



European Union  
Election Observation Mission

**HASHEMITE KINGDOM**

**OF JORDAN 2024**

Final Report



**Elections to the House of Representatives**

10 September 2024



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*The Election Observation Missions are independent from the institutions of the European Union.  
The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily  
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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACHR	Arab Charter on Human Rights
CDFJ	Centre for Defending the Freedom of Journalism
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CSPD	Civil Status and Passport Department
DEC	District Election Committee
EEM	Election Expert Mission
EL	Election Law for the House of Representatives
EOM	Election Observation Mission
GED	General Electoral District
HCD	Higher Council for the of Persons with Disabilities
HoR	House of Representatives
IAF	Islamic Action Front
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
IEC	Independent Election Commission
IPU	Interparliamentary Union
JBA	Jordan Bar Association
JNCW	Jordanian National Commission for Women
JPA	Jordan Press Association
LED	Local Electoral District
MC	Media Commission
MoPPA	Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCHR	National Centre for Human Rights
OPD	Organisations of Persons with Disabilities
PC	Polling Centre
PCC	Polling and Counting Committee
PPL	Political Parties Law
PS	Polling Station
PVL	Preliminary Voter Lists
PwD	Persons with Disabilities
QPC	Qualified Polling Centres
RCMPS	Royal Committee to Modernise the Political System
SMMU	Social Media Monitoring Unit
UN	United Nations
UNCAC	UN Convention against Corruption
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPR	Universal Periodic Review

## **EU Election Observation Mission to Jordan**

### **Elections to the House of Representatives, 10 September 2024**

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#### **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

On 10 September 2024, more than 1.6 million Jordanian voters elected the 20th House of Representatives in a well-run election. Jordan showed commitment to holding elections on schedule despite the uncertainty generated by the enduring conflict in Gaza and its wider regional repercussions. Voter and candidate registration were inclusive and efficiently administered. The 138 members of the House were elected among 1,623 candidates, offering a genuine choice to the electorate.

Jordan embarked on a new set of political reforms in June 2021 with the nomination by the King of a 92-member Royal Committee to Modernise the Political System (RCMPS), which resulted in the adoption in 2022 of a new Election Law for the House of Representatives (EL), a new Political Parties Law (PPL), as well as a set of amendments to the Constitution. The reforms fully implement two recommendations of previous EU election missions with a new lower age of eligibility for candidates to contest and a new Data Protection Law was adopted. Six further recommendations were partially implemented, including real-time results publication and a reserved seat for a woman in each local constituency. The political modernisation aspired to foster political participation of women and youth and encourage the formation of national programme-based political parties, to make the House of Representatives (HoR) more inclusive and politically less fragmented. The modernisation will be gradually introduced over three electoral cycles to 2032, and the first of which began with the 2024 parliamentary elections.

The stakes for these elections were to demonstrate the extent to which Jordanians were willing to engage with a party-based political system and to identify the key political forces that would shape the next decade. Leading up to the election, there were concerns regarding voters' indifference, with EU observers noting a general lack of enthusiasm among the electorate. With the prevailing regional conflict looming over the electoral process, the turnout was reported at 32.25 per cent indicating a modest level of participation.

Previous elections in 2013, 2016 and 2020 were observed by the EU with respectively two Election Observation Missions (EOMs) and an Electoral Expert Mission (EEM). The 2022 laws and parallel constitutional amendments implement, fully or in part, a number of past EU election mission recommendations, such as publishing results at polling station level, lowering the age for candidacy from 30 to 25 years, and loosening candidates' registration requirements to allow public officials to stand after they seek temporary leave from office.

Jordan's legal framework for democratic elections is substantially aligned with the state's regional and international commitments. Overall, there were well-defined rules of engagement for most stakeholders and clear and prompt mechanisms for dispute resolution. Still, some legal gaps exposed uncertainty for aspects of fundamental rights, notably freedom of expression. Gaps and ambiguities in law and regulations challenged financial accountability, while several legal issues, including on candidacy, final result timelines, among others, need clarification and development.

For the first time, political parties contested in a new 41-seat nationwide electoral district – the General Electoral District (GED) – under a closed list proportional system. In another 18 Local Electoral Districts (LED), candidates contested for the additional 97 seats through an open list proportional system. Thirty seats were reserved for women, Christians and Chechen/Circassians. Only lists who passed legally defined thresholds qualified for seat allocation based on a legal formula. The votes for lists who failed to reach the thresholds were disregarded. There was a high vote cast which failed to translate into any representation.

EU observers reported concerns about wide variations in the ratio of voters to seats between LEDs, notably impacting key urban centres of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa. In general, there is pronounced over-representation of voters in rural areas compared to the urban centres. The new GED somewhat mitigates past disparities and there is scope for improvement in future elections as the number of seats reserved for political parties grows. However, there remains a need for transparency in decision making on constituency delimitations.

The elections were administered by a three-tiered election administration, composed of the Independent Election Commission, 19 District Election Committees, one for each electoral district, and 5,843 Polling and Counting Committees, one for each polling station. With the 2022 legal reforms, the IEC took over the responsibility of political party registration from the Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs and created new units to foster the political participation of women and youth, as well as temporary campaign oversight committees.

The IEC implemented the elections efficiently and in line with legal deadlines. Most candidates met by the EU EOM expressed satisfaction with access to the election administration and confidence in its impartiality. Training of temporary staff was observed to be of high quality. The introduction of new election technology was well prepared and allowed fast access to detailed election results. While the IEC accredited list representatives for polling stations, contestants had no access to tabulation centres, which diminished the transparency of that key stage of the process.

Despite a comprehensive voter education programme conducted by the IEC, most EU EOM interlocutors expressed concern about the low level of knowledge and information among voters. The IEC's centralised approach to voter education and information meant that DEC's were barely involved. According to EU observers, information for voters was hardly visible on the ground.

A total of 5,080,858 voters were eligible to vote. Voters are included in the voter lists based on their permanent residence as recorded in the civil register, except for the Badia districts, where Bedouin voters are included according to their belonging to certain tribes. Preliminary voter lists were displayed in public spaces and online, giving voters the opportunity to file objections. EU EOM interlocutors expressed broad confidence in the accuracy and inclusiveness of voter lists.

Overall, 686 candidates were running on 25 lists in the GED and 937 candidates on 172 local lists in the 18 LEDs. The candidate registration process was overall inclusive and assessed as easy and smooth by EU EOM interlocutors from political parties and local lists. The IEC accepted all the submitted lists; 11 candidates were rejected as they did not fulfil the legal provisions for candidacy.

The five-week campaign was characterised by activities from a plurality of parties, and freedom of assembly was generally respected. Nevertheless, campaign messages were largely generic, and candidates promoted their personal image at the expense of political party programmes. Campaign activities remained relatively low-key until the last two weeks. They focused on posters, door-to-door canvassing, social gatherings in tents, and social media. Paid advertising in traditional media was limited due to its high costs.

Gaps in the campaign regulation and the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms left many violations unaddressed. There is ambiguity regarding campaigning on election day, especially in media and social media, and in and around polling centres.

Campaign finance rules were widely disregarded. Important gaps exist in the legislation as candidates' personal expenses are not subject to regulation, and spending caps apply uniformly to lists, but not to candidates, creating an uneven playing field. The lack of robust enforcement mechanisms leaves the effectiveness of campaign finance regulations in question.

Defamation is a criminal offence in both the Penal Code and the Cybercrime Law, which negatively influenced public discourse. No regulations on political advertising and free airtime were issued for this campaign. Many broadcasters offered paid interviews to the parties and lists, which reduced the amount of already scarce objective information on party programmes.

The EU EOM media monitoring findings showed that media failed to provide an adequate and comprehensive coverage of the election campaign. Concerned about being perceived as biased or aligned with any political force, most media outlets chose to focus their prime-time content during the campaign on the activities of the IEC, reporting on election violations without naming the parties responsible, and emphasising voter education. Positively, state-owned *Al Mamlaka TV* and *Al Balad* community radio organised debates for political parties.

The Cybercrime Law, amended in August 2023, introduced harsh penalties for vaguely defined offenses such as “spreading fake news” and “provoking strife”. EU observers reported an impact of self-censorship on politicians and journalists on the discourse of the election campaigns.

The campaign on social media was predominantly driven by candidates promoting their image rather than focusing on programmes or policies. Candidates and political parties did not significantly use paid advertisement on the monitored social media platforms.

The increased number of quota seats in the LED (18) and the preferential seat system in the GED led to an unprecedented number of women being elected (27). However, the cultural, social, and economic barriers significantly outweigh the legal framework in determining the participation of women, youth, and persons with disabilities in political life. Women, in particular, face challenges such as limited economic opportunities, high campaign costs, and pressure from their families that affect their political engagement.

The political participation of persons with disabilities is very limited, with obstacles ranging from deeply rooted social stigma to inaccessible infrastructure and lack of adequate transportation. The IEC set up 95 qualified polling centres to improve accessibility for voters with disabilities, but only six voters requested assignment to these centres, suggesting low awareness of the option.

The legal framework for election observation indicates unequal treatment of international and domestic observers, as the right of domestic observers to observe all phases of the electoral process is not explicitly stated, as it is for international observers. In practice, the accreditation process was inclusive and domestic observers did not report any obstacles to their work. The IEC accredited 20 domestic observer organisations with over 5,000 individual observers, enhancing the transparency of the process.

There were overall low levels of electoral disputes as IEC efforts complemented a solid legal framework for handling electoral complaints. The law provides clear rules, guidelines, and reasonable timelines for objections related to the preliminary voter lists, party and candidate registration, and various stages of polling and results. Of eleven rejected candidate applications, three appealed unsuccessfully. The post-election period signalled a less disputed poll than in previous years.

Positively, the IEC took steps to dissuade offenders through public statements and strategic and collaborative actions, including appointment of legal officers at DEC and engagement with various state bodies such as the judicial council and the Audit Bureau. There were relatively low detections and reports of serious offences overall. Still, several cases of undue influence and voter fraud were prosecuted. At least three candidates were sentenced to one year imprisonment on appeal for offences related to undue influence and barred from contesting the next elections.

Election day was calm and professionally organised. However, campaign activities outside of polling centres were widespread and the EU observed children being used for campaign purposes in all electoral districts of Jordan. Polling staff was well-trained and competent. Security forces were present in large numbers in polling centres without overstepping their mandate. List representatives were present in 90 per cent of polling stations visited, and citizen observers in 25 per cent. Tabulation of results was assessed positively by the EU EOM.

The IEC results website was functional and accessible throughout the election night, allowing a fast and transparent access to detailed preliminary results. Official results were published on 14 September in the Official Gazette. While the results publication process was speedy, information on blank and invalid ballots and details regarding turnout were not made public by the IEC.

The Islamic Action Front emerged as the clear winner of the popular vote, garnering 28.3 per cent of the vote and gaining 31 of 138 seats in the new HoR. The new centrist parties failed to make significant inroads through the GED, but did well in the LEDs and some will have sizeable blocs in the next Parliament.

### **Priority Recommendations**

The EU EOM has made 18 recommendations for improving the way elections are organised, managed, and conducted in Jordan. They include seven priority recommendations:

- 1. To ensure voters' right to make an informed choice, the IEC to reinforce its voter education efforts. The dedicated department within the IEC to be strengthened to be able to develop long-term programmes, and district election committees to be involved in conducting voter information activities prior to elections.*
- 2. Develop and implement effective mechanisms to consistently implement campaign regulations including on: (i) campaign activities inside and outside the perimeter of polling centres, (ii) campaigning moratoriums before and on election day.*
- 3. Enhance transparency in campaign finance by improving accountability rules and enforcement, and ensure the IEC is adequately resourced and trained to carry out effective oversight.*
- 4. Amend the Cybercrime Law to align with international human rights standards and obligations through consultations with key stakeholders, including civil society and media professionals.*
- 5. Decriminalise defamation in the Penal Code, the Press and Publication law and the Cybercrime Law to ensure due exercise of the freedom of expression, in line with international standards.*
- 6. Improve access and opportunity to vote for persons with disabilities by ensuring independent access to polling stations and establish legal provisions for reasonable accommodation in cases where access is insufficient.*
- 7. Incorporate into the Election Law the rights of domestic and international observers to unhindered access to the entire electoral process.*



## **II. INTRODUCTION**

The European Union (EU) deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe the 10 September 2024 parliamentary elections in Jordan following an invitation from the Independent Election Commission. The EOM was present from 29 July to 29 September 2024.

The EU EOM was led by the Chief Observer, Željana Zovko, Member of the European Parliament from Croatia. The EU EOM comprised a core team of 11 experts based in Amman and 28 long-term observers who arrived on 11 August and deployed to all governorates of the country. 38 short-term observers were present from 3 to 13 September and deployed throughout the country.

For the election day, the EU EOM was reinforced with 32 locally recruited observers from diplomatic representations of EU Member States. In total, the EU EOM deployed 120 observers from 27 EU Member States, as well as from partner countries Canada, Norway and Switzerland. In addition, a delegation of seven Members of the European Parliament was led by Andreas Schieder, Member of the European Parliament from Austria.

The mission's mandate was to observe all aspects of the electoral process and assess the extent to which the elections complied with regional and international commitments for elections, as well as with national legislation. The EU is independent in its findings and conclusions. The mission followed an established methodology and adhered to the "Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation", endorsed under United Nations auspices in October 2005 and now espoused by over 50 organisations.

## **III. POLITICAL CONTEXT**

Jordan embarked on a new set of political reforms in June 2021 with the nomination by the King of a 92-member Royal Committee to Modernise the Political System (RCMPS), which resulted in the adoption in 2022 of a new Election Law for the House of Representatives (EL), a new Political Parties Law (PPL), as well as a set of amendments to the Constitution. The political modernisation aspired to foster political participation of women and youth and encourage the formation of national programme-based political parties, to make the House of Representatives (HoR) more inclusive and politically less fragmented. The modernisation is being gradually introduced over three electoral cycles, commencing with the 2024 parliamentary elections. While moving towards a party-based system, the reforms also transferred more powers to the King, notably with the creation of the National Security Council under his leadership. The 10 September elections took place against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Gaza and the subsequent increasing regional tensions, which have dominated public discourse since October 2023.

These elections provided an opportunity to gauge how Jordanians would embrace the party-based political modernisation, and to determine who would be the dominant political forces of the next decade. The previous HoR was elected in 2020, during the Covid-19 pandemic. Turnout was then established at 29.9 per cent. Nearly all – 118 of 130 – members were elected as independent candidates, reflecting individualistic, tribal and family-based interests with very little political party engagement, and resulting in a fragmented Parliament. The HoR was perceived by the public and EU EOM interlocutors as having minimal power and influence, notably failing to propose any new legislation during its four-year term, which attracted criticism. In 2024, EU observers and representatives from political parties consistently reported a lack of voter interest in the HoR and the elections. Consequently, turnout was viewed as a key indicator of the success of the political modernisation and received significant scrutiny. The 32.25 per cent turnout was only a slight

increase from the last elections. Turnout relative to the growth of the electorate has actually decreased since 2016.<sup>1</sup>

The 36 parties contesting these elections represented a broad ideological spectrum. With the exception of the Islamic Action Front, most of the other established parties, lacking sufficient funds to run on their own, formed alliances. However, the political left remained fragmented, and despite its established structures, struggled to make an impact under the new system. The political centre was dominated by six new parties: *Etihad* (Union), *Al Mithaq* (Charter), *Eradah* (Will), *Taqaddum* (Progress), *Azm* (Determination), and the National Islamic Party. These parties – all founded after 2022 under the PPL – were well-financed and backed by wealthy and influential individuals. They recruited members of the 19<sup>th</sup> Parliament and high-ranking national and local government officials to build their base ahead of the coming elections. The socially conservative side was dominated by the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. The party, founded in 1992 and traditionally strong in urban areas and among Jordanians of Palestinian descent, was the only party to achieve any significant result in the last two elections in 2020 (10/130 seats) and 2016 (15/130) and had boycotted the 2013 polls.

#### **IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS EU EEM / EOM RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Several EU election mission recommendations fully or partially implemented, evidencing positive progress in electoral law reforms and implementation.**

Positively, Jordan's 2022 constitutional amendments and new laws for elections and political parties included reforms implementing fully or part several recommendations of prior EU election missions, including the EU EOM 2016 and the subsequent EU EEM 2020 deployed for the 2020 polls held during the COVID pandemic. The 2020 EU EEM endorsed the recommendations of the 2016 EU EOM and offered 14 recommendations, including to the IEC and the Jordanian authorities.

Two recommendations were fully implemented: the age for candidates to contest was reduced from 30 to 25 years of age and a new Data Protection Law was adopted. Six recommendations were partially implemented. The law now foresees real time online publication of polling stations results and a legal threshold to trigger the review of polling station results and refines the definition of persons with disability while the IEC took steps to improve accessibility. The law also prescribes a reserved seat for women in each LED as recommended, while the introduction of a new electoral system has somewhat improved inequality of the vote with the creation of a new national constituency where all voters may elect a third of seats in the HoR. The 2024 regulations also prescribed access to all aspects of the elections for international observers, and additional voting powers were granted to the HoR. Two recommendations were not implemented: the proposal to address excessive penalties linked to critical commentary and a recommendation for equitable public media coverage of elections and mandatory coverage of campaigns.

The EU EOM 2024 offers 18 recommendations for consideration by the Jordanian authorities.

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<sup>1</sup> See tables in Annex A.1 for data on historic turnout.

## V. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

**Jordan’s legal framework for democratic elections is substantially aligned with the state’s regional and international commitments, despite some gaps for key rights and procedures.**

Following the milestone 2022 reforms to the 1952 Constitution and both the EL and PPL, the revised legal framework offers a solid basis for genuine democratic elections, substantially in line with Jordan’s international and regional commitments. Overall, there were well-defined rules of engagement for most stakeholders and clear and prompt mechanisms for dispute resolution throughout the process. Still, some legal gaps expose uncertainty for aspects of fundamental rights, notably freedom of expression. Gaps and ambiguities in law and regulations challenged financial accountability, while several legal technicalities, including on candidacy, and final result timelines, among others, need clarification.

### International Principles and Commitments

Jordan is a state party to the Arab Charter on Human Rights (ACHR)<sup>2</sup> and has ratified the key United Nations (UN) human rights instruments related to democratic elections.<sup>3</sup> The state recently underwent its fourth UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR), having accepted 149 out of 226 recommendations of the previous review.<sup>4</sup> The UPR Working Group noted some laws, such as the penal code, negatively affected freedom of expression, and underscored concerns regarding conditions of detention and overcrowding in penitentiary institutions, and weak law and practice to tackle inequality and discrimination notably affecting women. Still, changes to the Constitution relating to persons with disabilities were perceived as positive, as were improvements in access to legal aid.

### Constitutional Governance

The Constitution (as amended) prescribes the core principles of law and establishes three pillars of government with an executive headed by the King, a bicameral legislative comprising a nominated Senate and a directly elected 138-seat HoR, and the judiciary, a key player in electoral dispute resolution and offence prosecution.<sup>5</sup>

There are notable overlaps of authority from the executive to other branches of government and the 2022 constitutional amendments deepened the powers of the King, placing further appointments of high-ranking officials under his exclusive authority,<sup>6</sup> while the King already appoints key judicial officers and government ministers. Legislative authority is vested in both the King and the Parliament. The HoR has a weak legacy in initiating legislation, which has overwhelmingly tended to originate with the government or at the King’s initiative.<sup>7</sup> The RCMPS envisages political parties and their parliamentary blocs participating in government or exercising constructive opposition and notes that confidence in the HoR is key to increasing electoral

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<sup>2</sup> [Arab Charter on Human Rights](#).

<sup>3</sup> The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ([ICCPR](#)), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ([ICERD](#)), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ([CEDAW](#)), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ([CRPD](#)), and the UN Convention against Corruption ([UNCAC](#)). Jordan is also a member of the [Interparliamentary Union](#).

<sup>4</sup> [Fourth Universal Periodic Review – Jordan](#).

<sup>5</sup> The courts system comprises several tiers of civil, administrative, and criminal courts. Courts of religious and special jurisdiction do not play a role in election matters

<sup>6</sup> These include a new National Security Council comprised of appointees of the King and, when it is convened, has broad decision-making competencies enforceable upon ratification by the King without parliamentary oversight.

<sup>7</sup> [IPU statistics for the period 2016-2020](#) showed only one per cent of legislation originated with the HoR.

participation. While, the role of the HoR in government formation is not prescribed in law, the 2022 reforms somewhat extend its oversight and voting competencies of the HoR.<sup>8</sup>

### **Constitutional and Fundamental Rights**

Positively, the Constitution guarantees the secret ballot and general direct elections based on principles of integrity, independent administration, and non-interference with the will of voters. Key changes to the Constitution in 2022 had a direct positive bearing on the 2024 elections, including the reduction of the age of eligibility for candidates from 30 to 25 years.<sup>9</sup> Other notable changes broadened the definition of Jordanian citizens to include women, ended dual occupancy of ministerial posts with membership of the HoR, and transferred jurisdiction for questions of validity of HoR membership to a single judicial body – the Court of Cassation.<sup>10</sup>

The Constitution broadly articulates fundamental rights of association, assembly, non-discrimination, and freedom of expression, including of press and media, yet potential remains for subordinate legislation to unduly limit these rights.<sup>11</sup> There is also no express constitutional prohibition on gender-based discrimination. Provisions in several laws such as the Penal Code, Crime Prevention law, and the Cybercrime Law, leave scope for excessive sanctioning, arbitrary detention, and curtailment of freedom of expression.

The Constitution foresees key supervisory institutions for electoral, accountability, and rights related matters including an Independent Election Commission, the Audit Bureau, and a quasi-judicial *Special Bureau* to interpret laws not already interpreted by courts.<sup>12</sup> In 2012, the judiciary was enhanced with a Constitutional Court to determine the compatibility of laws with and interpret provisions of the Constitution. A key decision of that court is seen as placing international treaties superior to domestic laws, thus potentially enhancing legal protection for fundamental rights. Still, this issue has yet to be fully tested and, thus far, access to the Constitutional Court is possible only through the Parliament or Council of Ministers or in specific court requests in limited circumstances.<sup>13</sup> Positively in 2022, the threshold for Parliament to challenge the constitutionality of laws was lowered to one quarter of either house. There are also two statutory monitoring, complaint receiving, and reporting bodies; the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) and the National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR).<sup>14</sup>

### **Electoral Law and Regulations**

The electoral legislative and regulatory framework is substantially aligned with Jordan's regional and international commitments. Key instruments are the EL, PPL, Law on the Independent

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<sup>8</sup> For example, among other matters, a new HoR now has a right to hold a vote of confidence on a ministerial statement within one month of convening of the new HoR. A Majority of the HoR may vote to refer Ministers to public prosecution, and they may also review the position of Speaker of the HoR annually.

<sup>9</sup> The reduction in the age of eligibility to stand was a recommendation of the EU EOM 2016 and the EEM 2020.

<sup>10</sup> Previously, the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction but, with three courts, left potential for conflicting decisions.

<sup>11</sup> Fundamental rights may be enjoyed only to the extent permitted by law, but the only constitutional limit to such laws as provided by article 128 seems unduly broad. It states that laws regulating rights must not prejudice those rights or affect their fundamentals without further detail.

<sup>12</sup> The Special Bureau has authority to make binding interpretation of law at the request of the Prime Minister, where a law has not been interpreted by the Courts. One of its interpretations enhanced the right to vote in a 2016 decision on voting age (*see Section VII. Voter Registration*).

<sup>13</sup> Citizens do not have direct access to the Constitutional court. Requests from either house of parliament must be made by at least a quarter of the members of the respective chambers. Constitution Article 60(2) governs judicial procedures to raise a question to Constitutional Court.

<sup>14</sup> The Centre's classification as A-status was renewed in 2023 following a peer review by the International Accreditation Body of the International Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.

Election Commission, Council of Ministers Regulations, including for public funding of political parties and political rights of students, and various IEC Executive Instructions to implement the law. Provisions of the Penal and Civil Code, Public Gatherings Law, digital and media laws, and judicial rules also regulate aspects of the process for various stakeholders, such as civil society, journalists, and litigants.

Among key changes, the EL introduced a new electoral system for contesting political parties at national level and the PPL transferred registration and oversight of political parties from the Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs (MoPPA) to the IEC, thus positively placing a key bulwark between government and political parties. The two laws also positively enhanced inclusion of women, youth and persons with disabilities (PwD) through affirmative measures for contesting and incentives for participation in political life (*See Sections XIV.-XVI. Participation of Women, Youth, Persons with Disabilities*).

The laws entail new accountability and transparency measures, also for political parties, added restrictions to curtail candidate's conflicts of interest, and a new IEC transparency measure for publishing results online.<sup>15</sup> The electoral legal framework offers clear timelines and well-articulated steps for dispute handling and appeals to courts. Importantly, electoral and political party laws can now only be changed based in a vote of at least two thirds of each house of parliament, offering more legal stability, though it also raises the bar for future legal reform.<sup>16</sup>

Some substantive and technical provisions of the law lack precision, thus leaving room for uncertainty. There are significant loopholes for candidates' campaign finance accountability (*See Section XI. Political Party and Campaign Finance*), while some timelines are missing (deadline for final results) or uncertain (investigation deadlines for decisions on whether to prosecute electoral offences). The contest for political party lists does not expressly exclude non-aligned (independent) candidates. Similarly, it is not clearly stated in law that national party lists must include candidates for reserved seats on party lists. In local lists, candidates can contest without disclosing a party affiliation, thus leaving possible disclosure to after election with potential to mislead the electorate. Local lists needed a minimum two candidates, but as withdrawals are possible, single candidate lists may result. Yet, the law is not clear on what happens if a single candidate list obtains a vote amounting to more than one seat.

***Recommendation - Provide certainty of law by a thorough removal of gaps, ambiguities and uncertainties in electoral laws and regulations including on i) candidate party membership on GED lists, ii) inclusion of candidates for reserved seats on GED lists, iii) declaration of candidates' party affiliation for LED lists, iv) procedures for single candidate LED lists where vote exceeds one seat.***

## **Electoral System**

For the first time, political parties contested in a new 41-seat nationwide electoral district – the General Electoral District (GED) – under a closed list proportional system. In another 18 Local Electoral Districts (LED), candidates contested for the additional 97 seats through an open list proportional system. Of the total 138 seats, an increase of eight on 2020, 30 were reserved for

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<sup>15</sup> To be published on the IEC website and in the Official Gazette before the previous parliament's end of mandate.

<sup>16</sup> Also applies to laws for the Audit Bureau, Judiciary, Anti-Corruption, Nationality and Personal status.

women, Christians and Chechen/Circassians.<sup>17</sup> Only lists who passed respective electoral district thresholds, as defined by law, qualified for seat allocation.<sup>18</sup>

Once lists passed the threshold, the free contest (non-reserved) seats were distributed to them based on a proportional formula in the law. After this distribution, the reserved seats were then allocated. In the LEDs, reserved seats went to candidates in order of candidates with highest individual vote on winning LED lists. On GED winning lists, the reserved seats were allotted in order of candidates with the highest ranking. The votes for lists who failed to reach the thresholds were disregarded. While recognising the sovereign right of Jordan to determine its electoral system, the system appeared to entail a considerably high vote cast failing to translate into any representation.<sup>19</sup>

### **Constituency Delimitation**

EU observers reported concerns about wide variations in the ratio of voters to seats between LEDs, notably affecting key urban centres of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa.<sup>20</sup> Generally, LEDs and governorates have shared the same boundaries, with a few exceptions such as the Badia LEDs, and the governorates of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa. The 2022 electoral system reforms entailed LED mergers and some boundary modifications. The EL reduced the number of LEDs in Amman, Irbid and Zarqa from five, four and two respectively, to three, two and one LEDs. However, the law does not define criteria for delineating boundaries between LEDs within a governorate nor the measures to be considered when LEDs are merged or readjusted.

The Council of Ministers adopted a by-law in 2023 broadly setting out the areas within those LEDs whose borders are not like their governorates, but these offered no clarity on the rationale behind the boundary demarcations.<sup>21</sup> While there is a relative balance between the three new LEDs in Amman with approximately 120,000 voters per seat, a comparison with other LEDs around the country reveal striking variations with some 20,000 voters per seat in Maan, 82,000 in Irbid 1, and 37,000 per seat in Mafraq.<sup>22</sup> In general, there is pronounced over-representation of voters in rural, areas also favouring Badia LEDs, compared to the urban centres. The creation of the new GED somewhat mitigates past disparities and there is scope for improvement in future elections as the number of GED closed list seats grows. Still, there is a need for transparency in constituency delimitation decision making to respond to representational disparities.

***Recommendation – Promote a representative and transparent delimitation of boundaries between electoral districts.***

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<sup>17</sup> Three seats were reserved among the 41 seat GED, two for Christians and one for Chechen/ Circassians. 27 Seats were reserved among the 18 LED; one woman seat in each LED and seven Christian and two Chechen Circassians in those LEDs where their numbers are traditionally concentrated.

<sup>18</sup> The EL provided a GED threshold of two and half per cent of actual votes cast and 7 per cent in each LED. Blank and invalid votes were included in the determination of the threshold

<sup>19</sup> See Annex A.2. In Madaba and Central Badia, over 50 per cent of votes were ‘lost’, over 40 per cent in Tafilah and Ajloun, and over 30 per cent in Jerash, Aqaba, and North Badia, and over twenty per cent in Amman 2 and 3 and Maan. Zarqa and Balqa had the lowest rate at 8.5 per cent and 0.5 per cent respectively.

<sup>20</sup> See Annex A.2. Voters per reserved seat figures also show wide variations. Generally, there is over-representation of rural voters compared to the urban centres.

<sup>21</sup> Electoral District Regulation 52 of 2023 as amended by Regulation 42 of 2024.

<sup>22</sup> See Annex A.2.

## VI. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

**The IEC implemented the elections efficiently and in line with legal deadlines.**

### **Structure and Composition of the Election Administration**

Elections in Jordan are administered by a three-tiered election administration, composed of the Independent Election Commission (IEC), District Election Committees (DEC) in every electoral district, and Polling and Counting Committees (PCC) for each polling station.

The IEC was created in 2012 as a permanent body with financial and administrative independence. It is governed by a Board of Commissioners composed of a chairperson and four members, appointed by the King for a non-renewable period of six years.<sup>23</sup> The current Board was appointed in April 2022, at the same time as the adoption of the new electoral laws.<sup>24</sup>

The IEC has a broad mandate that includes the registration of voters and candidates, the monitoring of the campaign, and voter education. With the 2022 legal reform, the IEC took over the responsibility of political party registration from the MoPPA. Within the IEC, new units were created to foster the political participation of women and youth, as well as three temporary committees for campaign oversight, campaign finance, and electoral violence against women. Another new section within the IEC was a social media monitoring unit.

In May 2024, the IEC appointed the members of the 19 DECs, one for the GED and one for each of the 18 LEDs.<sup>25</sup> DECs consist of one chairperson and four members and must include at least one woman. Training is compulsory for DEC members; the IEC started training prospective members already at the end of 2023. In this electoral process, the IEC for the first time assigned one legal officer to each DEC to follow-up on electoral offences. EU long-term observers reported that DECs were fully operational and consisted of experienced staff. Overall, DECs were well resourced, but some of them indicated that they would have needed more staff and resources to properly monitor the campaign (*see Section X. Campaign Environment*).

Polling and Counting Committees include one chairperson and two members, appointed by the IEC among government employees, academic or religious institutions, students, and civil society organisations.<sup>26</sup> There were 5,843 PCCs in this electoral process, one for each polling station.<sup>27</sup> The IEC trained some 24,000 prospective PCC members starting on 20 August. EU observers assessed the training as high quality, with professional trainers, good training materials and interactive sessions focussing on voting procedures, supporting voters with disabilities and discerning valid and invalid ballots.

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<sup>23</sup> The King appoints the members based on propositions from a committee that includes the Prime Minister, the speakers of the Upper and the Lower House of Parliament, and the president of the Judicial Council.

<sup>24</sup> The Board is chaired by Musa Maaytah, former Minister of Political and Parliamentary Affairs and former Senator, and includes members Abeer Bashir Dababneh, Ammar Ahmmad Al-Husseini, Jihad Fawaz Al-Momani, and Raed Sami Al Adwan.

<sup>25</sup> DEC responsibilities include administering and supervising the electoral process in the respective district, displaying preliminary voter lists and forwarding objections to the IEC, collecting candidate registration requests and submitting them to the IEC, preparing polling and tabulation centres, conducting training for electoral staff, supervising the campaign, administering electoral material, adjudicating complaints, and tabulating results for their electoral district.

<sup>26</sup> PCCs are responsible for administering voting and counting at polling stations, including explaining how to vote.

<sup>27</sup> Out of 5,843 polling stations (PS), 3,066 (52.5 per cent) were for women and 2,777 (47.5 per cent) for men. They were located in 1,649 polling centres, out of which 583 (35.3 per cent) had only PS for women, 537 (32.6 per cent) only PS for men, and 529 (32 per cent) were mixed polling centres, containing both PS for women and for men.

### **Administration of the Election**

The election administration was sufficiently resourced, with experienced permanent staff administering the election preparations and training some 45,000 temporary staff for different positions, from polling staff to data entry clerks. According to IEC interlocutors, the 17.875 million JOD (about 22.6 million EUR) from the State budget allocated to the IEC for the organisation of the elections was sufficient.<sup>28</sup> Specific activities like women and youth empowerment or social media monitoring were funded by external donors.

The EU EOM experienced a good level of cooperation and access to information with the IEC and DEC's across the country. In the run-up to the elections, the IEC published relevant information in a timely manner on its website, enhancing transparency. Most candidates met by the EU EOM expressed satisfaction with access to the IEC and DEC's and confidence in their professionalism and impartiality.

In this electoral process, the IEC successfully further developed its use of election technologies. Besides digital voter identification at polling stations, in use since 2016, the IEC introduced a system to transmit preliminary results from each polling station directly to the IEC data centre. Several nationwide connectivity tests were conducted, and some 8,000 IT clerks and technical officers were trained to operate the results software. Quality control officers were trained to audit election results at polling stations before transmission. For the first time, a dedicated website enabled immediate publication of results per polling station, polling centre, and electoral district, allowing fast and transparent public access to detailed results, as suggested by previous EU recommendations.

The IEC accredited 1,177 journalists and media representatives to cover the electoral process.<sup>29</sup> According to the EL, lists and candidates are entitled to send representatives to polling stations. Given the high number of candidates, the IEC took a pragmatic approach and decided per Executive Instruction to only accredit representatives of lists, not of individual candidates. The accreditation of list representatives for polling stations took place without any issues.<sup>30</sup> The transparency of tabulation procedures however was diminished by the IEC's decision to exclude candidates and list representatives from tabulation centres.

***Recommendation - Increase transparency and guarantee the right of contestants to participate in all stages of the electoral process by granting access to the tabulation process to candidates and list representatives.***

### **Voter Education**

The IEC developed a comprehensive voter education programme that was divided into phases according to the electoral process and included numerous types of activities, from workshops to billboards, social media campaigns, and the deployment of some 5,000 trained volunteers to man information booths in public places and conduct door-to-door campaigns.<sup>31</sup> After the 2022

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<sup>28</sup> This amount included some 9 million JOD (about 11.4 million EUR) for salaries for DEC and PCC members.

<sup>29</sup> Overall, the IEC received some 1,500 accreditation requests. There were three types of accreditations for journalists, one for access to the media centre, one to tabulation centres, and one for general coverage of the electoral process.

<sup>30</sup> While most local lists accredited high numbers of list representatives, only 4 out of 25 lists in the GED accredited list representatives to more than 5 per cent of polling stations: *Etihad* for 36.5 per cent of PS, IAF 23.8 per cent, *Namaa and Labour Alliance* 10.9 per cent, and *Eradah* 8.7 per cent.

<sup>31</sup> According to the IEC, voter education activities included sending out 38 million text messages, the production of 52 videos including 3 videos produced by and for PwD, 5,635 outdoor billboards, 1.6 million awareness brochures



reforms, the IEC launched an awareness campaign about the new electoral laws, targeting government departments, universities and CSOs. This was followed by specific campaigns during the voter registration (e.g. SMS sent out to citizens to invite them to check their assigned polling centre) and the candidate registration periods (preparation of a dedicated website with relevant information for prospective candidates). In the weeks before election day, a series of videos was disseminated on the IEC social networks and national media to encourage participation and explain how to vote.

Despite these wide-ranging activities, most EU EOM interlocutors expressed concern about the low level of knowledge and information among voters and about a predominant lack of interest in the elections. The IEC's centralised approach to voter education and information meant that DEC's were barely involved. According to EU observers, information for voters was hardly visible on the ground.

***Priority recommendation - To ensure voters' right to make an informed choice, the IEC to reinforce its voter education efforts. The dedicated department within the IEC to be strengthened to be able to develop long-term programmes, and district election committees to be involved in conducting voter information activities prior to elections.***

Apart from the IEC, local CSOs were conducting voter education activities in 12 out of 18 LEDs, as reported by EU observers. These were mostly scattered activities that focused on the target population of the respective CSO, as for example women, youth, or PwD. In four LEDs, EU observers reported that local radio outlets undertook voter education efforts, mostly using content provided by the IEC.

## **VII. VOTER REGISTRATION**

**EU EOM interlocutors expressed overall confidence in the accuracy and inclusiveness of voter lists.**

### **The Right to Vote**

By law, Jordanians have the right to vote if eighteen years of age at least ninety days before an election day. This was favourably interpreted by the authorities in 2016 to mean persons reaching the eighteenth year rather than passing an eighteenth birthday, thus a citizen at least 17 years and ninety days old on election day is eligible to vote.<sup>32</sup> Several categories of citizens were ineligible to vote including military, security, and police on active service, undischarged bankrupts, and citizens under court protection/guardianship due to lacking legal and civil capacity. Persons in administrative or pre-trial detention were not expressly excluded, however, there were no practical measures to enable them to exercise their voting rights.

### **Voter Registration Procedures**

Voter registration in Jordan is passive. Voter lists are based on the civil register held by the Civil Status and Passport Department (CSPD) of the Ministry of Interior. Voters are included in the voter lists based on their permanent residence as recorded in the civil register, except for the Badia districts, where Bedouin voters are included according to their belonging to certain tribes. Even

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distributed, awareness-raising campaigns in universities, commercial centres and door-to-door campaigns, training 278,997 students within the "I participate" programme, 10 knowledge transfer meetings for media representatives.

<sup>32</sup> This decision was issued in June 2016 by Jordan's Law Interpretation Bureau, a designated repository of laws and quasi-judicial authority for interpreting legislation. Jordanians qualify for a national identity card at the age of sixteen.

before the call for elections in April 2024, the IEC in March conducted a voter awareness campaign, inviting 5 million voters via SMS to verify their permanent residence as recorded in the civil register. As a result, the CSPD received and processed 37,586 requests from citizens to change their permanent residence.

After the call for elections, the CSPD prepared the preliminary voter lists (PVL) under IEC supervision. PVL were displayed in public spaces and online from 2 to 8 June, guaranteeing transparency. Voters had the right to file objections against the PVL from 3 to 16 June. A total of 18,726 objections were received by the CSPD and via the IEC website (against some 30,000 objections in 2020). Objections included 264 requests to be included in the PVL, 323 requests to correct errors in the data, 2,033 requests to be included in Badia voter lists, and 3,636 Christian and 218 Chechen/Circassian voters requesting to be transferred to a district with a reserved seat for their respective group. For the first time, voters had the possibility to request to change their polling centre within the same LED; 9,288 voters used this opportunity.<sup>33</sup>

Voters also had the right to file objections against the PVL entries of others. The IEC received 39 objections in Maan, all of which were rejected, and 503 in Mafraq, out of which 480 were accepted that were related to the inclusion of voters on the North Badia voter lists. EU EOM interlocutors expressed overall confidence in the accuracy and inclusiveness of voter lists.

After the objections period, and in line with legal deadlines, the IEC published the final voter lists comprising 5,115,219 eligible voters (a 9 per cent increase from 2020), including 590,794 (11.54 per cent) first time voters. By law, the IEC has the right to remove from the final voter lists those who lose their right to vote up until election day. A total of 34,361 voters were removed, most of them because they joined the security forces, bringing the number of eligible voters to 5,080,858 (*see Annex A.3 for a breakdown of voters per LED*).

## **VIII. REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES**

### **An overall inclusive environment for political party participation under the new PPL.**

The 2022 PPL transferred responsibility for party registration and compliance from the MoPPA to the IEC. Newly formed parties were given a year to comply with the new law, requiring them to hold congresses to confirm compliance with membership composition and geographical spread. Key conditions for registration included having at least 1,000 members, with a minimum of 30 members from 6 of Jordan's 12 governorates, 20 per cent of the membership being women and youth (18-35 years old), and at least one founding member with a disability. Existing parties had one year to update their status under the new regime.

Thirty-eight parties registered by the deadline in April 2023 and only one party failed to re-register under the new rules, reflecting an overall inclusive environment for political party participation.<sup>34</sup> Parties can form alliances, but these do not gain the status of a political party. Ahead of the 2024 elections, the IEC issued new instructions for founding and monitoring political parties. These

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<sup>33</sup> In Karak, the EU EOM received credible allegations that this option was abused by a candidate seeking to control the voting behaviour of an impoverished community. Several hundred voters were transferred from polling centres in Al-Aghwar to polling centres in Moab and al Mazar (within the same LED), allegedly at least in part without their knowledge or consent. After receiving a report by the Karak DEC, the IEC contacted a sample of the affected voters, but took no further action, arguing that no voter had submitted a complaint.

<sup>34</sup> The Partnership and Rescue Party, registered in 2016, was deregistered following challenges over its membership numbers. Some party members alleged the party's deregistration was politically motivated, however, the party did not appeal the decision, instead seeking in mid-2024 to register as a new party under a new name. This process is ongoing.

rules also outline procedures for mergers and the formation of alliances for electoral purposes. For the 2024 elections, 15 parties formed five different alliances to contest the national constituency.

## **IX. REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES**

**The high number of candidates and lists in the GED and in all LEDs provided voters with a genuine choice.**

### **The Right to Stand**

The right to stand is granted to registered voters who have been Jordanian nationals for at least ten years<sup>35</sup> and are at least 25 years old, an improvement from the previous minimum age of 35 and in line with a 2016 EU EOM recommendation. Among other requirements, candidates may not be a contractor for a public institution or a public company. Public employees who want to run must request unpaid leave 90 days before election day (a loosening of previous restrictions and a 2016 EU EOM recommendation); high-level public servants, including ministers, judges and ambassadors, must resign at least 60 days before election day.

### **Registration of Candidates**

Party lists contesting in the GED must have candidates who are registered as voters in at least half of the LEDs, at least one woman among the first three and one among the next three candidates, and one candidate under 35 years among the first five contestants. Party lists must pay a fee of 5,000 JOD (about 6,394 EUR) to be registered and a further 2,000 JOD (about 2,558 EUR) which are refundable if the list does not violate campaign rules. Political party members may only run on their party's list if they have been affiliated to their party for at least six months, and they may not run on the list of another party. However, the EL does not clearly stipulate that candidates on GED lists have to be affiliated to a political party.

Local lists in LEDs must have at least two candidates for competitive (non-reserved) seats and no more candidates than there are seats available in the corresponding district. Women, Christian and Chechen/Circassian candidates may choose to run for a reserved or a competitive seat. Badia candidates may run in a Badia or a non-Badia district, and non-Badia candidates may also run in Badia districts. Candidates on local lists must pay a registration fee of 500 JOD (about 639 EUR) and local lists another 500 JOD which are refundable if the list does not violate campaign rules.

The candidate registration process was overall inclusive and assessed as smooth by EU EOM interlocutors. In line with the electoral calendar, District Election Committees (DECs) received list registration applications from 30 July to 1 August. List submitters were given the opportunity to rectify or complete required information. By law, the IEC has up to seven days to verify the submitted documents. The IEC already presented preliminary lists on 5 August, instead of 9 August, allowing an earlier campaign start. All the submitted lists were accepted; 11 candidates on GED lists were rejected as they did not fulfil the legal provisions for candidacy.

LED candidates could withdraw until 26 August. Overall, 17 candidates from 11 local lists in 9 electoral districts withdrew, including 5 women.<sup>36</sup> The IEC published final lists on 28 August, in line with the electoral calendar. In the GED, 686 candidates ran on 25 lists. In the 18 LEDs, 937 candidates ran on 172 local lists (*see Annex A.4*).

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<sup>35</sup> The differential treatment of citizens is not consistent with Jordan's international commitments.

<sup>36</sup> In 2020, twice as many candidates had withdrawn.

## X. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

### **An overall free and inclusive campaign with scope for improvement in enforcing regulations.**

The election campaign is regulated under the EL and the IEC Executive Instructions for the Rules of Election Campaign for the Year 2024. These instruments largely deal with in-person and poster campaigning, lacking specific regulation in other areas. The use of the official state emblem, royal images, and campaigning in public institutions, government-owned companies, educational institutions, and places of worship is prohibited.<sup>37</sup> The law also enforces a total ban on posting electoral advertisements outside designated locations. The start date of the election campaign was tied to the publication of the preliminary candidate lists by the IEC, originally foreseen for 9 August. However, the IEC finished the registration process ahead of schedule, and the campaign officially started four days early on 5 August. According to EU EOM social media monitoring, at least 10 parties started campaign activities online before this date.

Campaign posters and banners appeared immediately on 5 August and quickly covered public spaces everywhere. According to the IEC Campaign Violations Committee, 3,936 violations were reported, among them some 300 on election day, and many more went unreported. The large majority related to minor campaign infractions such as placement and size of posters. Most of these matters were dealt with on a non-confrontational basis, by negotiations with parties and candidates, and engagement of municipal councils to remove offending materials. Despite their best effort, DEC and municipalities – largely deficient in resources to manage the volume of cases – left many violations unaddressed. The refundable deposit, aimed at restraining contestants from violating campaign regulations, was considered by most EU EOM interlocutors as insufficient to be an effective deterrent.<sup>38</sup>

Candidates and lists must secure IEC permission before opening campaign headquarters. Yet, the IEC reported that none of the 25 lists contesting the GED sought such approval, highlighting the political parties' lack of organised campaigning efforts. Contestants are required to remove campaign materials within seven days after the election to avoid penalties. According to EU EOM observations, this was carried out adequately. However, only part of the work was done by the contestants, placing a significant burden on local municipalities.

As per the IEC Executive Instructions, the campaign ends 24 hours before the day scheduled for voting.<sup>39</sup> As the regulations only apply during the campaign period, there is a regulatory gap for the 24 hours before and on election day. It is also unclear whether campaigning in media and on social media is allowed during this period, and campaign activities were observed on broadcast media and news websites, and on social media by many contesting parties and candidates. Campaign activities in and around polling centres (PC) were reported by all EU observers. Though socially accepted and difficult to curtail, the widespread use of children for campaigning around PC was contrary to an explicit prohibition in the IEC Executive Instruction and to the Labour Law.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> There is a conflict between the PPL, the Executive Instructions for the Rules of Election Campaign, and the 2022 Student By-law regarding the legality of campaign activities on university campuses.

<sup>38</sup> A deposit of 500/2,000 JOD per LED/GED list is refundable upon compliance with campaign regulations.

<sup>39</sup> Understood as starting at 00:00h on 9 September.

<sup>40</sup> Executive Instructions for the Rules of Election Campaign, Art. (4). o.

***Priority recommendation - Develop and implement effective mechanisms to consistently implement campaign regulations including on: (i) campaign activities inside and outside the perimeter of polling centres on election day, (ii) campaigning moratoriums before and on election day.***

Persistent allegations of vote buying and seat buying – asking or offering money for a prominent seat on a party list –, widely reported to EU observers in every electoral district, contributed to discrediting the political system amongst voters. Most parties lacked clear and transparent mechanisms to select their candidates. Intra-list competition was evident among LED candidates, who primarily joined forces to meet legal requirements rather than to form alliances based on shared ideas. There was little to no coordination among candidates on local lists, also reported by EU observers. Many traditionally influential tribes managed to accommodate the new party structures by strategically placing their members on various party and candidate lists. Although this was not an obligation, about 38 per cent of LED candidates declared their party affiliation, a notable difference from high levels of non-aligned candidacies in past elections.

The campaign was overall low-key and only started gaining momentum in the final two weeks before election day. EU observers reported that freedom of assembly was largely respected. Parties and candidates campaigned freely, focusing their efforts mostly on door-to-door canvassing and social gatherings in campaign tents and relying heavily on social media. The main campaign topics – across the political spectrum – included the war in Gaza and support for Palestine, unemployment, health care, and education, along with some other locally relevant issues. Campaign messages were largely generic, lacking clear or detailed programmes to address constituents’ needs. GED campaigns were generally coordinated and primarily financed by political parties, while LED campaigns were largely candidate-driven and self-financed. Although a few parties organised nationwide campaign tours, campaigning was mostly linked to personalities rather than party platforms. Some GED candidates joined LED campaigns, making use of their local influence to support a local candidate. As an exception to intra-list competition, male candidates often appeared alongside the female “quota” candidates on their list, seeing them not as competition to their own electoral chances but as an opportunity to benefit from their voter base. The EU EOM observed 121 peaceful and well-organised campaign events, concentrated between 21 August and 8 September, 84 per cent of which were for LED candidates. The LED campaign events observed had an 80 per cent higher attendance than those for the GED, demonstrating the predominant interest of voters towards local candidacies.

Contestants overwhelmingly avoided personal attacks and aggressive rhetoric against each other. However, several candidates reported threats or pressure by family members, political rivals, or state security operators to withdraw before or during the candidacy period.<sup>41</sup> Some withdrew, while others switched lists. Women candidates were more susceptible to such pressures than men. The IAF in particular, alleged a systematic campaign of discrimination and intimidation by state security, including threats, arrests, smear campaigns, community pressure on several Christian candidates, and discrimination in accessing campaign venues. These claims were echoed by civil society and journalists and were observed by the EU EOM. Despite the allegations, only one registered IAF candidate withdrew from the race by the 26 August deadline.

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<sup>41</sup> LTOs reported isolated cases of prospective candidates being pressured by state security forces directly or through family members to withdraw as candidates from certain lists.

## XI. POLITICAL PARTY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE

### **Important gaps in campaign spending regulations and enforcement tilted the playing field.**

The mechanisms for oversight and accountability in political party funding are overall reasonable, albeit with scope for further transparency measures. Political parties' income must be channelled through a Jordanian bank and can only originate in specified public and legitimate sources.<sup>42</sup> These include membership fees, party publications, bank accounts, real estate revenues,<sup>43</sup> regulated public funding, and gifts and donations, in cash or in kind, from natural and legal Jordanian persons. Prohibited sources include non-Jordanian persons or entities, unknown sources, and entities where government has over 51 per cent shareholding, a criterion that could be further restricted in the public interest. Donations exceeding 5,000 JOD (6,500 EUR) must now be paid against a cheque drawn from a Jordanian Bank. This limit could be lowered to strengthen traceability and accountability, including to capture multiple donations from the same source.

Positively, Jordan's current system for public funding of political parties, introduced in 2023, gives some support to both unrepresented and represented political parties.<sup>44</sup> All registered parties are entitled to a minimal amount of government funding, designed to cover their administrative expenses. Most of the state funding is contingent on election results, including some additional funds for each woman, youth and person with disabilities elected. The maximum amount a party can receive based on national elections is 120,000 JOD (156,000 EUR) per year.<sup>45</sup>

There is little traceability and transparency in relation to the funding and spending of candidates' campaign expenditures. As per the law, all registered lists must open a single dedicated bank account to manage all campaign resources and expenditures and appoint a chartered accountant responsible for auditing the account.<sup>46</sup> According to the IEC, all contestants complied with this provision. All income and expenditure transactions must be conducted through this account and reported to the IEC. At least half of the estimated campaign budget must be deposited upon opening the account, with the remainder deposited within 14 days. This provision can be easily circumvented by declaring a low estimate of expenditures, as was the case with several lists in the GED. There is no sanction for violations of this provision, severely limiting its effectiveness.

As reported by EU long-term observers, donations from family and tribe were widely regarded by candidates as exempt from reporting obligations, and candidates could easily circumvent regulations by simply not using the dedicated bank account. As a result, much campaign funding and spending escaped oversight. Thus, while lists may be able to formally comply with post-election disclosure requirements on the list accounts, it is doubtful that such disclosure will fully reflect the costs of campaigns and the sources of funding. In all, according to EU observers, the total campaign expenditure appeared to be orders of magnitude greater than the established spending limits would have allowed.

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<sup>42</sup> The PPL regulates the financing and oversight of political parties. The Council of Ministers issued a 2023 regulation for public funding of parties. IEC Executive Instructions regulate reporting of campaign income and spending by lists.

<sup>43</sup> Investment in commercial activity is prohibited. Political parties may benefit from tax exemption on their headquarters. Donations may be treated as income tax deductible expenses by donors.

<sup>44</sup> See regulation Financial Contribution System For Supporting The Political Parties, System No. 15 of 2023. Parties that reach 50 per cent of the threshold in the GED are entitled to 30,000 JOD (39,000 EUR) per year.

<sup>45</sup> Additional funding up to a maximum of 30,000 JOD is available based on success in municipal elections.

<sup>46</sup> IEC Executive Instructions for Disclosing the Sources of Funding for the Electoral Campaigns of Lists and Controlling Their Spending for the Year 2024.

***Priority recommendation - Enhance transparency in campaign finance by improving accountability rules and enforcement, and ensure the IEC is adequately trained and resourced to carry out effective oversight.***

As dedicated state campaign funding was not available for these elections, parties had to finance their campaigns through their own resources. The current spending cap for the GED, set out in the law as 500,000 JOD (650,000 EUR) – amounting to less than 0.1 JOD per voter – was assessed by most EU EOM interlocutors as insufficient to run an effective national campaign. In the LED, the spending limit is 100,000 JOD (130,000 EUR), which applies to lists rather than individual candidates and does not capture personal expenditures made by the candidates. Given the typical intra-list competition on local lists, this provision is not conducive to compliance.

This limit is also applied regardless of the number of candidates on a list or the size of the constituency, creating further inequality. The IEC may adjust spending limits based on district size, however, it did not do so for these elections. Consequently, lists with fewer candidates and running in smaller districts had a distinct advantage over bigger lists and constituencies, creating an uneven playing field.

***Recommendation - Adapt the spending cap system for the local electoral districts to apply to individual candidates and not to lists. Those caps to reflect the differences in number of registered voters per electoral district.***

A high-level inter-institutional committee was established to monitor compliance with campaign finance regulations.<sup>47</sup> The IEC, through 264 DEC campaign monitors, also tracked local campaign expenditures and produced cost estimates, which the oversight committee compared with lists' reported spending. Discrepancies and spending breaches were to be ruled on by the IEC's Board of Commissioners. While the campaign monitors were able to estimate in-person campaigning costs, spending on social media was not monitored. All campaign expenses incurred by parties, lists, candidates and third parties, should be accounted for, including on media and social media.

***Recommendation - Campaign finance oversight authorities to use available tools to monitor online spending.***

## **XII. MEDIA**

**Media failed to provide comprehensive information on electoral contestants to the voters, restrained by self-censorship and lack of clear media regulations.**

### **Media Environment**

Much of Jordanian media is concentrated in Amman. The national media landscape includes 10 TV stations, 41 radio stations, 128 regular electronic publications, 129 specialised print publications, and 272 media production companies registered with the Media Commission (MC), the regulatory body that licenses media outlets. The state owns 31 per cent of these entities.

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<sup>47</sup> The Committee for Monitoring Election Campaign Financing and Controlling Financial Spending of Candidate Lists includes representatives from the IEC, the Central Bank, the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, the Audit Bureau, the Association of Banks, and the Money Laundering Unit.

Two out of the three major television channels in Jordan, *Jordan TV* and *Al Mamlaka*, are state-owned.<sup>48</sup> The directors of both channels are nominated by the Minister of Government Communication and must be approved by the Prime Minister (PM). Additionally, the largest news agency *Petra*, along with the online newspaper *Al Rai*, are also state-owned. Radio stations *Amen FM*, *Jaish FM*, and *Hala FM* are affiliated with the military and public security, while *Jordan Radio* and *Amman FM* are part of the Jordan TV and Radio Corporation. In contrast, *Radio Al Balad* stands out as one of the few community radio stations offering independent political content and news.

According to the Press and Publications Law, amended in 2012, journalists must be members of the Jordan Press Association (JPA) to practice professionally.<sup>49</sup> However, the membership requirements make it difficult for many practicing journalists to join, leaving a significant number operating in a legally precarious position.<sup>50</sup> Media professionals have cited financial concerns and fears for their personal safety as the primary obstacles they face in their work. The Centre for Defending Freedom of Journalists (CDFJ) and the Community Media Network are the largest independent media organisations in Jordan, dedicated to monitoring freedom of expression and supporting independent journalism.<sup>51</sup>

### **Legal Framework for the Media**

The Constitution guarantees freedom of opinion in speech and in any form of expression as well as freedom of the press, printing, publication and mass-media. However, it does not protect the right to ‘seek’ and ‘receive’ information and ideas but only the right to express oneself.<sup>52</sup> Defamation is a criminal offence in both the Penal Code and the Cybercrime Law which negatively affected public discourse. The Penal Code additionally includes fines and prison terms for abasement and insult of public figures and authorities.<sup>53</sup> As reported by numerous EU EOM interlocutors, this situation has led to widespread self-censorship within the media community.

***Priority recommendation - Decriminalise defamation in Penal Code and the Cybercrime Law to ensure due exercise of the freedom of expression, in line with international standards.***

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<sup>48</sup> The largest private channel Roya TV shifted to mostly non-political content after its owners were briefly arrested in April 2020. This followed the airing of interviews with citizens who criticized the government’s measures regarding the COVID-19 pandemic.

<sup>49</sup> This obligation contradicts the principles of the ICCPR regarding freedom of expression (Article 19) and freedom of association (Article 22). See also HRC General Comment 34 Para. 44: “*Journalism is a function shared by a wide range of actors, including professional full-time reporters and analysts, as well as bloggers and others who engage in forms of self-publication in print, on the internet or elsewhere*”.

<sup>50</sup> One of the conditions is to have completed higher journalistic education and be active full-time in journalism. EU EOM interlocutors reported that many journalists who tried to register were denied.

<sup>51</sup> CDFJ deployed 21 journalists to monitor the violations in the work of journalists on election day in Amman, Ajloun, Aqaba, Balqa, Jerash, Irbid, Karak, Mafraq and Zarqa. Two complaints from media professionals were received by CDFJ from Amman and Ajloun.

<sup>52</sup> Freedoms stipulated in Article 15 of the Constitution are further limited by phrases such as “beyond the limits of the law”, “within the limits of the law” and “in accordance with the provisions of the law”. The right to access information is regulated by the 2024 Right to Information Law, which, however, failed to fully enable the right of individuals to exercise their right to access information held by public bodies.

<sup>53</sup> The CDFJ in their 2023 report on the status of media in Jordan mentioned one arrest and two prison sentences to media professionals: journalist Heba Abu Taha, the publisher of the Kul Al-Urdun website, Khaled Al-Majali, and the publisher of the Sawalif journalistic website, Ahmed Hassan Al-Zoubi. Ahmed Al-Zoubi was arrested on 2 July 2024 for political reasons, as reported by EU EOM interlocutors.



The overall media legal framework is scattered, underdeveloped and often cumbersome, consisting of around 20 laws and regulations that directly or indirectly govern media operations.<sup>54</sup> There is no separate law on the Media Commission (MC) which regulates broadcast media and provides a license to a media outlet upon obtaining the frequency from the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission. The Minister of Government Communication nominates the director of the MC, who is in turn appointed by the PM.

The IEC Executive Instructions for accrediting journalists require that those covering elections be employed by media entities registered with the MC. Several EU EOM media interlocutors criticised the high registration and annual fees at the MC, which are often unaffordable for local or community media outlets.<sup>55</sup> The shutdown of *Yarmouk TV* in June 2024 and the blockage of the *Al Hudood* website in May 2023 by the MC were viewed by the media community as arbitrary applications of media legislation, influenced by political motives, which clouded the discourse on freedom of expression during the election campaign.<sup>56</sup>

***Recommendation - Ensure independent and transparent functioning of the Media Commission by establishing an independent board of members appointed by media professionals, such as balanced representatives of private and state media outlets, independent media organisations, independent legal experts and representatives of relevant state agencies...***

### **Media Monitoring Findings**

The EL obliged official media outlets to treat all candidates impartially and equally during election campaigning. However, no regulations on political advertising and free airtime were issued. Many broadcasters offered paid interviews to parties and lists, which reduced the amount of already scarce objective information on party programmes.<sup>57</sup> Only a handful of parties could afford political advertising.<sup>58</sup> Free airtime to present parties' programmes was provided by state-owned *Jordan TV* only in the last weeks of the campaign.<sup>59</sup>

***Recommendation - Develop and enact a legal, regulatory, and operational framework for free and equitable airtime for contestants in public media.***

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<sup>54</sup> State Security Court Law (1959) as amended; Contempt of Courts Law (1959); Penal Code (1960) as amended; Protection of State Secrets and Documents Law (1971); Jordan Press Association Law (1998) as amended; Press and Publications Law (1998) as amended; Jordan Television and Radio Corporation Law (2000); Prevention of Terrorism Law (2006) as amended; Jordan News Agency Law (2009); Cybercrime Law (2010, 2015) as amended in 2023; Right to Information Law (2024). Additionally, Anti-Terrorism Law of 2006 and Crime-Prevention Law of 1954 are sporadically instrumentalised to suppress the freedom of expression.

<sup>55</sup> Annual fees, paid on the top of the registration fees, can reach up to 20,000 JOD (25,235 EUR) depending on the type of media. Discounted fees for community media were introduced only in 2023.

<sup>56</sup> *Yarmouk TV* was shut down by MC with the initial allegations of operation without the licence, which is debated in the court by *Yarmouk TV*, who had been openly functioning for 13 years before. ICCPR HRC GC 34 Para. 37: "Among restrictions on political discourse that have given the Committee cause for concern are (...) blocking access during election periods to sources, including local and international media, of political commentary, and limiting access of opposition parties and politicians to media outlets."

<sup>57</sup> This was reported by LTOs in Amman, Aqaba, Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa.

<sup>58</sup> See Media Annex, Charts 7 and 8.

<sup>59</sup> As reported by LTOs and confirmed by the media monitoring.

The EU EOM media monitoring findings showed that media mostly failed to provide an adequate and comprehensive coverage of the election campaign.<sup>60</sup> State-owned media outlets avoided publishing any material that might criticise the government or its policies. Concerned about being perceived as biased or aligned with any political force, most media outlets chose to focus their prime-time content during the campaign on the activities of the IEC, reporting on election violations without naming the parties responsible, and emphasising voter education.<sup>61</sup> Both broadcast media and news websites rarely reported on political rallies and were mostly absent at parties' campaign events.

***Recommendation - Provide training and professional development courses for media professionals to equip them with the knowledge and skills necessary to produce balanced, ethical and comprehensive journalism during elections.***

Most talk shows and editorial programmes on broadcast media featured former officials, celebrities, and experts discussing the importance of elections, rather than providing in-depth analyses of political party programmes or candidates' profiles. The EU EOM media monitoring revealed that male representatives of parties dominated election-related coverage, overshadowing women candidates across all monitored media.<sup>62</sup>

Positively, state-owned *Al Mamlaka TV* and *Al Balad* community radio organised debates for political parties. However, EU EOM interlocutors noted that many electoral contestants lacked an understanding of the importance of public debates and often refused to participate.

Monitored state-owned media devoted the majority of their election and political content to the IEC and the government, with none of the parties dominating in their coverage. Thus, *Jordan TV* and *Al Mamlaka TV* devoted more than a half of their prime-time election and political content to IEC and the government. *Jordan Radio* and *Hala Radio* devoted predominant part of the prime-time content to IEC and the government, leaving less than 20 per cent to a handful of parties. *Al Rai* and *Petra* devoted 90 per cent of their online space to the IEC and to the government, leaving thus only ten per cent to cover the campaign in their news and editorial articles

Monitored private media followed this trend to a lesser extent, with outlets allocating their prime-time election-related content to a select number of political parties. Hence, *Roya TV* included coverage of the Democratic Current Alliance, *Etihad*, *Eradah*, *Al Mithaq*, and the National Islamic Party in its prime-time programming. *Radio Noon* distributed half of their election-related airtime among *Al Mithaq* and National Islamic Party, devoting the other half to the IEC and the government, whereas *Radio Hayat* featured predominately *Etihad* in almost half of its news and editorial programmes, leaving the remaining airtime to the IEC and government.

Four out of seven monitored news websites allocated more space to political parties than to the IEC and the government, but showed certain biases. *Alanbat* dedicated about half of its election articles to *Al Mithaq*, while *Altaj* focused on *Al Mithaq*, *Eradah*, and the *Namaa* and Labour Party Alliance. *Assabeel* favoured IAF among the featured parties, whereas *Khaberni* showcased the largest number of parties in its election-related content.<sup>63</sup> Among radios, *Al Balad* community

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<sup>60</sup> The EU EOM Jordan monitoring sample for audio-visual and online media included two state-owned TV channels (*Jordan TV* and *Al Mamlaka*), one privately owned TV channel (*Roya TV*), two state-owned (*Jordan Radio*, *Hala Radio*) and three private radio stations (*Al Balad*, *Noon*, *Hayat*), two state-owned (*Petra* and *Al Rai*) and five private news websites (*Alanbat*, *Altaj*, *Assabeel*, *Khaberni*, *Roya News*).

<sup>61</sup> See Media Annex, Charts 2, 5, and 9.

<sup>62</sup> See Media Annex, Chart 4.

<sup>63</sup> See Media Annex, Chart 10.

radio featured the largest number of parties with almost evenly distributed coverage between them, in their news, debates and editorial content.<sup>64</sup>

### **XIII. SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL RIGHTS**

#### **Electoral campaigns on social media were predominantly driven by self-image promotion rather than focusing on political programs.**

##### **Social Media Environment**

With a high internet penetration rate of 91 per cent, over 6.38 million Jordanians actively use social media, making it a central hub for political discourse. Facebook is the dominant platform with 5.3 million users, followed by X (formerly Twitter) with 1 million users.<sup>65</sup> Tik Tok is banned, limiting its potential political influence (*see Annex C Graph 1*).<sup>66</sup>

In Jordan, around 45.6 per cent of the population relies on social media as their primary source of information.<sup>67</sup> This trend is particularly strong among individuals aged 18 to 34, with platforms like Facebook proving to be especially popular.<sup>68</sup> The trend is most prominent in urban areas such as Amman, where younger audiences turn to digital sources for updates on politics, economics, and social issues.

Social media monitoring in Jordan is limited, apart from a UNDP-sponsored project that works with the IEC to track online gender-based violence.<sup>69</sup> While some smaller fact-checking initiatives exist, specialised platforms were notably absent during the election period. The only platform, *Chayyek* focused mainly on training journalists in election coverage rather than issuing fact-checking reports.<sup>70</sup>

##### **Legal Framework**

The regulatory framework governing online spaces in Jordan includes the recently amended Cybercrime Law and the Data Protection Law.<sup>71</sup> The 2023 Cybercrime Law, imposes harsh penalties for broadly defined offences.<sup>72</sup> Article 15 penalises the dissemination of “fake news” or defamatory content that threatens national security with at least 3 months’ imprisonment and fines of up to 20,200 JOD (26,500 EUR). Article 17 targets content inciting strife, hatred, or religious insult, with sentences of up to 3 years and similar fines.

The primary issue with these articles lies in their vague and overly broad language, allowing for subjective interpretation. Terms like “fake news”, “provoking strife”, and “insulting religions” are not clearly defined, making it easy to prosecute individuals for legitimate forms of expression, such as political criticism. This ambiguity raises concerns about freedom of expression and

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<sup>64</sup> See Media Annex, Chart 3.

<sup>65</sup> Datareportal: [The state of digital in Jordan in 2024](#).

<sup>66</sup> [Freedom House](#): In December 2022, authorities blocked Tik Tok amid demonstrations by truck drivers who were protesting fuel price increases.

<sup>67</sup> Jordan Media Institute: [Trust in the Jordanian Media Index](#).

<sup>68</sup> Jordan Media Institute: [Trust in the Jordanian Media Index](#).

<sup>69</sup> IEC utilised the [eMonitor](#) tool for monitoring the online campaign.

<sup>70</sup> [Chayyek](#) is an independent news verification platform launched in 2021 focusing on Lebanese, Jordanian, and broader Arab affairs.

<sup>71</sup> [Freedom House](#): Online journalists, activists, and social media users can be prosecuted for their criticism of the government.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. EEAS [Statement by the Spokesperson on the revision of the Cybercrimes Law](#), 17.08.2023.

encourages self-censorship, as individuals may refrain from expressing opinions for fear of legal repercussions.<sup>73</sup> Several expert reports indicated that these legal amendments contributed to growing restrictions on online expression, and have led in some cases to the detention of prominent journalists and other critical voices.<sup>74</sup> EU observers reported that in some cases, candidates avoided controversial topics in their campaign, due to fear of legal repercussions under the Cybercrime law. On the other hand, the law was sometimes praised by women candidates as contributing to a more cautious online environment. Nonetheless, the digital space should be protected in accordance with international standards and commitments for freedom of expression.

***Priority recommendation -***

***Amend the Cybercrime Law to align with international human rights standards and obligations through consultations with key stakeholders, including civil society and media professionals, ensuring any definitions and application of "false news," "hate speech," and "provoking strife," do not entail arbitrary interpretation or implementation and are consistent with protecting freedom of expression online and offline. Include safeguards to prevent misuse of the law against journalists and individuals expressing critical opinions, while ensuring the law operates to protect, rather than suppress, public discourse.***

The widespread sending of unsolicited SMS messages by candidates and political parties during election campaigns highlights both gaps in the 2023 Data Protection Law and issues with its enforcement. While this law requires explicit consent for data processing and including personal contact information, it remains ambiguous regarding the use of such data for political communication, leaving scope for clarification.

**Social Media Monitoring Findings**

The EU EOM social media monitoring unit (SMMU) focused primarily on Facebook and X, the two most influential platforms in Jordan's political landscape. The monitoring sample included 103 candidates from 36 political parties, along with 60 independent candidates, covering both local and national lists.<sup>75</sup> Additionally, the unit tracked 15 Facebook pages related to Jordanian media and 32 political influencers on X, with special attention paid to issues like disinformation, hateful content, and online gender violence.<sup>76</sup>

The SMMU tracked 4,569 posts across various platforms. The IAF was the most active party, accounting for 32 per cent of total monitored posts, whilst independent candidates also had a strong presence, collectively making up 28 per cent of all monitored posts. *Al Mithaq* came third accounting for 14 per cent of the total number of monitored posts (*see Annex C Graph 2*).

Party-affiliated candidates continued to favour individual campaigns based on the promotion of their image, over party programmes and visions (*see Annex C Graph 4*). Of the monitored Facebook posts, 56.2 per cent were solely focused on promoting the candidate's name, image, and slogan, overshadowing any meaningful policy discussions. Voter education followed with 6.32 per cent, while economic issues were discussed in only 5.48 per cent of the content. Topics related to Palestine appeared in only 4.7 per cent of the posts, and public freedoms and human rights were

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<sup>73</sup> In August 2023, the King approved the new Cybercrime Law, which replaces the 2015 one. The new law includes criminal penalties for broadly defined online speech and introduces additional punishments for the use of circumvention tools. [Freedom on the Net 2023 Jordan](#).

<sup>74</sup> Amnesty: [Jordan: New Cybercrimes Law stifling freedom of expression one year on](#).

<sup>75</sup> [The official lists](#) from the IEC were relied upon to determine the party affiliations of the candidates.

<sup>76</sup> Only Facebook pages of the parties and candidates were monitored, as the tools used for monitoring do not allow for the tracking of personal accounts.

featured in 2.26 per cent. Youth issues garnered only 3 per cent, while women's issues accounted for even less (2 per cent).

Out of the 33 monitored political parties with official Facebook pages, 16 posted campaign-related content after the official campaign period ended.

Candidates and political parties made limited use of paid advertising on Meta. The total spending amounted to 167,716 USD (156,000 EUR). Meta pages related to political parties spent 44,289 USD (41,200 EUR). For example, the Labour Party spent 7,980 USD (7,430 EUR), *Al Mithaq* spent 6,207 USD (5,780 EUR), and the IAF spent even less, with 4,477 USD (4,160 EUR).

Individual candidates on both local and national lists spent 123,427 USD (114,800 EUR). Local list candidates spent 99,879 USD (92,900 EUR). Independent candidates accounted for 48 per cent of the spending, while party affiliated candidates made up 52 per cent (*see Annex C. Graphs 5-7*).<sup>77</sup>

#### **XIV. PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN**

##### **Deep-rooted cultural, social, and economic barriers continue to shape women's political involvement**

Jordan ratified the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) with reservations in 1992, but to date, there is no comprehensive law that fully incorporates CEDAW into domestic legislation. Gender-based violence and the lack of gender equality remain significant concerns. Jordanian women still cannot pass their nationality to their children if the father is a foreigner – a restriction that does not apply to men. Positively, a 2022 constitutional amendment redefined Jordanian citizens to include women and introduced a state guarantee to empower women, ensuring their active role in society, and a duty to protect them from discrimination and violence.<sup>78</sup>

The EL and PPL introduced measures to strengthen the position of women both within party structures and as candidates. At least 20 per cent of a party's founding members must be women. Parties must ensure women's right to leadership positions and guarantee fair, equal access to resources, especially during election campaigns. Parties receive additional public funding for each woman elected. While parties successfully included women as members, they fell short in promoting them to leadership positions. On average, while 45 per cent of the party members were women, they held only 19 per cent of the leadership positions.<sup>79</sup>

The EL increased the number of quota seats for women from 15 to 18 – one in each LED.<sup>80</sup> In the GED, there were no reserved seats for women, but lists had to include at least one woman among the top three as well as the second three candidates (referred to as preferential seats<sup>81</sup>). Women made up 20.3 per cent of LED and 27.5 per cent of GED candidates. Women had to choose whether to run for a reserved or a non-reserved seat in the LED list. Most LED candidates chose to contest

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<sup>77</sup> The data presented covers the period between 5 August and 8 September 2024.

<sup>78</sup> Constitution, Chapter 2. Art 6 (6).

<sup>79</sup> Information from the IEC as of 12 August 2024.

<sup>80</sup> However, with the overall increase in total seats, the proportion of reserved seats in the HoR rose only slightly, from 11.5 per cent to 13 per cent.

<sup>81</sup> A preferential seat, unlike a reserved seat, is a placement mechanism designed to ensure the presence of women and youth in electable positions within the GED, rather than guaranteeing a minimum number of those elected.

the reserved seats (166 out of 190). Women candidates told the EU EOM that running for reserved seats was easier than for open contests, as they felt supported by fellow list candidates rather than viewed as competitors. Candidates for reserved seats received, on average, a higher number of votes than those running for competitive seats.<sup>82</sup>

The combined measures of reserved and preferential seats led to the election of 27 women – 18 through the reserved seats in each LED and 9 through the GED. As a result, the share of women in the HoR increased significantly from 11.5 per cent in 2020 to 19.6 per cent. Despite this remarkable achievement, women’s presence still falls short of equal representation and the critical mass needed to influence decision-making.<sup>83</sup> While the EL envisions an initial expansion of GED seats to 50 per cent, followed by a further increase to 65 per cent over the next two parliamentary cycles, there is currently no roadmap for increasing the number of preferential or quota-based seats. Without expanding these preferential seats while maintaining the quota seats, the representation of women is likely to stall or decline in future parliaments.

***Recommendation - Enhance the representation of women and youth by increasing their opportunities to stand for election through more preferential placements in the General Electoral District lists.***

While the modernisation process and the quota system were praised by stakeholders for aiming toward inclusiveness, deep-rooted cultural, social, and economic barriers continue to shape women’s political involvement. Lack of funding poses a significant challenge for women, especially registration fees and campaign costs were considered high.<sup>84</sup> Women often experience coercion from their families and tribes regarding voting and contesting. In several districts, women reported to the EU EOM that they were pressured to withdraw their candidacy or, in one instance, not to join a party list.<sup>85</sup> EU observers noted that women were often excluded from internal decision-making and nomination processes within tribes and that their participation in campaign events was limited.<sup>86</sup> Coverage of women candidates in broadcast media was very limited. While they were more active than male candidates in using Facebook to engage with voters, their media coverage remained limited. Positively, some women candidates highlighted that the new provision, which allows publicly employed candidates to take unpaid leave instead of resigning – a previous EU EOM recommendation – was crucial for their opportunity to stand.

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<sup>82</sup> See Annex A.5 for the average number of votes given per type of seat and LED. In 14 out of 18 LED, candidates for the women’s seats received a higher average number of votes than those running for competitive seats. A similar trend was observed for the Christian and Chechen/Circassian seats. The likely explanation is that while candidates for competitive seats did not cooperate with each other, they did collaborate with candidates for reserved seats, endorsing one another and encouraging their supporters to do the same.

<sup>83</sup> In addition, the newly appointed government saw a decrease in women’s representation from 23 per cent to 16 per cent. The UN Commission on the Status of Women, during its 39<sup>th</sup> session in 1995, referred to 30-35 per cent as the minimum critical mass required for underrepresented groups to have a visible impact on the style and content of political decisions.

<sup>84</sup> The registration fee for LED is 500 JOD per candidate (approximately 630 EUR) and 2,000 JOD per GED list (2,520 EUR). The average monthly earnings in Jordan are around 340 JOD (ILOSTAT 2022), and the work force participation for women is as low as 14 per cent, making women financially dependent on their families and relatives.

<sup>85</sup> Similar concerns were expressed by organisations working on women’s political empowerment.

<sup>86</sup> Across all districts, the EU EOM observed that women made up, on average, around one-fifth of the speakers and attendees at campaign events. However, in the Badias, their presence was virtually non-existent. One tribe in Ajloun officially declared it would not support any female members as candidates.

The IEC established a new unit to promote women’s participation both within the IEC and as voters and candidates.<sup>87</sup> The IEC Board includes one woman among its five members and 14 per cent of other managerial positions at the IEC are held by women. Two DEC Chairs, including the one for the GED, are women, and most DEC members included women as members.<sup>88</sup> For the first time, the IEC developed a definition of electoral violence against women and established a committee for handling such complaints.<sup>89</sup> The officially reported cases were few, but both the IEC and the CSOs believe the real number to be higher.<sup>90</sup>

## **XV. PARTICIPATION OF YOUTH**

### **New laws strengthened the inclusion of youth in party structures and as candidates.**

Jordan has a young population, 45.4 per cent of voters were under the age of 35. First-time voters made up 11.5 per cent of the total electorate. One of the objectives of the political modernisation reforms was to boost youth participation, both within parties and as candidates. New constitutional amendments require the state to empower youth to contribute to political, economic, social, and cultural life.<sup>91</sup> Similarly to women, a party’s founding members must include at least 20 per cent youth, who should have the right to leadership roles and equal access to party resources, particularly during campaigns. Same as for women, parties receive additional public funding for each youth elected. Parties successfully included youth as members, with young people making up 39 per cent of party membership, of which 44 per cent were young women.<sup>92</sup>

Electoral lists in GED had to include at least one candidate under 35 among the top five, but no such provision existed for LEDs. As a result, youth made up 23 per cent of GED candidates but only 6 per cent in LEDs. Six youth were elected, three of them on GED lists and three on LED lists. Similarly to women, the relatively high registration fee and campaign costs for LED seats posed a barrier to youth candidacies.

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<sup>87</sup> The Women’s Empowerment Unit reports directly to the Chairman of the IEC. The IEC has a joint action plan with the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) and collaborates with international organisations and NGOs.

<sup>88</sup> On average, women comprised 22 per cent of DEC members and held 34 per cent of managerial positions within DECs. The representation of women at sub-DEC level was considerably higher.

<sup>89</sup> The following criteria were developed: the violence must occur during the election period and aim to affect the elections; the violence is perpetrated because the victim is a woman; and there must be consequences for the victim, which can be physical, psychological, economic, or electronic. The relevant provisions are under different laws such as the Penal Code, the Cybercrime law etc.

<sup>90</sup> As of 22 September 2024, 8 cases of electoral violence against women were reported, with 3 referred to the General Prosecutor. All concerned breaches of the Cybercrime law.

<sup>91</sup> Constitution, art. 6 (7).

<sup>92</sup> Information from IEC as of 12 August 2024.

## XVI. PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

### **The political participation of PwD is very limited, with obstacles ranging from deeply rooted social stigma to inaccessible infrastructure and lack of adequate transportation**

Jordan ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2008. While the pre-2022 Constitution provided for the protection and care for the disabled, the 2022 amendments included a new commitment to enhance their participation and integration in various aspects of life.<sup>93</sup> The 2017 Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (PwD) aims to ensure equal opportunities and accessibility in areas such as education, employment, and public services. The EL provides that the absence of legal and civil capacity is a basis for restricting the right to vote. The language of the law has been changed to a more moderate terminology but remains ambiguous in its application.

The 2022 reforms included measures to strengthen the position of PwDs within political party structures. A party's founding members must include at least one disabled person. The parties should enable PwD to benefit in a fair and equal manner from their resources, especially during electoral campaigns, and there are financial incentives for parties to get PwD elected. Most parties met only the bare minimum requirements for PwD representation, with their share making up 0.08 per cent of total party membership.<sup>94</sup>

The political participation of PwD is very limited, with obstacles ranging from deeply rooted social stigma to inaccessible infrastructure and lack of adequate transportation. Although an estimated 12 per cent of Jordan's population has a disability, the IEC had information of only 7,696 disabled voters (0.15 per cent of the electorate), acknowledging that the actual number is higher. Among the 1,623 candidates, six were known to have a disability. None of them got elected.

The IEC signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Higher Council for the of Persons with Disabilities (HCD), the National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and the Jordan Bar Association (JBA), to improve electoral participation for PwD. The planned measures included qualified polling centres, access to legal protection for PwD, a voter awareness campaign, dedicated volunteers in each polling centre, special training for electoral staff on how to deal with voters with disabilities, a training manual for police officers on PwD issues, and increased accessibility of the IEC website.

Of the 1,649 polling centres, the IEC prepared 95 qualified polling centres (QPC), which aimed to provide enhanced accessibility for voters with diverse disabilities. PwD could request assignment to one of these QPC, but only six voters did so, indicating low awareness of this option. The EU EOM observed that accessibility in QPCs was generally better than in regular PCs, though not always ensured. In regular polling centres, 55 per cent of stations were independently accessible, while 45 per cent were not. In qualified polling centres, 80 per cent of polling stations were accessible.<sup>95</sup> Organisations of persons with disabilities (OPD) and the HCD reported instances where PwD voters arrived to vote but were unable to do so due to inaccessibility.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Constitution, art. 6 (5).

<sup>94</sup> Information from IEC as of 12 August 2024.

<sup>95</sup> During voting, 527 polling stations were assessed.

<sup>96</sup> The Jordanian Coalition for People with Disabilities informed the EU EOM of multiple cases where people were not able to cast their vote on election day. When they arrived at their assigned PC, they found that they had been allocated to inaccessible PS. While polling centre staff attempted to assist, they were constrained by the EL, which does not allow ballot boxes to be brought to voters outside the polling stations.



*Priority recommendation - Improve access and opportunity to vote for persons with disabilities by ensuring independent access to polling stations and establish legal provisions for reasonable accommodation in cases where access is insufficient. Increase the number of accessible polling centres.*

*Recommendation - Enhance access and voting opportunities for persons with disabilities by developing a comprehensive operational framework for information collection, dissemination, and targeted outreach for civic and voter education in collaboration with the HCD and organisations of persons with disabilities.*

## **XVII. PARTICIPATION OF RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES**

**Christian, Chechen, and Circassian voters without reserved seats in their districts could register in districts where such seats were available.**

Christians, Chechens, and Circassians hold a special status in Jordan's political system with reserved seats in the HoR. These groups are historically well integrated into Jordanian society, with Christians making up about 2.1 per cent of the population and Circassians and Chechens together less than 2 per cent. There are two reserved seats for Christians in the GED and seven in the LEDs. Chechens and Circassians have three reserved seats in the HoR, one in GED, and two in LEDs.

Candidates' lists included five per cent Christians for GED, and six per cent for LEDs; and two per cent Chechens/Circassians for both GED and LEDs. Voters from ethnic or religious groups living in districts without reserved seats could register in districts where there are reserved seats for their group. This option was mostly used by Christians (3,636) and less by Chechens/Circassians (218).

Prior to the elections, the interlocutors from these groups expressed satisfaction with the modernisation process. However, after the election results were announced, representatives of both Christians and Circassians expressed their dissatisfaction to the EU EOM regarding the results of the elections, as some of their representatives were elected on a party list they did not support.<sup>97</sup>

## **XVIII. CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION**

**While the legal framework for election observation indicates unequal treatment of international and domestic observers, in practice, the accreditation process was inclusive and domestic observers did not report any obstacles to their work.**

The activities of domestic and international observers are not regulated in the EL, but in two IEC Executive Instructions, potentially compromising the legal certainty of observer's rights. Domestic organisations must be registered with an official Jordanian authority, be unrelated to any political party, and work in the domain of democracy, human rights, or political participation.<sup>98</sup> The regulations indicate unequal treatment of international and domestic observers, as the right of

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<sup>97</sup> For example, the IAF candidates won one reserved seat for the Christians and two for the Chechens/Circassians in the LED. This was criticised by the Nart Circassian TV among others.

<sup>98</sup> The IEC denied the registration request of four organisations because they were not active in the relevant areas. Two other organisations were initially accepted but then cancelled because of a partisan link or because one organisation's official registration had been cancelled.

domestic observers to observe all phases of the electoral process is not explicitly stated, as it is for international observers.

***Priority recommendation - Incorporate into the Election Law the rights of domestic observers and of international observers to unhindered access to the entire electoral process.***

In practice, the accreditation process was inclusive, and citizen observers did not report any obstacles to their work. The IEC accredited 20 domestic observer organisations with 5,037 individual observers.<sup>99</sup> The most experienced domestic observer organisation RASED carried out voter education activities, including some specifically aimed at young women. RASED deployed 54 long-term observers and 250 mobile teams of 3-4 observers for election day.

As for international observers, the IEC accredited 11 organisations and 15 delegations of international guests.<sup>100</sup> Besides the EU EOM, 207 international observers were accredited. The only international mission that published a statement after election day apart from the EU EOM was the League of Arab States, welcoming the measures taken to enhance the participation of women and youth in parliament as well as the transparent and smooth implementation of the elections by the IEC, but also pointing towards the differences in the value of a seat between LEDs, affecting the equality of the vote.

## **XIX. ELECTORAL DISPUTES**

**Overall low levels of electoral disputes and prosecutions, as IEC efforts complement a solid legal framework for handling electoral complaints and tackling offences.**

### **Complaints and Appeals**

The law provides clear rules, guidelines, and reasonable timelines for objections by relevant stakeholders regarding entry on or omission from the preliminary voter lists, against party and candidate registration, at various stages of polling, and as regards results. EU EOM interlocutors were largely positive about the IEC's role as it fulfilled its mandate to determine complaints and objections during various stages of the elections in line with legal timeframes, and there were few appeals to the courts. Of eleven rejected candidate applications, only three appealed and all lost their cases based on failure to satisfy the legally defined eligibility criteria.

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<sup>99</sup> Aman Alliance, Balqa Alliance for Observing Elections, Arab Centre for Human Rights and International Peace, Shabab 42 Foundation, Jordan Coalition of Persons with Disability, Hayat Centre – RASED, Karak Castle Centre for Consultancy and Training, Lawyers without Borders, Ibtanaa' for Consultancy and Training, Sanad Youth Work, National Society for Human Rights, Democratic National Dialogue Association, Women Committees Society, Knights of Change Teams, Jordan Bar Association, Turab Alwatan Foundation for Comprehensive Development, Performance Index Centre, National Centre for Human Rights, Alumma Studies Centre, Qased Training and Empowerment.

<sup>100</sup> International observer organisations included, besides the EU EOM, Arab Network for Democratic Elections, Arab Network for Elections, Arab Women's Organisation, Arabic Parliament, Arab Parliamentarian's Network Society – Ra'edat, International Parliamentarian's Congress, League of Arab States, Madarat – RASED Palestine, Peace Echo – RASED Lebanon, and the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation. International guests included the Arab Election Management Bodies, Australian Embassy, Bahrein Society for Transparency, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Honorary Consulate of Malta, IFES, Japanese Embassy, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, National Election Commission Egypt, NDI, Qatari Ministry of Interior, UK Embassy, UNDP, US Embassy, and an alliance of Tocqueville Academy, IRI, and the Eduardo Frei Foundation.

### **Electoral Offences**

Positively, the IEC took steps to dissuade offenders through public statements, strategic, collaborative, and investigative actions, and referring matters to public prosecutors. It set up a dedicated committee for monitoring alleged electoral offences with three key subcommittees focusing on campaign violations, electoral violence against women, and campaign financing infractions. It also deployed 264 field monitors across the governorates to detect electoral law and campaign violations, while designated legal officers at the DEC provided *preliminary legal grounds* and safeguarded evidence for prosecutors. The judicial council, in collaboration the IEC, assigned four state prosecutors to the North, Centre and South of the country to undertake judicial investigations based on referrals from the IEC or the police, and determine whether an offender was to be tried.

There were relatively low levels of serious offences overall, though there were several timely prosecutions. Prior to the elections, the IEC reported some 49 electoral law violations referred to prosecutors, most alleging bribery and vote buying and selling. Several allegations related to misrepresentation and false information (none proven), and at least one case was investigated under the Cybercrime Law based on the dissemination of information aimed to obstruct the electoral process. Shortly after his election, an *Al Mithaq* candidate from Balqa, charged before the poll, was sentenced to two years for bribing voters, thus entailing his replacement in the HoR by the next candidate on his list. On election day, some 44 cases were referred to prosecutors, among them several cases of vote buying and impersonation. At the time of writing there were at least 18 trials before the courts, some with several defendants. Cases related mainly either to offences of undue influence or offences related to voter fraud. At least six accused had been acquitted and there were eight successful prosecutions among them seven cases related to voter ID fraud attracting fines of 2,500 Dinar each. Three accused who contested the LED elections appealed their initial convictions (related to undue influence and vote buying). All lost their appeals, and each was sentenced to one year imprisonment and barred from contesting the next elections as envisaged by law. One of the three was elected on 10 September, however he may still be eligible to hold his seat as he was sentenced to a period of one year, whereas the law prescribes that ineligibility applies to sentences in excess of one year.<sup>101</sup>

The electoral legal framework encompasses a comprehensive body of proscribed election related offences, with a range of fines and possible custodial sentences for more serious matters, including for acts of bribery or vote buying. Sanctioning criteria enable courts to set penalties proportional to the severity of offences, thus ensuring a balance between deterrence and fairness and protecting the integrity of the electoral process. Courts adjudicate electoral offences within 30 days after referral from a prosecutor. However, the period for investigation by prosecutors is not time bound.

### **Election Petitions**

The validity of membership to the HoR can be challenged within 15 days after publication of results in the Official Gazette to the Court of Cassation. The court then has 30 days to issue its judgment. The Court may accept or dismiss an appeal and, if it accepts it, declare the winner or annul an election in a district if it finds the procedures were not lawful. The EU EOM was aware of three appeals made by the deadline, indicating a much less disputed poll than in previous years.

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<sup>101</sup> The HoR has the option by a two third majority vote to expel one of its members.

## **XX. VOTING, COUNTING AND TABULATION OF RESULTS**

**Election day was calm, orderly, and professionally organised, but the EU EOM observed widespread campaign activities outside of polling centres. Voting procedures were overall respected in the vast majority of polling stations and was assessed as good or very good in 97 per cent of polling stations visited by the EU EOM. Closing and counting were assessed as good or very good in 38 out of 44 polling stations. The EU EOM was able to observe the tabulation process without undue restriction, and it was assessed as good or very good in all tabulation centres.**

On election day, the EU EOM observed the opening in 51 polling stations (PS), voting in 527 PS, and counting in 44 PS. Overall, election day was calm, orderly, and professionally organised. However, campaign activities outside of polling centres were widespread and the EU observed children being used for campaign purposes in all electoral districts of Jordan, a violation of the national (?) Labour Law and IEC Executive Instructions.

Polling staff was present in the required numbers throughout the entire election day and their overall performance was assessed by EU observers as well-trained and competent. Security forces were present in large numbers in all observed polling centres without overstepping their mandate. List representatives were present in 90 per cent of PS visited from opening until counting, and citizen observers in 25 per cent of PS. Overall, 59 per cent of PS visited throughout the day were independently accessible for voters with reduced mobility (*see Section XVI. Participation of Persons with Disabilities*).

### **Opening**

In the beginning of the election day, the EU EOM noted campaign material outside of 10 out of 51 observed PS, and campaign activities outside of three PS. Most of the observed PS opened on time (40/51) or with a slight delay of up to 15 minutes (11/51). No essential material was missing in the observed polling stations and opening procedures were overall respected. The ballot boxes were shown to be empty and sealed securely. In 27/51 observed polling stations, the received ballot papers were counted twice before the opening of the PS as required, in 15/51 cases they were not; in 9/51 cases, EU observers did not observe this step of the procedures as they were only allowed to enter the PS at 6:45am. All people present had a clear view of the opening procedures, and the EU EOM as well as citizen observers and list representatives were able to observe the opening process without undue restrictions. No objections were made regarding the opening procedures in the observed PS. Overall, the opening was assessed as good or very good by all EU EOM observers.

### **Voting**

In 47 per cent of PS visited during voting, the EU EOM noted campaign activities outside of the PS. The layout of the PS was adequate for the conduct of polling in 95 per cent. In 26 per cent of observed PS, EU observers saw disabled voters voting with assistance; in 62 per cent of these cases, the assistance was provided by an assistant chosen by the voter, and in the remaining 38 per cent, by polling staff, as per IEC Executive Instructions. In 68 per cent of assisted voting cases, the assistant's finger was marked in line with the procedures.

In all observed PS, the ballot boxes were in plain view. EU observers noted that in 5 per cent of PS, there were unauthorised persons present inside the polling station, mostly police or local officials. In two PS, list representatives and a candidate were unduly interfering with the work of the PS staff. Observers noted campaign material inside of 6 per cent of PS. In 5 per cent of PS, the

layout did not sufficiently protect the secrecy of the vote, and in 10 per cent, voters did not always mark their ballot in secrecy. Positively, in 90 per cent of PS, polling staff explained the voting process to all the voters. The EU EOM did not observe any voter without proper ID being allowed to vote, nor voters turned away by the polling staff without a lawful ground. However, in 4 per cent of PS, observers saw persons attempting to influence voters on who to vote for. The EU EOM noted indications of vote buying outside of eight PS and directly observed two instances of vote buying.

EU observers were able to observe the voting process without undue restriction in 99 per cent of PS. No formal objections were made regarding the voting procedures in the observed PS during voting. In one PS, a voter was formally reported to the DEC for an electoral offence because he refused to have indelible ink applied to his finger after voting. In three PS, a person was compelled to leave the polling station (in two cases, because they wanted to assist several voters to vote, and in one case because of taking picture within the PS). The CDFJ reported two cases in which journalists experienced difficulties in accessing polling stations in Ajloun and Amman.

### **Closing and Counting**

**EU observers assessed closing and counting as good or very good in 38 out of 44 polling stations.**

At the moment of closing, campaign activities were still observed outside 20 out of 44 PS. In 14 PS, there were voters waiting in line at the time of closing, and in all these cases they were still allowed to vote, in line with the procedures. However, in five cases, voters arriving after 7pm were also allowed to vote. In 23 out of 44 cases, the polling station closed on time, and in the remaining cases within 30 minutes, mostly because there were still voters lining up to vote.

Closing and counting procedures were respected in the vast majority of observed PS. The seals of the ballot boxes were intact before counting in all observed PS. In all PS, the election material remained in plain view of observers and list representatives during the count. While polling staff appeared to be having difficulties completing the protocols in 14 out of 44 PS, all protocols were filled out completely in the end, mostly with the help of the quality control officer. The results were transmitted successfully via the results transmission software in all PS observed at that stage. On average, counting lasted more than four hours in the observed polling stations.

The EU EOM was able to observe the counting process without undue restriction, and so were list representatives and citizen observers. No cases of intimidation of polling staff during the count were observed. No formal objections were made regarding the closing and counting procedures in the observed PS, and no one was formally reported to the DEC for an electoral offence.

### **Aggregation of Results at Polling Centres**

After results had been established in all polling stations within a polling centre (PC), PS results were aggregated at PC level. The EU EOM observed this process in 13 PC. The facilities were adequate for reception of material and protocols in all cases. No list representatives were present in 11/13 PC and no citizen observers in 12/13 PC. The EU EOM did not see any unauthorised people present nor people interfering with the PC staff. Results protocols were delivered intact and were checked for consistency, accuracy and signatures. No record of objections was received in the observed PC, and no one was formally reported to DEC because of an electoral offence.

### **Tabulation of Results**

Tabulation at LED level started around midnight of the election night. The first LEDs were those with a low number of voters and polling centres, like Jerash and Aqaba. In urban areas with a high number of voters like Amman, Irbid and Zarqa, tabulation started in the morning of 11 September around 6am. The first LEDs finished tabulation around 5am, the last one to finish was Amman 2 around 4:30am on 11 September.

In the election night, the EU EOM visited all 18 LED tabulation centres. All of them were adequate for the reception of election material in terms of space and access. Police was present outside all tabulation centres. Outside of five tabulation centres there was a large number of people present and in one case (Amman 1), this negatively affected the process. In Jerash, observers noted that there was unrest in the vicinity of the tabulation centre.

The EU EOM was able to observe the tabulation process without undue restriction, and so were citizen observers, who were present in 16 out of 18 tabulation centres. Media were present in all observed tabulation centres and transmitting live at least parts of the process. In four cases, there were unauthorised people present inside the tabulation centre (local officials, list representatives, and a candidate upon invitation of the DEC); however, the EU EOM did not observe anyone interfering with the work of the tabulation centre staff. According to an IEC Executive Instruction, list representatives and candidates were not allowed to access tabulation centres (*see Section VI. Electoral Administration*).

In the LED tabulation centres, the PC director or the head of the DEC sub-office delivered all the results forms in intact conditions. In 15 out of 18 tabulation centres, PC results sheets were always checked for consistency, accuracy and signatures; in three cases (Amman 3, Irbid 2, Tafilah), this was not always done. In two tabulation centres, EU observers noted procedural errors or omissions in the work of the tabulation staff (in Amman 2 this was due to the fatigue of the staff and in Tafilah due to technical problems). In four tabulation centres, extended breaks were taken during the tabulation process (in two cases convenience breaks, in one case due to lack of material and in one case due to technical problems). In all these cases, the integrity of the material was sufficiently protected during the break.

LED level results started to arrive at the GED DEC on the 11 September around 9am. The tabulation centre staff checked the envelope from PCs for completeness as well as consistency and accuracy; in cases of discrepancies, the PC results were forwarded to the GED DEC. Results from Madaba, Jerash, and Ajloun were revised in this way during the morning of 11 September and in some 13% of PC results, minor corrections were undertaken by the GED DEC. Around noon, the GED DEC decided to speed up the process, as the number of necessary corrections had been low and had no significant impact on the results. While all PC results were still checked for completeness, only a sample of PC results were now checked for consistency. At 6pm on 11 September, the chair of the GED DEC presented at a press conference the results for the GED, including the total number of votes for all GED lists, the total number of voters, the calculation of the threshold, and seats allocated to the winning candidates.

## **XXI. RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT**

### **Publication of Results**

The IEC started to publish preliminary results from polling stations (PS) on its dedicated website on election day around 9pm. Preliminary LED level results were published on 11 September, the

day after election day, starting in the early morning with smaller LEDs and finalising with the big urban LEDs around 5pm. The IEC results website was accessible and fully functional during the election night and in the days that followed. While the publication of PS level results increased transparency, in line with a 2020 EU EEM recommendation, the information on the IEC website only included valid votes for lists and candidates, but not invalid and blank votes, nor the number of voters who voted.

Twenty-four hours after the end of polling, the IEC chairman announced that 104 party members had been elected and communicated the number of seats won per political party, as well as the number of women (27) and youth (6) elected. He also pointed out that for the GED, there had been some 30,000 invalid votes and some 200,000 blank votes, an unusually high number.

On 12 September around noon, the IEC published on its website the final results, indicating the winning candidates with their number of votes and the number of votes for their respective list. Official results were swiftly published on 14 September in the Official Gazette, including the number of votes received by all candidates running on all local lists, the number of votes received by the 25 GED lists, the GED lists that passed the threshold and the number of seats they obtained, as well as the names of the candidates that won the 38 competitive GED seats and the three GED reserved seats for Christians and Chechens/Circassians.

While the results publication process was speedy, no information on blank and invalid votes – an element also essential to establish the overall integrity of the process – was initially published. Data provided by the IEC to the EU EOM indicates that the percentage of invalid votes was slightly higher for LED ballots (2.96 per cent) than for GED ballots (1.87 per cent), while a significantly higher share of blank ballots was cast for the GED (14.02 per cent) than for the LEDs (2 per cent) (*see Annex A.6*). EU EOM interlocutors provided different interpretations of this, ranging from voters not knowing how to mark the GED ballot to voters casting a protest vote.

The IEC communicated on its social media channels that the overall number of voters who voted was 1,638,351 (32.25 per cent). As in previous elections, turnout was significantly lower for women (29.18 per cent) than for men (35.69 per cent). Based on data provided by the IEC to the EU EOM, there were large differences in turnout between LEDs, with densely populated urban areas showing the lowest turnout (*see Annex A.7*). Overall turnout was higher than during the 2020 elections (29.90 per cent), impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic, but lower than the 2016 elections (36.13 per cent) (*see Annex A.8*).

***Recommendation - Guarantee transparency, accountability, and voters' right to information, by prescribing in law the publication of results to include information on blank and invalid votes and turnout per electoral district, and specify the deadlines for publication of results.***

## **Results**

Of the 25 lists competing in the GED, 10 passed the threshold to gain a seat in the HoR. The large number of blank and invalid votes combined with the 'lost' votes of the lists that remained under the threshold resulted in every winning list gaining at least two GED seats. Of the 72 incumbents running, only 30 were re-elected (along with 19 further former MPs), showing voters' dissatisfaction with the outgoing Parliament and the current political class.

The clear winner of the popular vote was the IAF, which garnered 464,350 votes (28.3 per cent of all votes) in the GED and won 17 of the 41 seats, its best result since the re-introduction of political parties in 1989. However, the party secured only 14 seats in the LED. The IAF used its organisation to run a well-planned, strategic campaign, mobilising public sentiment. The party included tribe

members among its candidates and used strategies to reach out to all segments of society, not only to Jordanians of Palestinian origin, its traditional voter base. The party made inroads in several districts under strong tribal influence, notably the Badias, Maan, and Tafilah.<sup>102</sup> The IAF also won four of the nine non-quota women's seats, the two available LED Circassian seats, and one of nine seats reserved for Christians. However, despite winning 22.5 per cent of seats and therewith a strong voice, neither the IAF, nor any other party alone, will hold a majority bloc in Parliament.

Despite having significantly more funds for campaigning, the new political parties failed to make a meaningful impact in the GED, gaining just 2-4 seats each.<sup>103</sup> Their failure to attract voters can be attributed to their absence of previous electoral experience as well as to their general lack of attractive, marketable programmes. Several, such as *Al Mithaq*, *Eradah*, *Taqaddum* and *Azm*, performed well at LED level, but failed to capitalise on their strong local candidates to boost the parties' performance in the GED, highlighting the persistence of tribal influences and personality-based politics. Of the five alliances comprising 15 smaller, only one – the *Namaa* and Labour Alliance – managed to pass the GED threshold to gain two seats. Two small parties, the Civil Democratic Party and the Jordanian Youth Party – both of which remained well under the threshold with their respective alliances in the GED – managed to secure one LED seat each, to bring the number of parties represented in the next HoR to 12. Thirty-four candidates were elected as independents with no declared party affiliation.

### **Post-election developments**

After the publication of the results, three parties announced that several candidates of undeclared party affiliation were in fact their members or allies, thus significantly increasing their blocs in Parliament.<sup>104</sup>

In line with the Constitution, the government resigned on 15 September, and the King appointed Jaafar Hassan, a non-aligned political figure and his former chief of staff, as the new Prime Minister (PM). The new 32-member cabinet, appointed by the PM just three days later, comprised 24 former ministers. Although three parties are marginally represented in the new government, there is no overall representation of the forces making up the new Parliament.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> North Badia: 11,091, South Badia: 7,292, Central Badia: 4,096, Maan: 12,634, Tafilah: 15,347.

<sup>103</sup> See full results tables in Annexes A.9-A.12.

<sup>104</sup> *Al Mithaq*: +9, *Taqaddum*: +7, *Azm*: +6. By the time the new House is sworn in, it is likely that the remaining 12 independent MPs will also find a home in one of the political parties. If the centrist parties decide to form a bloc in the new House, they could have a comfortable majority to influence law-making.

<sup>105</sup> *Taqaddum*: 3 ministers, *Al Mithaq*: 2, *Eradah*: 1.



**EU Election Observation Mission to Jordan**  
**Elections to the House of Representatives, 10 September 2024**

**XXII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
<b>LEGAL FRAMEWORK</b>						
1	11	<p>Some substantive and technical provisions of the Election law lack precision, leaving room for uncertainty. Some timelines are either missing or uncertain. The contest for political party lists does not expressly exclude non-aligned (Independent) candidates, nor states whether national party lists must include candidates for reserved seats on party lists. In local lists, candidates contest without disclosing a party affiliation, thus leaving disclosure to after election with potential for misleading the electorate. Local lists withdrawals made single candidate lists possible. Yet, the law is not clear on what happens if a single candidate list obtains a vote equal to more than one seat.</p>	<p>Provide certainty of law by a thorough removal of gaps, ambiguities and uncertainties in electoral laws and regulations including on i) Candidate party membership on GED lists ii) inclusion of candidates for reserved seats on GED lists, iii) declaration of candidates' party affiliation for LED lists iv) Results procedures for single candidate LED lists.</p>	<p>Amend the Election Law for the House of Representatives</p> <p>Amend IEC Executive Instructions</p>	<p>Legislature</p> <p>IEC</p>	<p><b>Rule of Law</b></p> <p><b>ICCPR, HRC GC 25, para. 9</b>  <i>“The rights and obligations provided for in [ICCPR article 25] paragraph (b) should be guaranteed by law.”</i></p> <p><b>ICCPR, HRC GC 34, para. 25,</b>  <i>“...a norm, to be characterized as a “law”, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public.”</i></p>

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
2	12	<p>EU EOM observers reported concerns about wide variations in the ratio of voters to seats between LEDs. In general, there is over-representation of voters in rural areas compared to the urban centres. The creation of the new GED somewhat mitigates past disparities. Still, the law does not define criteria for delineating boundaries between LEDs within a governorate nor the measures to be considered when LEDs are merged or readjusted, thus highlighting a need for transparency in constituency delimitation.</p>	<p>Promote a representative and transparent delimitation of boundaries between electoral districts.</p>	<p>Legislation IEC Executive Instructions</p>	<p>Legislature IEC Civil Status and Passports Department Civil Society</p>	<p><b>Transparency and access to information</b></p> <p><b>ICCPR, article 25, para. (c)</b> <i>"To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country."</i></p> <p><b>ICCPR, HRC GC, 25. Para. 21.</b> <i>"Although the Covenant does not impose any particular electoral system....the vote of one elector should be equal to the vote of another. The drawing of electoral boundaries and the method of allocating votes should not distort the distribution of voters or discriminate against any group and should not exclude or restrict unreasonably the right of citizens to choose their representatives freely."</i></p> <p><b>ICERD, article 5, para. (c)</b> <i>" States Parties undertake ...to guarantee the right of</i></p>

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
						<i>everyone .....equality before the law [...] in the enjoyment (c) Political rights, in particular the right[...]to take part[...]in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service; [...]</i>
<b>ELECTION ADMINISTRATION</b>						
3	14	According to the EL, lists and candidates are entitled to send representatives to polling stations. (...) The transparency of tabulation procedures however was diminished by the IEC’s decision to exclude candidates and list representatives from tabulation centres.	Increase transparency and guarantee the right of contestants to participate in all stages of the electoral process by granting access to the tabulation process to candidates and list representatives.	Amend IEC Executive Instruction	IEC	<p><b>Transparency</b></p> <p><b>ICCPR, Article 25:</b> “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (...) (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (...)</p> <p><b>UNCAC, Article 10:</b> “Each State party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, take such</p>

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
						<p><i>measures as may be necessary to enhance transparency in its public administration, including with regard to its organization, functioning and decision-making processes, where appropriate (...)</i></p> <p><b>ICCPR, HRC GC 25, para. 20:</b> <i>“The security of ballot boxes must be guaranteed and votes should be counted in the presence of the candidates or their agents. There should be independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process and access to judicial review or other equivalent process so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the counting of the votes.”</i></p>
4 P	15	<p>The IEC developed a comprehensive voter education programme (...) Despite these wide-ranging activities, most EU EOM interlocutors expressed concern about the low level of</p>	<p><b>Priority Recommendation - To ensure voters’ right to make an informed choice, the IEC to reinforce its voter education efforts. The dedicated department within the IEC to be strengthened to be able to</b></p>	<p>No legal change required</p>	<p>IEC</p>	<p><b>Genuine elections that reflect the free expression of the will of voters</b></p> <p><b>ICCPR, Article 19.2:</b> <i>“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this</i></p>

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
		<p>knowledge and information among voters and about a predominant lack of interest in the elections. The IEC’s centralised approach to voter education and information meant that DEC’s were barely involved. According to EU observers, information for voters was hardly visible on the ground.</p>	<p><b>develop long-term programmes, and district election committees to be involved in conducting voter information activities prior to elections.</b></p>			<p><i>right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”</i></p> <p><b>ICCPR, Article 25:</b> “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (...) (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (...)”</p> <p><b>ICCPR GC 25, para. 11:</b> “Voter education and registration campaigns are necessary to ensure the effective exercise of article 25 rights by an informed community.”</p>

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
<b>CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT</b>						
<b>5 P</b>	<b>19</b>	<p>The mechanism for addressing campaign violations lacks specific deadlines, and despite their best effort, the DEC and municipalities left many violations unaddressed. The refundable deposit, aimed at restraining contestants from violations, was considered by most EU EOM interlocutors as an insufficient deterrent. There is a regulatory gap for the effective control of campaigning 24 hours before and on election day. Campaign activities were observed on broadcast media and news websites, and on social media by nearly every contesting party. Campaign activities in and around PCs were reported by all EU observers, including with the widespread use of children.</p>	<p><b>Priority Recommendation - Develop and implement effective mechanisms to consistently implement campaign regulations, including on: (i) campaign activities inside and outside the perimeter of polling centres on election day, (ii) any campaign moratoriums before and on election day.</b></p>	No legal change required	IEC	<p><b>Genuine elections that reflect the free expression of the will of voters/ Rule of Law/Fairness in the election campaign</b></p> <p><b>ICCPR, HRC GC 25, para. 19</b>  <i>“Persons entitled to vote must be free to vote [...] without undue influence or coercion of any kind which may distort or inhibit the free expression of the elector’s will. Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of... manipulative interference of any kind.”</i></p> <p><b>UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 19/36 of 2012 (A/HRC/RES/19/36), para 16:</b>  <i>“Calls upon States to make continuous effort to strengthen the rule of law and promote democracy by c) ensuring that a sufficient degree of legal certainty and predictability is</i></p>

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
						<i>provided in the application of the law, in order to avoid any arbitrariness”.</i>
<b>CAMPAIGN FINANCE</b>						
6 P	21	<p>There is little traceability and transparency in relation to the funding and spending of candidates’ campaign expenditures. The provisions on opening and using a dedicated bank account can be easily circumvented by declaring a low estimate of expenditures, and not reporting certain donations and expenditures. There is no sanction for violations of some of these provisions. Donations from family and tribe were widely regarded by candidates as exempt from reporting obligations, and candidates could evade regulations by simply not using the dedicated bank account. As a result, much campaign funding and</p>	<p><b>Priority Recommendation - Enhance transparency in campaign finance by improving accountability rules and enforcement, and ensure the IEC is adequately trained and resourced to carry out effective oversight.</b></p>	<p>Amend Executive Instructions for disclosing the sources of funding for the electoral campaigns of lists and controlling their spending</p>	IEC	<p><b>Transparency and access to information/ Prevention of corruption/Fairness in the election campaign</b></p> <p><i>UNCAC, art. 7 (3) “Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures [...] to enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures.”</i></p> <p><i>UNCAC, art. 7 (4) “[...] maintain and strengthen systems that promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interest.”</i></p> <p><i>UNCAC, art.13.1 “Each State Party shall take appropriate measures [...] to promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside</i></p>

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
		<p>spending escaped oversight.</p>				<p><i>the public sector [...] in the prevention of and the fight against corruption [...]. This participation should be strengthened by such measures as: (b) Ensuring that the public has effective access to information.”</i></p>
7	21	<p>In the LED, the spending limit applies to lists rather than individual candidates and does not capture personal expenditures made by the candidates. This limit is also applied regardless of the number of candidates on a list or the size of the constituency, creating further inequality. Consequently, lists with fewer candidates and running in smaller districts had a distinct advantage over bigger lists and constituencies, creating an uneven playing field.</p>	<p>Adapt the spending cap system for Local Electoral Districts to apply to individual candidates as well as to lists. Those caps to reflect the differences in number of registered voters per electoral district.</p>	<p>Amend Election Law for the House of Representatives, Art. 26</p> <p>Amend IEC Executive Instructions for disclosing the sources of funding for the electoral campaigns of lists and controlling their spending</p>	<p>Legislature</p> <p>IEC</p>	<p><b>Transparency and access to information/ Prevention of corruption/Fairness in the election campaign</b></p> <p><b>ICCPR HRC GC 25. Para. 19</b> <i>“Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party.”</i></p> <p><b>UNCAC, art. 7 (3)</b> <i>“Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures (...) to enhance transparency in the</i></p>



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						<p><i>funding of candidatures.”</i></p> <p><b>UNCAC, art. 7 (4)</b> “[...] maintain and strengthen systems that promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interest.”</p>
8	21	<p>The IEC, through 264 DEC campaign monitors, also tracked local campaign expenditures and produced cost estimates, which the oversight committee compared with lists’ reported spending. While the campaign monitors were able to estimate in-person campaigning costs, spending on social media was not monitored. (...) All campaign expenses incurred by parties, lists, candidates and third parties, should be accounted for, including on media and social media.</p>	<p>Campaign finance oversight authorities to use available tools to monitor online spending.</p>	<p>No legal change required</p>	<p>IEC</p>	<p><b>Transparency and access to information/ Prevention of corruption/Fairness in the election campaign</b></p> <p><b>UNCAC, art. 7 (4)</b> “[...] maintain and strengthen systems that promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interest.”</p> <p><b>ICCPR HRC GC 25. Para. 19</b> “Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party.”</p>

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<b>MEDIA</b>						
9 P	22	<p>Penal Code and Cybercrime Law include multiple articles criminalising defamation that may limit freedom of speech and lead to self-censorship among the media community and political actors, including during the election campaign.</p>	<p><b>Priority recommendation – Decriminalise defamation in the Cybercrime Law, the Press and Publications Law and Penal Code to ensure due exercise of the freedom of expression, in line with international standards.</b></p>	<p>Penal Code  Press and Publications Law Cybercrime Law</p>	<p>Legislature Ministry of Government Communication</p>	<p><b>Freedom of opinion and expression</b>  <b>ICCPR, Article 19</b> <i>1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. (...)</i></p> <p><b>ICCPR, HRC GC 34, para. 20</b> <i>“The free communication of information and ideas about public and political issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential. This implies a free press and other media able to comment on public issues and to inform public opinion without censorship or restraint.”</i></p>

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						<p>Universal Periodic Review (4<sup>th</sup> Cycle, 2024)  <b>Recommendation 136.43</b>  <i>“Ensure protection of freedom of expression including for journalists and other members of civil society so that they have the ability to speak freely, including to criticize the Government”</i>  <b>and Recommendation 136.55</b>  <i>Protect freedom of expression and the press, including revising restrictive laws and ensuring a safe environment for journalists</i>  <b>Recommendation 137.44</b>  <i>“Guarantee and protect the right to freedom of expression by amending all provisions that criminalize the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression</i></p> <p>Communication by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (OL JOR 3/2018), 7 December 2018</p>

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
						<p><i>“...the continued existence of criminal defamation under article 11 of the Cybercrime Law No.27 remains problematic. Article 11 states that internet users can face a jail term of no less than three months and a 2-maximum fine of JD 2000 (...), if they are found guilty of defamation on social media or online media outlets.</i></p>
10	23	<p>The Media Commission is governed by a director, nominated by the Minister of Government Communication and appointed by the Prime Minister which undermines the independence of the media regulatory body.</p>	<p>Ensure independent and transparent functioning of the Media Commission by establishing an independent board of members appointed by media professionals, such as balanced representatives of private and state media outlets, independent media organisations, independent legal experts and representatives of relevant state agencies.</p>	<p>Audio visual Law  Press and Publications Law</p>	<p>Legislature  Ministry of Government Communication</p>	<p><b>Freedom of opinion and Expression/ Transparency and right to access information</b></p> <p><b>UN (OHCHR), OAS, OSCE: Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age, para. 1.b.ii</b>  <i>“Any administrative body which has the power to oversee rules relating to the media during election periods should be independent of the government and its decisions should be subject to timely judicial review.”</i></p> <p><b>Article 19: Joint Declaration by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE</b></p>

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						<p><b>Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression (2003), p. 31</b>  <i>“All public authorities which exercise formal regulatory powers over the media should be protected against interferences, particularly of a political or economic nature, including by an appointments process for members which is transparent, allows for public input and is not controlled by any particular political party.”</i></p> <p><b>ICCPR, HRC GC 34, para. 39</b> stipulates a regulatory framework that respects freedom of expression, “a necessary condition for... transparency and accountability”</p> <p><b>Universal Periodic Review (4th Cycle, 2024)</b>  <b>Recommendation 136.49</b>  <i>“Review the Press and Publications Act to guarantee effective enforcement with the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press.”</i></p>

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11	23	<p>Legislation does not include provisions on free airtime and political advertising. Many political actors, especially outside Amman, cannot afford political advertising. Several political parties were able to present their programmes for free only shortly before the end of the campaign.</p>	<p>Develop and enact a legal, regulatory, and operational framework for free and equitable airtime for contestants in public media to provide voters with accessible and comprehensive information on electoral contestants.</p>	<p>Amend the Election Law for the House of Representatives</p> <p>IEC Executive Instructions</p> <p>Audiovisual Law</p> <p>Press and Publications Law</p>	<p>Legislature</p> <p>Ministry of Government Communication</p> <p>IEC</p>	<p><b>Right and opportunity to participate in public affairs and hold office/ Transparency and right to access information/ Freedom of opinion and expression.</b></p> <p><b>International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression: Joint Statement on the Media and Elections, p. 2, para. 20.3</b></p> <p><i>“All publicly-owned media, including public service broadcasters, should be under the following obligations during an election period: To grant all parties and candidates equitable access to the media to communicate their messages directly with the public, either for free or at subsidised rates. Equitable access means fair and non-discriminatory access allocated according to objective criteria for measuring overall levels of support, and includes factors such as timing of access</i></p>

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						<p><i>and any fees.”</i></p> <p><b>UN (Center for Human Rights): Human Rights and Elections: A Handbook on the Legal, Technical, and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, para. 120</b></p> <p><i>“Fair media access implies not only equality of time and space allotted, but also attention to the hour of broadcasting (i.e. prime-time versus late broadcasting) and the placement of printed advertisements (i.e. front page versus back page).”</i></p>
12	24	<p>Most media failed to provide objective, comprehensive and balanced coverage of the electoral contestants during the campaign.</p>	<p>Provide training and professional development courses for media professionals to equip them with the knowledge and skills necessary to produce balanced, ethical and comprehensive journalism during elections.</p>	<p>No legal change required</p>	<p>CSOs Media Ministry of Government Communication Jordan Press Association</p>	<p><b>Transparency and right to access information.</b></p> <p><b>Article 19: Joint Declaration on Diversity in Broadcasting by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and the ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom</b></p>

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						<p><b>of Expression and Access to Information (2007), p. 46</b>  <i>“Sufficient ‘space’ should be allocated to broadcasting uses on different communications platforms to ensure that, as a whole, the public is able to receive a range of diverse broadcasting services...Different types of broadcasters – commercial, public service and community – should be able to operate on, and have equitable access to, all available distribution platforms.”</i></p> <p><b>Universal Periodic Review (4th Cycle, 2024)</b>  <b>Recommendation 136.50</b>  <i>“Strengthen communication channels and build trust with the public and the media, and create the appropriate climate to improve the media system and develop its tools”.</i></p>
<b>SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL RIGHTS</b>						
13 P	26	The current Cybercrime Law in Jordan includes vague provisions on “false news” and “hate speech,” which can be	<b>Priority recommendation:</b> <b>Amend the Cybercrime Law to align with international human rights commitments through</b>	Amend Cybercrime Law definitions of “false news” and “hate speech,”		<b>Freedom of Expression/ Rule of Law</b>  <b>ICCPR, Article 19</b>



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		broadly interpreted, risking the suppression of free speech, media freedom, and targeting of journalists. In addition, severe penalties and lack of privacy protections undermine civil liberties.	<b>consultations with key stakeholders, including civil society and media professionals, ensuring any definitions and application of "false news," "hate speech," and "provoking strife," do not entail arbitrary interpretation or implementation and are consistent with protecting freedom of expression. Include safeguards to prevent misuse of the law against journalists and individuals expressing critical opinions, while ensuring the law operates to protect, rather than suppress, public discourse.</b>	Privacy protection measures, proportional penalties, and specific protections for journalists.	Legislature	<b>Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004), Article 32 Rabat Plan of Action (2012)</b> on combating hate speech, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression standards on the protection of journalists, and United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which call for lawful, necessary, and proportionate restrictions to protect both security and human rights.
<b>PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN</b>						
14	28	The increased number of reserved seats in the LED and the preferential seats in GED lists had a positive impact on the representation of women. The EL foresees that GED seats expand at the expense of LED seats in future HoR. However,	Enhance the representation of women and youth by, among other measures, increasing their opportunities to stand for election through more preferential placements on General Electoral Districts lists.	Amend the Election Law for the House of Representatives art. 8	Legislature	<b>Women's participation in public affairs/ Equality between men and women</b>  <b>CEDAW, art. 7:</b> <i>"Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and</i>

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		<p>there is currently no roadmap for the preferential and reserved seats in this process. Without expanding these preferential seats while maintaining the quota seats, the representation of women is likely to stall or decline in future parliaments.</p>				<p><i>public life and shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right to vote and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies.</i></p> <p><b>And Art. 4.1.</b> <i>“Adoption by State Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women.”</i></p>
<b>PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES</b>						
15 P	31	<p>Despite dedicated efforts to improve voting access for PwD through the expansion of QPCs, many polling stations, including those within QPCs, remained physically inaccessible. The EL does not stipulate reasonable accommodation for cases where accessibility is insufficient. The Executive Instructions foreseen in EL art 42 have not been adopted.</p>	<p><b>Priority Recommendation - Improve access and opportunity to vote for persons with disabilities by ensuring independent access to polling stations and establish legal provisions for reasonable accommodation in cases where access is insufficient. Increase the numbers of accessible centres.</b></p>	<p>Amend the Election Law for the House of Representatives</p> <p>and</p> <p>IEC Executive Instructions</p>	<p>Legislature</p> <p>IEC</p>	<p><b>Right and opportunity to vote</b> <b>Freedom from Discrimination</b> <i>CPRD, art. 29: “States Parties shall [...] undertake to: a) Ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life [...] by: i. Ensuring that voting procedures, facilities and materials are appropriate, accessible and easy to understand and use.”</i></p> <p><b>ICCPR GC 25, para. 11:</b></p>

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						<p><i>“Voter education and registration campaigns are necessary to ensure the effective exercise of article 25 rights by an informed community.”</i></p>
16	31	<p>The political participation of PwD is very limited. Although an estimated 12 per cent of Jordan's population has a disability, the IEC had information of only 7,696 disabled voters (0.15 per cent of the electorate). The information about the possibility to change PC was insufficient and few PwD used this opportunity. Organisations of Persons with Disabilities were insufficiently involved in both the process of gathering information about PwD voters and disseminating information about the possibility to change polling stations.</p>	<p>Enhance access and voting opportunities for persons with disabilities by developing a comprehensive operational framework for information collection, dissemination, and targeted outreach for civic and voter education in collaboration with the Higher Council of persons with Disabilities and organisations of persons with disabilities.</p>	<p>No legal change required</p>	<p>IEC in coordination with Higher Council of persons with Disabilities and Organisations of Persons with Disabilities</p>	<p><b>Right and opportunity to vote</b> <b>Freedom from Discrimination</b> <b>CPRD, art. 29:</b> <i>“States Parties shall [...] undertake to: a) Ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life [...] by: i. Ensuring that voting procedures, facilities and materials are appropriate, accessible and easy to understand and use.”</i></p> <p><b>ICCPR GC 25, para. 11:</b> <i>“Voter education and registration campaigns are necessary to ensure the effective exercise of article 25 rights by an informed community.”</i></p>
<b>CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION</b>						
17 P	32	<p>The activities of domestic and international observers are not</p>	<p><b>Priority Recommendation - Incorporate into the Election</b></p>		IEC	<b>Transparency</b>

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		<p>regulated in the EL, but in two IEC Executive Instructions, potentially compromising the legal certainty of observer’s rights. The regulations indicate unequal treatment of international and domestic observers, as the right of domestic observers to observe all phases of the electoral process is not explicitly stated, as it is for international observers.</p>	<p><b>Law the rights of domestic and international observers to unhindered access to the entire electoral process.</b></p>	<p>Amend the Election Law for the House of Representatives</p>		<p><b>ICCPR, HRC GC no. 25, para. 8:</b> “Citizens also take part in the conduct of public affairs by exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with their representatives or through their capacity to organize themselves. This participation is supported by ensuring freedom of expression, assembly and association.”</p> <p><b>ICCPR, HRC GC no. 25, para. 20:</b> “There should be independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process and access to judicial review or other equivalent process so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the counting of the votes.”</p> <p><b>UNCAC, Article 10:</b> “Each State party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, take such measures as may be necessary to enhance transparency in its</p>

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						<p><i>public administration, including with regard to its organization, functioning and decision-making processes, where appropriate (...)</i></p> <p><b>IPU Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Election, 26 March 1994:</b> “(7) States should take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure the transparency of the entire electoral process including, for example, through the presence of party agents and duly accredited observers.”</p>
<b>VOTING COUNTING AND TABULATIONS OF RESULTS</b>						
18	37	While the results publication process was speedy, no information on blank and invalid votes was initially published. (...) Based on data provided by the IEC to the EOM that was not made public, there were large differences in turnout between LEDs	Guarantee transparency, accountability and voters’ right to information by prescribing in law the publication of results to include information on blank and invalid votes and turnout per electoral district and specify the deadlines for publication of results.	Amend Election Law for the House of Representatives	Legislature	<p><b>Transparency and Predictability</b></p> <p><b>ICCPR, Article 25:</b> “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (...) (b) To vote and to be elected at</p>

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						<p><i>genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (...)</i></p> <p><b>UNCAC, Article 10:</b> “<i>Each State party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, take such measures as may be necessary to enhance transparency in its public administration, including with regard to its organization, functioning and decision-making processes, where appropriate (...)</i>”</p> <p><b>ICCPR, HRC GC no. 34, para. 19</b> “<i>States parties should proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest. States parties should make every effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such information.</i>”</p>

**EU Election Observation Mission to Jordan**  
**Elections to the House of Representatives, 10 September 2024**

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**A. ANNEXES**

**A.1 Number of eligible voters and turnout (baseline: 2016)**

Year	Number of eligible voters	Votes cast
2016	4,130,145	1,492,400
2020	4,647,835 (+12.5%)	1,378,711 (-7.6%)
2024	5,080,858 (+23%)	1,638,351 (+9.8%)

**A.2 LED Votes per Seat and Lost Votes**

LED	Eligible Voters	Votes per Seat	Actual Voters	Threshold 7%	Passed Threshold	Votes for Lists over Threshold	Lost Votes	Blank	Invalid
Ajloun	114,300	29,000	61,948	4,336	2 of 7	27,881	26,958	5,660	1,449
Amman 1	617,759	103,000	120,515	8,437	5 of 10	87,171	17,567	14,221	1,156
Amman 2	852,487	107,000	155,953	10,917	4 of 9	93,471	40,580	19,870	2,032
Amman 3	484,055	81,000	105,423	7,380	4 of 13	67,788	24,645	11,308	1,682
Aqaba	80,760	27,000	30,744	2,152	2 of 8	16,465	10,734	3,188	357
Balqa	352,948	44,000	143,839	10,069	6 of 11	112,826	6,170	22,100	2,743
Central Badia	76,322	25,000	38,804	2,716	2 of 9	13,228	19,598	5,439	539
Irbid 1	569,974	71,000	197,014	13,971	7 of 12	128,932	33,086	30,924	4,072
Irbid 2	324,321	46,000	138,918	9,724	5 of 11	89,755	25,075	20,604	3,484
Jerash	129,236	32,000	71,386	4,997	3 of 9	34,832	25,835	9,329	1,390
Karak	189,268	24,000	116,837	4,179	6 of 17	77,171	18,365	18,015	3,286
Maan	57,414	14,000	34,575	2,420	3 of 6	18,280	10,247	5,240	808
Madaba	126,381	32,000	59,964	4,197	2 of 10	19,351	33,209	6,115	1,289
Mafraq	110,932	28,000	57,808	4,046	3 of 6	40,126	8,648	7,962	1,072
North Badia	119,184	40,000	60,333	4,223	2 of 7	25,144	20,239	13,767	1,183
South Badia	85,952	29,000	52,897	3,703	2 of 5	29,202	12,825	10,224	646
Tafilah	61,996	15,000	33,943	2,376	3 of 11	13,310	14,428	5,415	790
Zarqa	727,569	73,000	157,450	11,021	6 of 11	121,413	13,405	20,346	2,286
<b>Jordan</b>	<b>5,080,858</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>1,638,351</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>105/172</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>361,614</b>	<b>229,727</b>	<b>30,264</b>

### A.3 Eligible Voters per LED

District	Voters	Women	Women %	Men	Men %
Amman 2	852,487	437,952	51.37%	414,535	48.63%
Zarqa	727,569	374,277	51.44%	353,292	48.56%
Amman 1	617,759	317,254	51.36%	300,505	48.64%
Irbid 1	569,974	299,092	52.47%	270,882	47.53%
Amman 3	484,055	255,523	52.79%	228,532	47.21%
Balqa	352,948	187,356	53.08%	165,592	46.92%
Irbid 2	324,321	178,285	54.97%	146,036	45.03%
Karak	189,268	104,272	55.09%	84,996	44.91%
Jerash	129,236	71,247	55.13%	57,989	44.87%
Madaba	126,381	67,413	53.34%	58,968	46.66%
North Badia	119,184	69,214	58.07%	49,970	41.93%
Ajloun	114,300	64,107	56.09%	50,193	43.91%
Mafrq	110,932	60,463	54.50%	50,469	45.50%
South Badia	85,952	48,851	56.84%	37,101	43.16%
Aqaba	80,760	41,072	50.86%	39,688	49.14%
Central Badia	76,322	45,244	59.28%	31,078	40.72%
Tafilah	61,996	34,830	56.18%	27,166	43.82%
Maan	57,414	30,016	52.28%	27,398	47.72%
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,080,858</b>	<b>2,686,468</b>	<b>52.87%</b>	<b>2,394,390</b>	<b>47.13%</b>

### A.4 Lists and Candidates per LED

	lists	candidates
Ajloun	7	26
Amman 1	10	57
Amman 2	9	71
Amman 3	13	71
Aqaba	8	23
Balqa	11	81
Central Badia	9	27
Irbid 1	12	96
Irbid 2	11	76
Jerash	9	36
Karak	17	114
Maan	6	23
Madaba	10	39
Mafrq	6	23
North Badia	7	21
South Badia	5	15
Tafilah	11	40
Zarqa	11	98
<b>total</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>937</b>



A.5 Average Number of Votes per Type of Seat

LED	Competitive seat	Women's seat	Christian seat	Chechen/ Circassian seat
Ajloun	7,913	9,837	8,916	-
Amman 1	9,592	18,774	-	-
Amman 2	14,803	27,184	23,726	-
Amman 3	10,467	15,314	-	14,420
Aqaba	6,509	6,410	-	-
Badia Central	5,820	5,055	-	-
Badia North	9,975	9,234	-	-
Badia South	8,667	11,926	-	-
Balqa	7,438	12,479	11,164	-
Irbid 1	10,072	15,819	-	-
Irbid 2	8,340	12,160	9,935	-
Jerash	7,262	9,307	-	-
Karak	5,926	9,331	7,977	-
Maan	5,320	5,592	-	-
Madaba	6,977	6,967	6,141	-
Mafraq	8,414	12,537	-	-
Tafilah	2,358	3,270	-	-
Zarqa	8,760	17,270	13,512	16,809

**A.6 Blank and Invalid Votes per Electoral District**

**Votes for the GED**

LED	eligible voters	invalid ballots	invalid ballots %	blank ballots	blank ballots %
Amman 1	120,519	1,556	1.29%	14,221	11.80%
Amman 2	155,953	2,032	1.30%	19,870	12.74%
Amman 3	105,423	1,682	1.60%	11,308	10.73%
Irbid 1	197,014	4,072	2.07%	30,924	15.70%
Irbid 2	138,918	3,484	2.51%	20,604	14.83%
Balqa	143,839	2,743	1.91%	22,100	15.36%
Karak	116,837	3,286	2.81%	18,015	15.42%
Maan	34,575	808	2.34%	5,240	15.16%
Zarqa	157,447	2,286	1.45%	20,346	12.92%
Mafrak	57,808	1,072	1.85%	7,962	13.77%
Tafilah	33,945	790	2.33%	5,415	15.95%
Madaba	59,964	1,289	2.15%	6,115	10.20%
Jerash	71,386	1,390	1.95%	9,329	13.07%
Ajloun	61,948	1,449	2.34%	5,660	9.14%
Aqaba	30,745	357	1.16%	3,188	10.37%
North Badia	60,333	1,183	1.96%	13,767	22.82%
Central Badia	38,805	539	1.39%	5,439	14.02%
South Badia	52,897	646	1.22%	10,224	19.33%
<b>Jordan</b>	<b>1,638,356</b>	<b>30,664</b>	<b>1.87%</b>	<b>229,727</b>	<b>14.02%</b>

**Votes for the LED**

LED	eligible voters	invalid ballots	invalid ballots %	blank ballots	blank ballots %
Amman 1	120,519	3,014	2.50%	2,509	2.08%
Amman 2	155,953	3,767	2.42%	3,569	2.29%
Amman 3	105,423	3,113	2.95%	3,000	2.85%
Irbid 1	197,014	6,239	3.17%	4,630	2.35%
Irbid 2	138,918	4,362	3.14%	4,006	2.88%
Balqa	143,839	4,421	3.07%	2,034	1.41%
Karak	116,837	3,232	2.77%	1,912	1.64%
Maan	34,575	984	2.85%	628	1.82%
Zarqa	157,447	4,372	2.78%	2,854	1.81%
Mafrak	57,808	1,941	3.36%	1,288	2.23%
Tafilah	33,945	1,584	4.67%	551	1.62%
Madaba	59,964	3,530	5.89%	692	1.15%
Jerash	71,386	2,170	3.04%	1,245	1.74%
Ajloun	61,948	2,158	3.48%	1,693	2.73%
Aqaba	30,745	649	2.11%	236	0.77%
North Badia	60,333	1,382	2.29%	1,004	1.66%
Central Badia	38,805	990	2.55%	564	1.45%
South Badia	52,897	612	1.16%	385	0.73%
<b>Jordan</b>	<b>1,638,356</b>	<b>48,520</b>	<b>2.96%</b>	<b>32,800</b>	<b>2.00%</b>


A.7 Turnout per LED, from highest to lowest

LED	eligible voters	actual voters	turnout
Karak	189,268	116,837	61.73%
South Badia	85,952	52,897	61.54%
Maan	57,414	34,575	60.22%
Jerash	129,236	71,386	55.24%
Tafilah	61,996	33,943	54.75%
Ajloun	114,300	61,948	54.20%
Mafraq	110,932	57,808	52.11%
Central Badia	76,322	38,804	50.84%
North Badia	119,184	60,333	50.62%
Madaba	126,381	59,964	47.45%
Irbid 2	324,321	138,918	42.83%
Balqa	352,948	143,839	40.75%
Aqaba	80,760	30,744	38.07%
Irbid 1	569,974	197,014	34.57%
<b>Jordan</b>	<b>5,080,858</b>	<b>1,638,351</b>	<b>32.25%</b>
Amman 3	484,055	105,423	21.78%
Zarqa	727,569	157,450	21.64%
Amman 1	617,759	120,515	19.51%
Amman 2	852,487	155,953	18.29%


A.8 Turnout in the 2016, 2020 and 2024 Elections

Governorate	2016			2020			2024		
	eligible voters	actual voters	turnout	eligible voters	actual voters	turnout	eligible voters	actual voters	turnout
Ajloun	101,112	59,333	58.68%	114,980	56,815	49.41%	114,300	61,948	54.20%
Amman	1,557,385	362,416	23.27%	1,729,506	283,474	16.39%	1,954,301	381,891	19.54%
Aqaba	55,819	23,817	42.67%	63,891	24,127	37.76%	80,760	30,744	38.07%
Balqa	297,818	124,614	41.84%	335,921	121,849	36.27%	352,948	143,839	40.75%
Central Badia	56,102	35,587	63.43%	64,666	36,661	56.69%	76,322	38,804	50.84%
Irbid	748,752	319,278	42.64%	841,742	309,635	36.79%	894,295	335,932	37.56%
Jerash	107,637	62,403	57.98%	122,493	62,295	50.86%	129,236	71,386	55.24%
Karak	167,280	103,451	61.84%	188,801	103,056	54.58%	189,268	116,837	61.73%
Maan	53,217	27,768	52.18%	59,359	29,797	50.20%	57,414	34,575	60.22%
Madaba	106,370	50,255	47.25%	119,404	53,826	45.08%	126,381	59,964	47.45%
Mafraq	95,055	50,391	53.01%	109,688	49,749	45.36%	110,932	57,808	52.11%
North Badia	83,914	51,023	60.80%	98,026	55,571	56.69%	119,184	60,333	50.62%
South Badia	64,039	43,788	68.38%	73,868	48,559	65.74%	85,952	52,897	61.54%
Tafilah	54,638	32,574	59.62%	63,067	31,067	49.26%	61,996	33,943	54.75%
Zarqa	581,007	145,702	25.08%	655,231	121,230	18.50%	727,569	157,450	21.64%
<b>Jordan</b>	<b>4,130,145</b>	<b>1,492,400</b>	<b>36.13%</b>	<b>4,640,643</b>	<b>1,387,711</b>	<b>29.90%</b>	<b>5,080,858</b>	<b>1,638,351</b>	<b>32.25%</b>

**A.9 Official Results HoR**



**A.10 GED Winners**



**A.11 Number of Votes in the GED**

<b>List nr.</b>	<b>List name</b>	<b>Number of votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
1	Etihad (Union)	66,227	4.04%
2	National Construction	26,090	1.59%
3	Construction and Labour	37,068	2.26%
4	Namaa and Labor Parties Alliance	45,859	2.80%
5	National Development Party	27,909	1.70%
6	Jordanian National Democratic Alliance	17,939	1.09%
7	Taqaddam (Progress)	61,199	3.74%
8	Al Mithaq (Charter)	93,680	5.72%
9	National Islamic Party	87,519	5.34%
10	Future and Life Party	26,091	1.59%
11	Renaissance Alliance	12,354	0.75%
12	New Approach	17,622	1.08%
13	Labour (Workers) Party	50,142	3.06%
14	Blessed Land Party	50,244	3.07%
15	Justice and Reform Party	20,023	1.22%
16	Unionists and National Constitutional Alliance	14,239	0.87%
17	IAF	464,350	28.34%
18	Azm (Determination)	41,891	2.56%
19	Jordanian Shoura Party	11,968	0.73%
20	Vision Party	26,000	1.59%
21	Eradah (Will)	75,121	4.59%
22	Jordanian Communist Party	38,633	2.36%
23	Renaissance and Labor Party	8,330	0.51%
24	Democratic Current Alliance (Social Democrats and Civil Democrats)	23,551	1.44%
25	National Loyalty (Alwafa' Al Watani)	34,076	2.08%

A.12 Number of Seats received in LED

List name	Number of elected LED candidates	Number of elected candidates per district
Al Mithaq	17	Amman 1: 2 Amman 2: 2 Amman 3: 1 Irbid 1: 2 Irbid 2: 2 North Badia: 1 Balqa: 2 Ajloun: 1 Mafraq: 1 Karak: 3 Maan: 1
Eradah	16	Amman 1: 1 Amman 2: 1 Irbid 1: 1 Irbid 2: 2 Zarqa: 3 Central Badia: 1 Jerash: 2 Balqa: 1 Karak: 1 Tafilah: 2 Maan: 1
IAF	14	Amman1: 2 Amman 2: 4 Amman 3: 3 Zarqa: 2 Irbid 1: 1 Aqaba: 2
Taqaddum	5	Irbid 1: 2 Madaba: 1 Jerash: 1 Zarqa: 1
National Islamic Party	4	Amman 1: 1 Amman 3: 1 Zarqa: 1 Tafilah: 1
Azm	3	Madaba: 1 South Badia: 1 Zarqa: 1
Etihad	2	Amman 2: 1 Salt: 1
Jordanian Civil Democratic Party	1	Balqa
Youth Party	1	Irbid 1

## **B. MEDIA ANNEX**

### **MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS**

Starting from 6 August, the EU EOM systematically monitored a sample of national media. The sample comprised 15 outlets with a close to a nationwide reach. Those were two state-owned TV channels (*Jordan TV* and *Al Mamlaka*), one privately owned TV channel (*Roya TV*), two state-owned (*Jordan Radio*, *Hala Radio*) and three private radio stations (*Al Balad*, *Noon*, *Hayat*), two state-owned (*Petra* and *Al Rai*) and five privately owned news websites (*Alanbat*, *Altaj*, *Assabeel*, *Khaberni*, *Roya News*).

Media monitoring included quantitative and qualitative analysis of the coverage of campaign and other socio-political issues, assessing the amount of time and space allocated to party candidates, political parties, public officials, and other politically relevant subjects. The tone of the coverage and the gender balance across the media landscape was also evaluated. The latter contributed to the EU EOM's assessment of female participation in the public and political life. The monitoring also registered voter education campaigns in the media. All monitored media broadcast were in Arabic.

#### **1. The EU EOM monitoring results for broadcast media with a nation-wide reach**

The quantitative monitoring was done from 6 August to 8 September, and stopped during the campaign silence day, election day, as well as during the announcement of the results when only qualitative analysis was then performed. On campaign silence day, 9 September, only voter education content was coded and election silence breach was registered.

The broadcast media monitoring focused on programmes aired during the prime-time hours:

- For radio stations – from 07:00 to 08:00, 12:00 to 14:30 in the afternoon, and from 18:00 to midnight, depending on a radio station.
- For television channels –from 18:00 to 00:00.

##### **1.1. Total time allocated to political communication in national broadcast media's primetime programming**


During the 34-days' monitoring period, the EU EOM coded TV broadcasts lasting 615 hours in total, with 97 hours of political and election-related content. The EU EOM coded radio broadcasts lasting 1,530 hours in total with 51 hours of political and election-related content.

Chart 1 demonstrates the share of political and electoral content on broadcast media coded by the Media Monitoring Unit (MMU).

Chart 1.

## Volume of political and electoral coverage

Media monitoring period 06 August 2024 - 08 September 2024. TV 18:00 - 00:00, Radio 07:00-10:00,14:00-20:00



TV: Al Mamlaka Pol/Elect. coverage: 129419 seconds, Jordan TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 107044 seconds, Roya TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 120419 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each TV: 734400 seconds. Radio: Jordan Radio Pol/Elect. coverage: 98657 seconds, Radio Al Balad Pol/Elect. coverage: 37020 seconds, Radio Hala Pol/Elect. coverage: 8685 seconds, Radio Hayat Pol/Elect. coverage: 27053 seconds, Radio Noon Pol/Elect. coverage: 10761 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each RADIO: 1101600 seconds

Source: EU EOM Jordan 2024 MMU


Chart 2 demonstrates the programme format used by broadcast in their electoral coverage. State-owned *Al Mamlaka* channels primarily covered election-related issues in their news programmes, whereas the state-owned *Jordan TV* and private *Roya TV* mostly covered them in their editorials. *Radio Noon* devoted a large portion of its airtime to political advertising, hence reducing voters access to journalistic coverage of elections. Such editorial policy undermines the main principle of media to inform the audience on the newsworthy events in a balanced manner. Positively, *Jordan TV* and *Al Mamlaka* devoted a notable share of their prime-time programmes to voter education among TVs; and similarly for *Jordan Radio* and *Radio Hala* among radios.



Chart 2.

### Political and electoral coverage by format in broadcast media

Media monitoring period 06 August 2024 - 08 September 2024.



TV: Al Mamlaka Pol/Elect. coverage: 129419 seconds, Jordan TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 107044 seconds, Roya TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 120419 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each TV: 734400 seconds. Radio: Jordan Radio Pol/Elect. coverage: 98657 seconds, Radio Al Balad Pol/Elect. coverage: 37020 seconds, Radio Hala Pol/Elect. coverage: 8685 seconds, Radio Hayat Pol/Elect. coverage: 27053 seconds, Radio Noon Pol/Elect. coverage: 10761 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each RADIO: 1101600 seconds

Source: EU EOM Jordan 2024 MMU


### 1.2. Exposure of political actors in broadcast media

Chart 3 shows the proportional distribution of time among various political and electoral actors within the prime-time programmes of editorial choice and news. Coverage of the IEC was dominant in all monitored broadcast media, especially in state-owned *Jordan Radio* and *Radio Hala*, and with approximately half of the coverage in state-owned *Al Mamlaka* and *Jordan TV*.

Chart 3.

**Electoral actors coverage by broadcast media**

Media monitoring period 06.08.2024 - 08.09.2024



Percentage of total time measured in seconds. TV: Al Mamlaka Pol/Elect. coverage: 129419 seconds, Jordan TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 107044 seconds, Roya TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 120419 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each TV: 734400 seconds. Radio: Jordan Radio Pol/Elect. coverage: 98657 seconds, Radio Al Balad Pol/Elect. coverage: 37020 seconds, Radio Hala Pol/Elect. coverage: 8685 seconds, Radio Hayat Pol/Elect. coverage: 27053 seconds, Radio Noon Pol/Elect. coverage: 10761 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each RADIO: 1101600 seconds

Source: EU EOM Jordan 2024 MMU


**1.4. Gender balance in broadcast media**

Chart 4 demonstrates the gender balance across monitored media, exemplifying underrepresentation of female candidates. Regrettably, *Radio Noon*, *Radio Hala* and *Radio Hayat* did not feature any content with female politicians.

Chart 4.

### Coverage of the candidate by gender in broadcast media

Media monitoring period 06 August 2024 - 08 September 2024



TV: Al Mamlaka Pol/Elect. coverage: 129419 seconds, Jordan TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 107044 seconds, Roya TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 120419 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each TV: 734400 seconds. Radio: Jordan Radio Pol/Elect. coverage: 98657 seconds, Radio Al Balad Pol/Elect. coverage: 37020 seconds, Radio Hala Pol/Elect. coverage: 8685 seconds, Radio Hayat Pol/Elect. coverage: 27053 seconds, Radio Noon Pol/Elect. coverage: 10761 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each RADIO: 1101600 seconds

Source: EU EOM Jordan 2024 MMU

#### 1.5. Voter information across the monitored broadcast media


During the 34-day campaign period, a total of 447 voter education clips were broadcasted by the monitored TV stations and 448 jingles aired on the radio.

Chart 5 shows the proportional distribution of voter education clips per sponsoring organisation. IEC was definitely a leader in the number of voter education clips aired by the broadcast media. State and private media produced their own voter education materials, taking thus an active part in voter awareness process. In many cases, both state-owned and private media produced the content of the featured voter education material.

Chart 5.

### Voter education across the monitored broadcast media

Media Monitoring Period 06.08.2024 - 10.09.2024



Percentage of total time measured in seconds  
Source: EU EOM Jordan 2024 MMU

Chart 6 demonstrates the topics of the voter education clips on both monitored radio and TV stations. Predominately, it included ‘encouraging to vote’ and general information on the procedures, followed by jingles about the participation of women and youth.

Chart 6.

### Voter education across the monitored broadcast media by topic

Media Monitoring Period 06.08.2024 - 10.09.2024



TV: Al Mamlaka Pol/Elect. coverage: 129419 seconds, Jordan TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 107044 seconds, Roya TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 120419 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each TV: 734400 seconds. Radio: Jordan Radio Pol/Elect. coverage: 98657 seconds, Radio Al Balad Pol/Elect. coverage: 37020 seconds, Radio Hala Pol/Elect. coverage: 8685 seconds, Radio Hayat Pol/Elect. coverage: 27053 seconds, Radio Noon Pol/Elect. coverage: 10761 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each RADIO: 1101600 seconds  
Source: EU EOM Jordan 2024 MMU

## 1.6. Political advertisement in broadcast media


Roya TV was the only TV channel which aired paid political advertising. Chart 12 shows share of political advertising videos placed on Roya TV, where Democratic Current Alliance dominated among other parties, featured on Roya TV.

Chart 7.

### Political advertising on Roya TV

Media monitoring period 06 August 2024 - 08 September 2024

Democratic Current Alliance   AlMithaq   Etihad   Taqaddum   National Islamic Party   Eradah



Percentage of the total time measured in seconds. Roya TV Pol/Elect. coverage: 120419 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each TV: 734400 seconds

Source: EU EOM Jordan 2024 MMU


Chart 8 demonstrates political advertising aired on radio stations. Monitored radio stations featured different combination of parties, depending on the radio station. Thus, *Jordan Radio* featured *Al Mithaq* and *Etihad*, *Al Balad* – Democratic Current Alliance and IAF, *Radio Hayat* – IAF, *Eradah*, *Al Mithaq* and *Etihad*, *Radio Noon* – *Azm* and National Islamic Party.

Chart 8.

## Political advertising on monitored radio stations

Media monitoring period 06 August 2024 - 08 September 2024

■ AlMithaq 
 ■ Etihad 
 ■ Azm 
 ■ Democratic Current Alliance 
 ■ Eradah 
 ■ Islamic Action Front 
 ■ National Islamic Party



Percentage of total time measured in seconds

Chart: Jordan Radio Pol/Elect. coverage: 98657 seconds, Radio Al Balad Pol/Elect. coverage: 37020 seconds, Radio Hala Pol/Elect. coverage: 8685 seconds, Radio Hayat Pol/Elect. coverage: 27053 seconds, Radio Noon Pol/Elect. coverage: 10761 seconds, Total monitored coverage for each RADIO: 1101600 seconds • Source: EU EOM Jordan 2024 MMU

## 2. The EU EOM monitoring results for websites with a nation-wide reach


*Al Rai*, *Alanbat*, *Altaj*, *Assabeel*, *Khaberni*, *Petra*, *Roya news* were monitored from 6 August to 8 September on a quantitative basis and qualitative basis. To analyse news websites' coverage of the elections, media monitors measured space allocated to political actors on each website in pixels.

### 2.1. Allocation of space to electoral content on news websites

Chart 9 shows the allocation of space devoted to election-related content on news web-sites. Monitored web-sites focused predominantly on the news articles while informing their readers about elections. State-owned *Al Rai* and *Petra* news agency featured voter education content, whereas private *Assabeel* and *Khaberni* published a few materials on that topic. Remarkably, privately owned *Altaj* and *Khaberni* devoted approximately half of its election-related online space to political advertising.

## Political and electoral coverage by format on news websites

Media monitoring period 06.08.2024 - 08.09.2024



Percentage of total space measured in pixels  
 Chart: EU EOM Jordan 2024 MMU • Created with Datawrapper


### 2.2. Exposure of electoral and political actors on news websites

Chart 10 demonstrates the allocation of space to political actors on news websites, where coverage of IEC dominated the online space, followed by the Government on state-owned *Petra News Agency* and *Al Rai*, and by *Al Mithaq* in case of *Khaberni*, *Altaj*, *Alanbat* and *Roya News*. *Khaberni* and *Altaj* news also devoted much coverage to *Eradah*. Remaining parties were very much underrepresented in the articles of the online websites.

*Chart 10.*

**Electoral actors coverage by news websites**

Media monitoring period 06.08.2024 - 08.09.2024



Percentage of total space measured in pixels

Source: EU EOM Jordan 2024 MMU · Created with Datawrapper




C. SOCIAL MEDIA ANNEX

Social Media Environment in Jordan

With 91 per cent internet penetration, over 6.38 million Jordanians use social media. Facebook dominates with 5.3 million users, followed by X with 1 million.

Graph 1

Internet Users (Social Media Platforms) - Jordan 2024



Source: Datareportal

Findings from the EU EOM Social Media Monitoring Unit

The monitoring sample included 106 candidates from 36 political parties, along with 43 independent candidates, covering both local and national lists, with special attention paid to issues like misinformation, hate speech, and online gender violence.

Methodology

Data from Facebook and X was sourced from **Crowdtangle**, **SentiOne** and **Tweetdeck** in the period between 5 August and 10 September 2024. A total of 2,988 Facebook posts and 1,581 Twitter (X) posts published by sampled political parties and candidates were analysed.

Table1. Platform & Tools Used in Monitoring - Jordan 2024

Observed domain	Platform	Tool
Campaign	Facebook	Sentione
	Facebook	CrowdTangle
	Twitter (X)	Sentione
	Twitter (X)	Tweetdeck
Advertisement	Facebook	Meta Ad library

**Table 2. Projects on Sentione with Description - Jordan 2024**

Sentione Projects	Description
Keywords Related to the Mission	To monitor any posts and words attacking the European Election Observation Mission
Candidates	To monitor election related posts published by candidates (sample)
Election Day	To monitor posts related to Election Day and all violations related to it.
IEC	To monitor posts published by the Independent Election Commission
Keywords	Keywords related to the election
Media	Posted related to the election published by Media on Facebook and X (TV pages, news agencies ... )
Mission Accounts	To monitor the posts published by the mission itself and the reactions
Political Parties	To monitor election related posts published by the political parties (all parties)
Twitter	To monitor posts published by candidates and political parties

**Table 3. Social Media Accounts monitored (277)**

List of Social Media Accounts	Facebook pages	X (Formerly Twitter)
Political Parties (Official Accounts)	33	6
Candidates Accounts	152	11
IEC	1	1
Media		28
Influencers		32
NGOs	7	6


**Type of Posts Used in Election Campaigning (Period from 05 August until 10 September 2024)**

During the election campaign, the IAF contributed 31.9 per cent of social media posts, followed by independents at 28.17 per cent. *Al Mithaq* accounted for 13.8 per cent. Other active parties included the National Unionist Current Party 8.3 per cent, Jordan Labour Party 4.3 per cent, and the Progress Party 4.1 per cent. Minor contributors like the National Islamic Party 0.98 per cent

and Azm Party 1.59 per cent posted less frequently, while several smaller parties contributed less than 1per cent.

**Graph 2**

**Parties Posts Percentage on Facebook**




Candidates predominantly used posts with photos and text, making up 52.57 per cent of content. Video posts with text followed at 18.12 per cent, while standalone videos accounted for 13.7 per cent. Photos without text made up 9.19 per cent, and simple text posts 3.3 per cent. Less common formats, such as live streams 1.68 per cent and photos with links 1.1 per cent, represented a smaller share, with other content types collectively under 1 per cent.

Graph 3

Percentage of Type of Posts by Party (Facebook & X)

Jordan (Period from 05 Aug 2024 until 10 Sep 2024)




Topics discussed by Political parties & political candidates on Facebook & Twitter (X)

During the campaign, self-branding dominated discussions, making up 55.96 per cent of posts. Voter education 6.32 per cent and economic issues 5.48 per cent were the next most frequent topics. Other key themes included Palestine 4.7 per cent, youth 3.04 per cent, public freedoms and human rights 2.26 per cent, and women’s issues 2.04 per cent as in the chart below:

Graph 4

Topics on Facebook - Political Parties

Main Topics have been discussed by Parties in their campaigns (Period between 05 Aug and 10 Sep 2024)



Candidates Ad Spending on Meta during the Campaign

Graph 5

### Amount Spent on Ads by Parties & Candidates (\$)

(Period from 05 Aug until 10 Sep 2024) - Meta Ad Library




Graph 6

### Amount Spent on Ads by Parties

(Period from 05 Aug until 10 Sep 2024) - Meta Ad Library

Legend: Democratic Current Bloc, Jordanian Communist Party, National Islamic Party, Islamic Action Front Party, National Unionist Party, Blessed Land Party, Construction and Labor Party, Jordanian Democratic People's Party, Justice Party, Jordan Labour, Labor Party, Alghad party, Jordanian Future and Life Party, National Charter Party, Will Party, Azm Party (Hizb 'Azm)




### Graph 7

#### Amount Spent on Ads by Candidates from National and Local List (\$)

(Period from 05 Aug until 10 Sep 2024) - Meta Ad Library

Local National




### Graph 8

#### Amount Spent on Local lists by Independent and Party Affiliated Candidates (\$)

(Period from 05 Aug until 10 Sep 2024) - Meta Ad Library

Affiliated Independents



**IEC Platform Interaction Overview**

Facebook generated the highest total engagement, with 23,792 interactions. Of these, 3,917 were comments, and 4,929 were shares. Instagram followed with a total of 2,993 interactions, including 845 comments. Twitter, while having the lowest overall engagement, accounted for 219 total interactions, with 16 comments and 85 retweets.

**Graph 9**

**IEC Platform Interaction Overview (Engagement, Comments, and Shares/Retweets)**



	Facebook	Instagram	Twitter
<b>Total Engagement</b>	<b>23792</b>	<b>2993</b>	<b>219</b>
comments	3,917	845	16
shares/ retweets	4,929	N/A	85

