within **Health**, aside from recommendations for **urgent additional humanitarian aid for both COVID-19 and the injuries and illnesses associated with prolonged conflict**, respondents had a few key requests: they advocated **increased access to high quality prosthetics** to improve quality of life, and also recommended **expanded access and coverage of disability and life insurance and other labour rights for medical workers**, noting that the ability to deliver quality care is impacted by conditions of work.

Within **Syria**, participants urged relief from or re-targeting of sanctions to reduce their impact on access to humanitarian goods and funding, noting that humanitarian exemptions are convoluted and deter investment. They also advised **improving effectiveness of humanitarian exemptions**, issuing clear guidance on sanctions and other restrictions, and reallocating risk between partners.

Neighbouring countries

Recommendations from neighbouring countries varied, reflecting the distinct humanitarian situation confronting each country.

Respondents from **Lebanon**, noting the extraordinary and escalating humanitarian crises there, recommended **immediate cash assistance for refugees and host community** alike. They also advocated **import supports for vital medical and food supplies**, to mitigate the impacts of the currency crisis.

In **Jordan**, reflecting relatively more positive relations between host and refugee populations compared to other neighbouring countries, **respondents urged support for non-discriminatory social services** - including education, livelihoods, and health - to preserve these relatively positive relations. For example, participants recommended:

“Open sectors of the economy in which Syrian refugees are currently prevented from working, including high growth and professional sectors, based on a formula that minimizes disruption to Jordanian workers...Allow unbiased enrollment for children regardless of nationality, documentation, or status and extend the documentation waiver for the enrollment of Syrian school children beyond the current academic year...[Accelerate] the transition to integrated or single-shift schools. Raise enrollment places in single-shift schools, strengthen data collection on existing enrollment, and improve school transport to reduce disparities.”

Participants also urged **the re-establishment of rectification of status processes for Syrian refugees** to allow them to regularize their legal status and creation of a national legal aid system to ensure refugees - and all vulnerable residents of Jordan - can access their rights.

In both **Turkey and Lebanon, the dramatic rise in social tensions and discrimination during the COVID-19 pandemic in particular led to calls for increased investment in conflict resolution, prevention, and psychosocial support for survivors of violence.** Respondents from Lebanon noted that lack of legal status interferes with refugees' ability to report and receive protection from violence, harassment, and crime; they recommended increased regularization measures to lower these barriers.

Participants from **Turkey and Lebanon likewise urged protection from deportation and involuntary return.** Respondents from Lebanon specifically called for an immediate halt to summary deportations from Lebanon and to ensure that any removals, including at the border, are overseen by a judge with a right of appeal in accordance with rule of law. Respondents from both countries further noted extreme trauma from pushbacks including on Aegean and Cypriot sea routes and advocated for a halt to these pushbacks. These participants also urged an **increase in emergency resettlement places to protect the most vulnerable refugees, including LGBTQ+ individuals.**

Finally, **respondents from all neighbouring countries noted the increase in SGBV and domestic violence that has accompanied Coronavirus lockdowns and economic stress.** They recommended further **increases in remote access for those victims with access to technology, but also an immediate increase in service provision and outreach, including psychosocial support to save lives.**

Annexes

Annex I. Overview of results on remaining Resilience sub-themes

Table: Overview of results on remaining sub-themes - Inside Syria and Neighbouring countries

Theme	Key Actors	n	%	
Health and COVID-19 response/ vaccination	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	89	82.4%
		2 International NGOs	72	66.7%
		3 United Nations	67	62.0%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	43	70.5%
		2 Local authorities	43	70.5%
		3 United Nations	38	62.3%
	Resources		n	%
	In Syria	1 Additional Funding	93	86.9%
		2 Facilitation of physical access	75	70.1%
		3 Capacity building and expertise	70	65.4%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Additional Funding	46	78.0%
		2 Facilitation of physical access	35	59.3%
		3 Support to institutional capacities	32	54.2%
	Funding		n	%
	In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	83	78.3%
2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors		74	69.8%	
3 United Nations		66	62.3%	
Neighbouring countries	1 United Nations	37	63.8%	
	2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	36	62.1%	
	3 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	33	56.9%	

Theme	Key Actors	n	%	
Governance	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	27	64.3%
		2 Local authorities	26	61.9%
		3 United Nations	21	50.0%
	Neighbouring countries	1 United Nations	10	62.5%
		2 European Union	9	56.3%
		3 International NGOs	9	56.3%
	Resources		n	%
	In Syria	1 Political support	29	72.5%
		2 Capacity building and expertise	29	72.5%
		3 Support to institutional capacities	28	70.0%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Political support	11	68.8%
		2 Support to institutional capacities	10	62.5%
		3 Capacity building and expertise	9	56.3%
	Funding		n	%
	In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	23	59.0%
2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors		19	48.7%	
3 Grants		17	43.6%	
Neighbouring countries	1 Grants	10	66.7%	
	2 Funding to large consortia of NGOs	7	46.7%	
	3 United Nations	7	46.7%	
Theme	Key Actors	n	%	
Gender equality and women empowerment	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	71	89.9%
		2 International NGOs	41	51.9%
		3 United Nations	40	50.6%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	40	88.9%
		2 Local authorities	33	73.3%
		3 International NGOs	26	57.8%
	Resources		n	%
In Syria	1 Additional Funding	60	75.9%	

		2 Capacity building and expertise	59	74.7%	
		3 Support to institutional capacities	47	59.5%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 Additional Funding	30	68.2%	
		2 Capacity building and expertise	27	61.4%	
		3 Access to financing and investment	25	56.8%	
	Funding		n	%	
	In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	66	83.5%	
		2 Grants	50	63.3%	
		3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	44	55.7%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	31	70.5%	
		2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	26	59.1%	
		3 Grants	23	52.3%	
Theme	Key Actors		n	%	
Justice and accountability	In Syria	1 European Union	13	72.2%	
		2 United Nations	12	66.7%	
		3 International NGOs	8	44.4%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 European Union	4	50.0%	
		2 United Nations	3	37.5%	
		3 International NGOs	3	37.5%	
		Resources		n	%
	In Syria	1 Political will of an authority inside Syria	16	53.3%	
		2 Capacity building and expertise	15	50.0%	
		3 Political support	14	46.7%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 Capacity building and expertise	5	50.0%	
		2 Additional Funding	4	40.0%	
		3 Political will of host country	4	40.0%	
	Funding		n	%	
	In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	21	53.8%	

		2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	16	41.0%	
		3 Grants	15	38.5%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	6	60.0%	
		2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	5	50.0%	
		3 United Nations	4	40.0%	
Theme	Key Actors		n	%	
Security	In Syria	1 United Nations	36	57.1%	
		2 Local authorities	35	55.6%	
		3 European Union	32	50.8%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 United Nations	7	70.0%	
		2 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	6	60.0%	
		3 European Union	6	60.0%	
		Resources		n	%
	In Syria	1 Political support	45	65.2%	
		2 Capacity building and expertise	45	65.2%	
		3 Support to institutional capacities	38	55.1%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 Political support	8	61.5%	
		2 Political will of host country	7	53.8%	
		3 Capacity building and expertise	4	30.8%	
		Funding		n	%
	In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	45	60.8%	
2 United Nations		40	54.1%		
3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors		34	45.9%		
Neighbouring countries	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	8	50.0%		
	2 Grants	8	50.0%		
	3 United Nations	7	43.8%		

Theme	Key Actors	n	%	
Community level integration	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	37	78.7%
		2 Local communities	28	59.6%
		3 Local authorities	24	51.1%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	22	75.9%
		2 Local communities	21	72.4%
		3 Local authorities	19	65.5%
	Resources		n	%
	In Syria	1 Additional Funding	40	78.4%
		2 Capacity building and expertise	35	68.6%
		3 Support to institutional capacities	32	62.7%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Support to institutional capacities	19	57.6%
		2 Additional Funding	17	51.5%
		3 Political support	17	51.5%
	Funding		n	%
	In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	45	90.0%
2 Grants		34	68.0%	
3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors		25	50.0%	
Neighbouring countries	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	26	78.8%	
	2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors	17	51.5%	
	3 Grants	17	51.5%	
Theme	Key Actors	n	%	
Return and Reintegration	In Syria	1 Local communities	33	75.0%
		2 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	32	72.7%
		3 Local authorities	28	63.6%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	17	56.7%
		2 United Nations	16	53.3%
		3 European Union	16	53.3%
	Resources		n	%

	In Syria	1 Political support	31	72.1%	
		2 Facilitation of physical access	27	62.8%	
		3 Support to institutional capacities	26	60.5%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 Political support	18	62.1%	
		2 Additional Funding	14	48.3%	
		3 Facilitation of physical access	13	44.8%	
	Funding			n	%
	In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	31	72.1%	
		2 United Nations	28	65.1%	
3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support and capacity building to local actors		27	62.8%		
Neighbouring countries	1 United Nations	18	62.1%		
	2 Development agencies	16	55.2%		
	3 Direct funding to local NGOs or community based organisations	15	51.7%		

Annex II. Overview of results on remaining Humanitarian sub-themes

Table. Overview of sub-themes under Humanitarian - both in Syria and neighbouring countries

Theme	Sub-theme	n	%	
Health and nutrition	In Syria	1 Primary health care	30	28.3%
		2 I don't want to specify any particular issue	25	23.6%
		3 Response to COVID-19 pandemic	19	17.9%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Primary health care	19	33.9%
		2 Mental health and psycho-social support	14	25.0%
		3 Response to COVID-19 pandemic	10	17.9%
	Key Actors		n	%
	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	90	85.7%
		2 International NGOs	62	59.0%
		3 United Nations	52	49.5%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	36	64.3%
		2 Local authorities	31	55.4%
		3 United Nations	28	50.0%
	Resources		n	%
	In Syria	1 Additional funding	88	83.8%
		2 In-kind assistance	49	46.7%
		3 Support for resilience and risk mitigation	47	44.8%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Additional funding	40	71.4%
		2 Multi-purpose cash assistance	30	53.6%
		3 Support for resilience and risk mitigation	22	39.3%
	Funding		n	%
In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs	78	74.3%	
	2 Multi-donor pooled funds	56	53.3%	

		3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support to local actors	55	52.4%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 Direct funding to local NGOs	33	60.0%	
		2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support to local actors	29	52.7%	
		3 Funding UN agencies or other international organisations	25	45.5%	
Theme	Key Actors		n	%	
Shelter and settlements	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	58	80.6%	
		2 United Nations	39	54.2%	
		3 International NGOs	39	54.2%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	25	62.5%	
		2 United Nations	25	62.5%	
		3 International NGOs	20	50.0%	
		Resources		n	%
	In Syria	1 Additional funding	60	83.3%	
		2 Support for resilience and risk mitigation	34	47.2%	
		3 Multi-purpose cash assistance	33	45.8%	
	Neighbouring countries	1 Multi-purpose cash assistance	28	70.0%	
		2 Additional funding	23	57.5%	
		3 Support for resilience and risk mitigation	23	57.5%	
		Funding		n	%
	In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs	54	76.1%	
2 Multi-donor pooled funds		42	59.2%		
3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support to local actors		41	57.7%		
Neighbouring countries	1 Direct funding to local NGOs	24	61.5%		
	2 Multi-donor pooled funds	21	53.8%		
	3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support to local actors	19	48.7%		

Theme	Key Actors	n	%	
WASH	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	45	84.9%
		2 International NGOs	37	69.8%
		3 Local authorities	29	54.7%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Local authorities	17	68.0%
		2 International NGOs	16	64.0%
		3 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	14	56.0%
	Resources		n	%
	In Syria	1 Additional funding	49	92.5%
		2 Multi-purpose cash assistance	25	47.2%
		3 In-kind assistance	24	45.3%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Additional funding	15	60.0%
		2 Multi-purpose cash assistance	12	48.0%
		3 In-kind assistance	12	48.0%
	Funding		n	%
	In Syria	1 Direct funding to local NGOs	38	71.7%
		2 Multi-donor pooled funds	35	66.0%
		3 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support to local actors	34	64.2%
	Neighbouring countries	1 Direct funding to local NGOs	15	60.0%
2 Funding to large NGOs who can provide support to local actors		15	60.0%	
3 Multi-annual funding		11	44.0%	
Theme	Key Actors	n	%	
Assistance to spontaneous returnees and IDPs	In Syria	1 Local organisations (NGOs, CSOs, CBOs)	28	87.5%
		2 International NGOs	27	84.4%
		3 The European Union	17	53.1%
	Resources		n	%
In Syria	1 Additional funding	25	78.1%	

	2	Support for resilience and risk mitigation	19	59.4%
	3	Multi-purpose cash assistance	17	53.1%
		Funding	n	%
In Syria	1	Direct funding to local NGOs	25	78.1%
	2	Funding to large NGOs who can provide support to local actors	21	65.6%
	3	Funding to large consort of NGOs	18	56.3%

Annex III. Overview of recommendations Resilience and Humanitarian

Table: Overview of recommendations Resilience - Inside Syria, including breakdown per area

	Country: Syria	Area: Syrian regime controlled areas	Area: North West Syria (HTS control)	Area: Turkish controlled areas	Area: North East Syria (SDF control)
Involvement of and support to local organisations	126	22	17	9	46
Focus on Conflict resolutions /transitional justice/human rights (with International political support)	124	19	33	14	28
Invest in Livelihoods	67	14	17	8	14
Support to marginalized groups (women/children/disabled)/women empowerment	49	3	12	1	12
Support education	38	3	12	2	9
GENERAL humanitarian aid	29	3	2	3	10
Funding	28	6	9	1	3
Allow humanitarian aid to be let in/continued/equal aid distribution	25	9	2	3	4
GENERAL Sustainability/development/resilience support	21	5	6	3	4
Support health (incl Covid-19 and MHPSS)	14	3	1	2	4
Increase Monitoring & Accountability	13	4	6	0	1
Social cohesion support	8	4	0	1	1
Enabling safe return	8	1	1	2	2
Nexus Humanitarian-Development-Peac	5	1	1	0	0
Release of detainees	3	0	3	0	0
Support to neighbouring countries	1	1	0	0	0

Table: Overview of recommendations Resilience - Neighbouring countries, incl. breakdown per country.⁹

⁹ Due to the limited amount of answers from Iraq and Egypt, their answers have not been included in the analyses.

	Country: Neighbouring countries	Country: Lebanon	Country: Jordan	Country: Turkey
Involvement of and support to local organisations	36	7	6	22
Invest in Livelihoods	31	10	6	14
Focus on Conflict resolutions /transitional justice/human rights (with International political support)	31	9	3	16
Funding	19	6	4	9
Social cohesion support	15	4	4	7
Support to marginalized groups (women/children/disabled)/women empowerment	13	5	3	5
GENERAL Sustainability/development/resilience support	13	2	3	8
GENERAL Humanitarian aid	11	4	2	5
Support Education	11	1	4	6
Increase Monitoring and Accountability	10	4	1	5
Support to neighbouring countries	6	6	0	0
Enable safe return to Syria	6	0	1	2
Allow humanitarian aid to be let in/continued/equal aid distribution	5	1	4	0
Support Health (incl. Covid-19 and MHPSS)	4	1	1	2
Nexus Humanitarian-Development-Peace	3	1	2	0
Release of detainees	0	0	0	0

Table: Overview of recommendations Humanitarian domain - In Syria, incl.breakdown per area

	Country: Syria	Area: Syrian regime controlled areas	Area: North West Syria (HTS control)	Area: Turkish controlled areas	Area: North East Syria (SDF control)	Area: Whole of Syria
Involvement of and support to local actors/organisations	61	9	10	0	27	12
Invest in Livelihoods	27	7	2	2	8	7
GENERAL humanitarian aid	27	6	3	3	9	4
Funding	27	5	6	3	7	5

Allow humanitarian aid to be let in/continued/equal aid distribution	27	3	5	2	8	7
Focus on conflict resolution/transitional justice/human rights/ (with international political support)	26	5	2	2	8	7
Support Health	23	6	6	0	6	3
Increase Monitoring & accountability	18	4	3	0	8	3
GENERAL Resilience support	17	2	5	1	3	5
Support Education in Emergencies	16	2	4	2	4	4
Ensure Food security	10	6	1	0	1	1
Support for marginalized groups (women/children/disabled)	8	2	0	0	3	3
Nexus Humanitarian-Development-Peace	8	1	3	0	1	3
Increase social cohesion programmes	6	1	2	1	2	0
Increase Cash assistance	6	1	2	0	0	2
Provide Shelter support	4	1	1	1	0	1
Support to neighbouring countries	2	1	0	0	0	0

Table: Overview of recommendations Humanitarian - Neighbouring countries, incl. breakdown per country¹⁰

	Country: Neighbouring countries	Country: Lebanon	Country: Jordan	Country: Turkey
No answer	34	10	7	17
Involvement of and support to local actors/organisations	16	3	2	10
Support to neighbouring countries	14	10	2	2
GeENERAL humanitarian aid	10	2	4	4
Support Health	9	3	0	6
Funding	8	2	2	4
GENERAL Resilience support	7	4	0	3
Monitoring and accountability	6	2	0	4

¹⁰ Due to the limited amount of answers from Iraq and Egypt, their answers have not been included in the analyses.

Focus on conflict resolution/transitional justice/human rights/ (with international political support)	6	2	2	2
Livelihoods	5	0	3	2
Support Education in Emergencies	5	0	1	4
Support for marginalized groups (women/children/disabled)	4	2	0	2
Social cohesion programmes + strengthening local communities	4	0	1	3
Allow humanitarian aid to be let in/continued/equal aid distribution	4	2	0	1
Resettlement	2	0	2	0
Nexus Humanitarian-Development-Peace	2	0	0	2
Ensure Food security	1	1	0	0
Cash assistance	1	0	1	0